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This dissertation examines how theatre and law have worked together to produce
and regulate gay male lives since the 1895 Oscar Wilde trials. I use the term “gay legal
theatre” to label an interdisciplinary body of texts and performances that include legal
trials and theatrical productions. Since the Wilde trials, gay legal theatre has entrenched
conceptions of gay men in transatlantic culture and influenced the laws governing gay
lives and same-sex activity. I explore crucial moments in the history of this unique
genre: the Wilde trials; the British theatrical productions performed on the cusp of the
1967 Sexual Offences Act; mainstream gay American theatre in the period preceding the
Stonewall Riots and during the AIDS crisis; and finally, the contemporary same-sex
marriage debate and the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges (2015).
The study shows that gay drama has always been in part a legal drama, and legal trials
involving gay and lesbian lives have often been infused with crucial theatrical elements
in order to legitimize legal gains for LGBT people.
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From Wilde to Obergefell:
Gay Legal Theatre, 1895-2015
Introduction
Since the trials of Oscar Wilde, how have theatre and law worked together to
shape constructions and regulations of gay men? This interdisciplinary study attempts to
provide some answers to that central question. As they have emerged over the last
several hundred years, sexual minorities have had a substantial relationship with legal
and theatrical stages.1 Specifically, the representation of gay male lives has often been
through a hybrid genre, legal theatre. Gay legal theatre has a hybrid composition that
potentially includes dramatic texts, theatrical performances, and legal texts and trials that
involve representations of gay characters. Since at least 1895, dramatizations of gay
characters have been inevitably enmeshed in legal regulations or implications; such
dramatizations have also potentially shaped laws related to homosexuality and gay lives.
Moreover, gay men have been performing in a theatrical history of legal trials that began
with seventeenth-century sodomy trials. This multi-faceted, legal-theatrical tradition has
evolved and culminated in the recent legalization of same-sex marriage in the United
Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and the United States.
On an abstract level, law and theatre perform essential rituals that are collective
acts of judgment within a community: punishing criminality; demanding atonement;
granting absolution; allowing forgiveness. These are the rituals that bestow or withhold
Alan Sinfield claims, “Theatre has been a particular site for the formation of dissident sexual identities”
(Out on Stage 1).
1
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humanity from individuals and groups. Legally, these rituals can encompass simply
written language, such as statutes, a judicial opinion, or a Constitutional Amendment; but
legal rituals also rise to the level of performative ceremony in the courtroom, ranging
from lawyers arguing motions in front of a judge, to the full-blown theatrical spectacle of
a trial performed for a community of spectators. The structure and function of theatre in
many ways mirror the rituals of a trial. Theatre also consistently capitalizes on emotions
that arise only in a small number of legal trials: imagination, compassion, and empathy.
Gay legal theatre consistently presents gay characters and issues in an inextricable and
culturally captivating web of legal and theatrical discourse.
In The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century
(2002), Shoshana Felman presents an interdisciplinary study of law and literature that has
opened up scholarly possibilities in the field of LGBT dramatic criticism. This
dissertation was inspired by Felman’s book because I saw how her approach could be
productively applied to gay drama, something she did not specifically address. When
Felman interpreted moments in twentieth-century trials as a form of literature, I felt
liberated to explore the interdisciplinary paths of this dissertation. Felman’s
categorization of what law and literature try respectively to accomplish is also helpful for
my purposes in this dissertation. She argues that law, especially significant trials, works
to “bridge over” and resolve the “abyss,” as she calls it—irresolvable conflicts and
traumas of race, gender, and sexuality—while literature revels in and exploits those
conflicts that ultimately have no certain solutions (95).
If, according to Felman, law attempts closure and literature exploits
indeterminacy, I am claiming that gay drama, because it is often obsessed with and
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infiltrated by the law, achieves status as a hybrid discourse. It is also queer in its
dynamic orientation toward the law: potentially reinforcing, potentially destabilizing.
Thus, gay drama has always been a form of legal theatre that can be performed in theaters
or courtrooms, but it is never wholly within or outside of legal and theatrical discourse.
Even when performed in a theater, these texts function in certain ways as authoritative
discourse, especially with regard to delimiting the cultural parameters of sexual
minorities. In turn, many of the contemporary trials involving gay and lesbian lives, as I
argue in Chapter Four on the same-sex marriage cases, utilize theatricality to compel
cultural attention and justify the law’s authority.
In this sense, I am exploring a particular genre that circulated most powerfully in
the period between the Wilde trials and the contemporary transatlantic legalization of
same-sex marriage. Most of my analysis focuses on gay male playwrights and dramatic
representations of gay men. The selected texts share important commonalities related to
the production, representation, and regulation of mainly gay male lives. LGBT, the
contemporary acronym meaning lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, is an admirably
inclusive term, and I use variants of the term strategically when I think they can apply,
but I try to be as specific as possible in every instance. I undertake a brief reading of a
lesbian drama, The Children’s Hour (1934), and in the final chapter my analysis focuses
on the gay and lesbian movement for marriage equality in the United States, reading the
landmark marriage equality case Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) as a form of gay and
lesbian theatre. To this extent, “gay and lesbian legal theatre” might also be an
appropriate title for this dissertation, but I think the specific history of lesbian theatre and
law deserves development in a future study. Bisexual characters do not play a large role
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in the study, except I suppose for some of the characters in Joe Orton’s plays, but there is
nothing in my analysis that would exclude bisexuals or bisexuality. Although I do not
engage with any plays that address transgender issues or represent transgender characters,
much of my analysis could very well be applied to transgender texts, characters, and legal
trials. Developing the ideas in my dissertation to include transgender history, drama, and
law could be a fruitful line of inquiry. I utilize the word “queer” throughout, especially
when I describe certain functions of a dramatic text or character; for example, I argue that
Mart Crowley’s play The Boys in the Band (1968) and Tony Kushner’s Angels in
America (1992) queer spaces (theatrical, national, and Constitutional). In that sense, I
mainly employ “queer” as a verb, as when I argue that Joe Orton’s plays queer the
cultural conception of the family.
A serious investigation of the relationship between gay drama and the law
concerns itself with four main modes of inquiry: 1) laws governing the representation of
gay desire, acts, and identities on the stage; 2) laws regulating homosexuality in the wider
culture; 3) theatre’s engagement with laws governing gay male sexuality in the culture
and on the stage; 4) the theatrical properties of legal performances that adjudicate gay
lives and rights. I address all four of these areas at some point in the following study.
I consider the Wilde trials as the beginning of the modern gay legal-theatrical
tradition; the trials are dramas that have always fascinated the transatlantic stage,
precipitating many later theatrical versions of and responses to them. However, the close,
sometimes inextricable, relationship between law and gay drama precedes Wilde,
beginning in earnest in the early modern period with Thomas Middleton’s play
Michaelmas Term (1605), in which legal language and metaphor serve as the container
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and representation of male homosexual desire.2 Capital sodomy trials echoed within the
cultural consciousness for generations, culminating most spectacularly in the trials of
Oscar Wilde. By the time Wilde was tried, the crime was no longer capital death, but still
required a punishment of hard labor. The Wilde trials were a particularly resonant kind
of social drama, a performative blend of legal procedure and theatrical self-presentation.
Since the Wilde trials, the law has always been a specter in the wings of gay
stages. The twentieth century began with strict legal controls on male homosexual
activity represented on the stage and practiced in the wider transatlantic culture. Nicholas
de Jongh’s pair of studies, Not in Front of the Audience: Homosexuality on Stage (1992)
and Politics, Prudery and Perversions: The Censoring of the English Stage 1901-1968
(2000) provide an invaluable companion for anyone attempting to navigate the maze of
laws governing modern theatrical censorship in the United States and the United
Kingdom. Not in Front of the Audience traces a transatlantic history of twentieth-century
gay male dramatic representations, charting how those representations were shaped by
and in response to the particular censorship laws governing stage portrayals of male
homosexuality. The book is a mixture of critical interpretations of gay male drama and a

2

Legal and homosexual dynamics are brought into prominent tension in Thomas Middleton’s play
Michaelmas Term (1605). The play involves the conflict between Master Richard Easy, a landowning
gentleman from Essex, and the merchant Quomodo who tries to trick Easy into giving up his land. In the
face of male homosociality morphing into homosexuality, Middleton erects an opposing dynamic of
legality. Law is used to police, contain, and potentially quash homosexual desire and expression. These
themes come into direct relief in the interpretation of the relationship between Easy, Quomodo, and the
merchant’s henchman Shortyard. Specifically, we can read Easy’s homosexual desire as being first
exploited and then contained in the play, in terms of a budding romance with Shortyard that is halted
through the use of legal discourse and practice. Michaelmas Term is a play about how sodomitical desire is
managed and contained through the linguistic and practical realm of law. For an analysis of law and
sexuality in the play, see W. Nicholas Knight, “Sex and Law Language in Middleton’s Michaelmas Term”
in ‘Accompaninge the players’: Essays Celebrating Thomas Middleton, 1580-1980. Ed. Kenneth
Friedenreich (New York: AMS Press, 1983): 89-108.
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legal-cultural history of the censorship laws as they changed over the years. It lays out
several major phases to the history of gay drama, the first being 1925-1958, the period in
which gay characters met with “[s]uicide, alcoholism, murder, mental breakdown, death,
imprisonment, ostracism, blackmail or mere misery…” (3). De Jongh demarcates 19581967 as the transitional stage: in 1958 the Lord Chamberlain in Britain allowed discreet,
“serious references” and representations on stage; the actual practice of male
homosexuality in private was eventually allowed with the Sexual Offences Act of 1967.
The 1967 Act marks the watershed moment in England and Wales for
decriminalizing private male homosexual activity.3 The Republic of Ireland would not
decriminalize homosexual activity until 1993,4 and the U.S. not until 20035. The Sexual
Offences Act was followed in 1968 by the Theatres Act, which abolished the Lord
Chamberlain’s censorship powers. It is interesting to note the close proximity of the
1967 Sexual Offences Act and the Theatres Act passed the next year. As soon as it
relaxed its regulation of private sexuality in the Sexual Offences Act, the state relaxed its
control over public performances, although they were still subject to existing obscenity
laws. The timing here shows the close relationship between the two sets of laws
governing the stage and wider culture.

3

The 1967 Sexual Offences Act did not extend to Scotland and Northern Ireland. In addition, the statute
did not apply to the merchant navy and the armed forces. See Jeffrey Weeks, Coming Out: Homosexual
Politics in Britain from the Nineteenth Century to the Present (London: Quartet, 1990), 176. Scotland did
not see homosexual decriminalization until The Criminal Justice Act of 1980. See Roger Davidson,
“Sexuality and the State: the Campaign for Scottish Homosexual Law Reform, 1967-80,” Contemporary
British History 20.4 (2006): 533-558. Northern Ireland did not decriminalize private homosexuality until
the Homosexual Offences Order of 1982 as a result of the case Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (1981) in the
European Court of Human Rights.
4
The laws in the Republic of Ireland were changed in 1993 as a result of the 1988 case Norris v. Ireland
(European Court of Human Rights).
5
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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According to de Jongh, during the period 1958-1967, some dramas began to
question the conventional treatment of gay and lesbian individuals: “Plays about
homosexuality no longer accepted the notion of the homosexual as archetypically evil or
dangerous. As the first tentative steps toward gay identity and community were taken,
the stage began to depict the homosexual as the model of the pathetic-unfortunate” (5).
De Jongh labels 1968-1985 as the period when gay male drama saw the greatest change
and the previous “negative myths, by which homosexuals were judged, began to be
eroded. Gay dramatists and gay or gay-sympathising actors were reluctant to represent
homosexuals in terms of the old stereotypes. … The gay hero was born…” (5). De
Jongh’s 1992 book ends with the AIDS crisis, in which de Jongh sees a potential return to
the old representations of gay and lesbian characters as sinful and sick.
In addition to de Jongh’s work, I admire and consistently cite two book-length
studies tracing the history and exploring the implications of homosexuality in modern
drama: Alan Sinfield’s study Out on Stage: Lesbian and Gay Theatre in the Twentieth
Century (1999) and John Clum’s Still Acting Gay: Male Homosexuality in Modern
Drama (2000). Sinfield and Clum appeal to me because they chart gay and lesbian
theatre as a transatlantic history, and an important one at that. Clum claims, “the tradition
of what can be called gay drama has been central to twentieth-century theater, though
critics once called it ‘superficial’” (xiii). In turn, Sinfield’s book begins with the
assertion that “theatre and theatricality have been experienced throughout the twentieth
century as queer” (1). Clum and Sinfield analyze gay and lesbian theatre as a canon that
developed throughout the twentieth century, partly in response to historical and cultural
changes. Sinfield thinks that historical “changes in theatre as an institution interact with
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shifts in ideologies of gender and sexuality” (1). Similar to de Jongh, Clum views the
history of gay male drama as one that moves toward greater visibility on the stage.6
Although Sinfield and Clum provide some analysis of legal regulations and themes, only
de Jongh’s studies provide a sustained analysis of the law’s integral role in gay drama.
The purpose of my dissertation is to strengthen and clarify the productive connections
that seem to have always existed between theatre and law, in particular those between
specifically gay drama and the laws surrounding gay lives.7
I seek to explore how theatrical representations of sexual minorities influence
relevant laws; how laws affect representations of sexual minorities; and how legal trials
employ theatricality to attract cultural attention and authority in an attempt to resolve the
social drama of gay and lesbian lives. Law and theatre, working together, have
consistently shaped the emergence and representational circulation of gays and lesbians
and hence the visibility of certain kinds of lives and the erasure of others. David Savran
argues in A Queer Sort of Materialism: Recontextualizing American Theatre (2003) that
much of the recent, supposedly “queer” American theatre actually indicates “that lesbian

“The history of the representation of homosexual desire onstage is a series of moves from nothing, to
innuendo and gesture, to discussion without any physical signs of attraction or affection, to, finally,
showing” (Clum 7).
7
For other book-length studies of homosexuality in modern and contemporary drama, see Kaeier Curtin,
We Can Always Call them Bulgarians: the Emergence of Gays and Lesbians on the American Stage
(Boston: Alyson Pub, 1987); James Fisher, ed., “We Will Be Citizens”: New Essays on Gay and Lesbian
Theatre (Jefferson: McFarland & Co, 2008); Kim Marra, Staging Desire: Queer Readings of American
Theater History (Ann Arbor: U of Mich P, 1992); Sean O’Connor, Straight Acting: Popular Gay Drama
from Wilde to Rattigan (Washington: Cassell, 1998); Michael Paller, Gentlemen Callers: Tennessee
Williams, Homosexuality, and Mid-Twentieth-Century Broadway Drama (New York: Palgrave, 2005);
David Roman, Acts of Intervention: Performance, Gay Culture, and AIDS (Bloomington: Indiana UP,
1998); Sarah Schulman, Stage Struck: Theater, AIDS, and the Marketing of Gay America (Durham: Duke
UP, 1998); David Savran, A Queer Sort of Materialism: Recontextualizing American Theater (Ann Arbor:
U Mich P, 2003); Savran, Communists, Cowboys, and Queers: The Politics of Masculinity in the Work of
Arthur Miller and Tennessee Williams (Minneapolis: U of Minn P, 1992);Alisa Solomon and Framji
Minwalla, eds., The Queerest Art: Essays on Gay and Lesbian Theater (New York: NYU P, 2002); Sara
Warner, Acts of Gaiety: LGBT Performance and the Politics of Pleasure (Ann Arbor: U of Mich P, 2014).
6
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and gay politics have become increasingly assimilationist,” and such theatre “tends to
privilege and appeal to white, middle-class subjects, producing them as the axis from
which to universalize” (76). Savran’s critique reveals what may be a problematic function
of gay legal theatre’s central texts. Originally produced in mainstream spaces to mostly
white, middle- or upper-middle class audiences, these commercially successful theatrical
performances, while working to change the laws surrounding male homosexuality and
improve the social conditions of mainly gay men, also potentially efface queer lives,
women, lesbians, bisexuals, trans people, people of color, and the working-class and
poor.8
Similar exclusionary effects can be seen in the performance of recent landmark
gay rights cases, as I investigate in my analysis of Obergefell. The plaintiffs were
carefully chosen as a legal strategy to portray gays and lesbians as “unthreatening”:
white, middle-class, and de-sexualized. The social drama of Obergefell ended with
cultural celebrations, but also several unresolved elements for the LGBTQ community. I
use Andrew Sullivan’s Virtually Normal: An Argument about Homosexuality (1995) and
Michael Warner’s The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life
(1999) to illustrate the tension in the LGBTQ community surrounding the politics of
same-sex marriage, and how that tension manifests in Obergefell. Savran, Warner, and
Judith Butler serve to articulate the queer critique of what I see as the normalizing,
assimilationist impulse in gay legal theatre. Margaret Sönser Breen’s Narratives of

8

See David Eng, The Feeling of Kinship: Queer Liberalism and the Racialization of Intimacy (Durham:
Duke UP, 2010). Eng argues that recent political and legal victories for gays and lesbians come at the cost
of ignoring racial oppression. See Chapter 1, “The Law of Kinship: Lawrence v. Texas and the Emergence
of Queer Liberalism,” 23-57.
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Queer Desire: Deserts of the Heart (2009) also helped me to contextualize the cultural
debates over same-sex marriage.
Although this dissertation is presented chronologically from the Wilde trials to
the present day, I do not envision it as an exhaustive historical study; in a sense, de Jongh
has already undertaken such work. Rather, I will explore crucial historical eruptions
when my ideas come most starkly to light. Specifically, these are the 1895 Wilde trials;
the 1960s in Britain; the roughly twenty-five year period in the United States between the
Stonewall riots and the end of the Cold War, 1968-1992 (I actually start a year before the
1969 Stonewall Riots with the premiere of Mart Crowley’s play The Boys in the Band);
and the contemporary transatlantic debates over same-sex marriage. The methodology is
interdisciplinary: I utilize literary criticism, historical scholarship, queer theory, gender
studies, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and legal sources and scholarship. All
source material will be transatlantic in scope, encompassing the United States, the
Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom (the Republic of Ireland seems to get short
shrift in this study until one remembers that Wilde was in fact Irish).
Chapter one examines the 1895 Oscar Wilde trials alongside two theatrical
texts, Wilde’s The Importance of Being Earnest (1895) and Moisés Kaufman’s
dramatization of the Wilde trial, Gross Indecency: The Three Trials of Oscar Wilde
(1998). I apply Shoshana Felman’s conceptualization of the modern trauma trial to the
Wilde trials; in doing so, I work to situate the trials as part of a larger history of the
sodomy trial reaching back to the 1600’s. This particular form of the trauma trial was
repeated for hundreds of years, often resulting in the execution of the offending man, but
I position the Wilde trials as a crucial tipping point. I agree with Alan Sinfield’s claim
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that the trials helped to crystallize the image of the modern gay man in the cultural
consciousness, but I extend his point and contextualize it within the movement toward
transatlantic legalization of same-sex marriage.
The Wilde trials, I argue, represent a legal-theatrical eruption in gay history,
through which the ritual of the sodomy trial began to transform into the contemporary
same-sex wedding ritual. This transformation was gradual, but it only occurred through
law and theatre working together to change, for gay lives, what sociologist Jeffery
Alexander terms the “master narratives” of traumatized groups.9 Beginning with crucial
textual and performative moments in the trials, as described in various published
accounts, I also analyze Wilde’s comedy The Importance of Being Earnest (1895) and
Kaufman’s contemporary play Gross Indecency (1998). These plays attest to both the
ability of literature to transcend legal traumas and the inherently theatrical nature of the
law.
Chapter two moves forward to the second major eruption in gay legal-dramatic
history: specifically the time period 1958-1968 in Britain. In 1958, the Lord
Chamberlain relaxed the prohibition on all representations of homosexuality on stage,
allowing for “serious” references only. The 1967 Sexual Offences Act finally overhauled
the Wilde-era Criminal Law Amendment and allowed for male homosexual acts in
private. The following year, the Theatres Act of 1968 abolished the Lord Chamberlain’s
power to censor theatre. This chapter examines two British dramatists, Noël Coward and
Joe Orton, who were highly cognizant of the changing legal regimes in that decade, as
reflected in their work. Using strategies of close reading, alongside legal and

9

Jeffrey Alexander, Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity (Berkeley: U of California P, 2004), 12-15.
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biographical contextualization, I first analyze Coward’s last play Song at Twilight (1966)
as a political play that was a thinly veiled champion of the following year’s passage of
the Sexual Offences Act. I read Twilight as an early work of Gay Liberation because it
eschews the politics of assimilation and, as Coward himself performed the role of Hugh
Latymer, makes a didactic plea for social tolerance and legal change.
In sharp contrast to Coward’s Lord Chamberlain-sanctioned “seriousness” on
the subject of homosexuality, Joe Orton’s plays are deeply skeptical of law’s promise
with regard to liberating anyone, gay or otherwise. Entertaining Mr. Sloane presents a
queer, presciently contemporary legal theory of family and marriage, in which
individuals are free to enter into relationships based on theories of contract, not status. I
read Sloane as a radical, queer vision of family, as well as a libertarian view of
contractual marriage, a view that would actually help engender the contemporary samesex marriage movement. Loot, I argue, questions law’s ability to effect social change,
and basically views law as a form of state control and surveillance.
The second half of the dissertation moves to the United States, as I chart the
movement from the year before the Stonewall riots, with the premiere of Mart Crowley’s
The Boys in the Band (1968), to the present day, ending with an analysis of the Supreme
Court’s landmark same-sex marriage decision Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). Chapter
Three examines popular gay American drama from 1968-1992. Although England and
Wales decriminalized homosexuality statutorily in the 1967 Sexual Offences Act, Federal
decriminalization in the United States did not occur until the Supreme Court Lawrence v.
Texas case in 2003. Accordingly, the crucial context in Chapter Three is the emerging
and contested Supreme Court jurisprudence over sexual privacy and gay and lesbian
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rights. I situate two popular gay American dramas, Mart Crowley’s The Boys in the Band
(1968) and Tony Kushner’s Angels in America (1992), not only within the context of gay
history, but also within their jurisprudential context. Specifically, I chart connections in
the spatial rhetoric deployed by those gay playwrights and liberal Supreme Court
Justices’ “living Constitution” method of Constitutional interpretation. Crowley’s use of
queer space, as I define the term, echoed and anticipated the emerging jurisprudence of
sexual privacy being recognized in cases like Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Eisenstadt
v. Baird (1972), and ultimately Romer v. Evans (1996), Lawrence v. Texas (2003), U.S. v.
Windsor (2013), and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). Kushner’s epic is partly a response to
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the case that temporarily restricted sexual privacy rights
until it was overruled by Lawrence. Angels in America is also, in its legal themes, a
cultural precursor to the contemporary genealogy of gay rights jurisprudence: Romer,
Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell.
The dissertation concludes in Chapter Four with a case study of same-sex
marriage, the contested contemporary ritual that encompasses both legal and dramatic
components. I explore same-sex marriage as the potential culmination of early modern
sodomy trials, the Wilde trials, and twentieth-century assimilation and normalization of
gay and lesbian characters and desire onto cultural stages. This final chapter is a “Case
study” that tests the strength of my original claim that gay drama is inevitably a hybrid,
interdisciplinary discourse. Using anthropologist Victor Turner’s theory, I analyze the
“social drama” of gay and lesbian lives in its most recent manifestation, the Supreme
Court case Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). Using a strategy promoted by the Law and
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Literature movement, I read law as literature and so interpret Obergefell as a theatrical
performance.
Obergefell ends triumphantly, and the genre of gay legal theatre comes to an
ostensible culmination. However, legal theatre will continue to serve cultural purposes.
Continued discrimination in employment and persistent violence towards LGBT people,
as well as the uncertain ideological makeup of the United States Supreme Court and
conservative backlash against recent legal decisions, indicate that legal theatre will still
influence cultural attitudes and legal regulations. It will be interesting to observe future
legal challenges brought by and against LGBT people in the courts, and to what extent
those challenges fit into theatrical terms that capture the public imagination. Such legal
and cultural development may very well be mirrored and contested on stage as well.
Until then, the following chapters illustrate a current history of the intense, inextricable
relationship between law and theatre as both discourses worked together to produce and
change gay lives.
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Chapter 1
Transcending the Trauma:
Literary Interventions in the Wilde Trials
Jack. Oh, that’s nonsense, Algy. You never talk anything but nonsense.
Algernon. Nobody ever does.
--The Importance of Being Earnest (1895)
Carson: Did you ever kiss him?
Wilde: Oh, no, never in my life; he was a peculiarly plain boy.
Carson: He was what?
--Regina v. John Douglas, 4 April 1895

Introduction
In The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century
(2002), Shoshana Felman claims “that trauma—individual as well as social—is the basic
underlying reality of the law” (172). How does this claim inform our reading of the
Oscar Wilde trials? Can it inform our reading of Wilde’s own literature and other literary
production related to the trials? How can literature, specifically dramatic literature and
performance, allow us a space to contemplate, resolve, or transcend legal trauma?
Moreover, when we analyze the theatrical nature of trials, can we evaluate legal
performance in order to achieve the healing closure of social justice? These are the
questions that inform this chapter, and indeed much of this dissertation.
I read the Wilde trials as an example of what Felman terms a trauma trial: a
riveting spectacle when seemingly irresolvable cultural conflicts are played out in a
courtroom. Consequently, we can see that trauma trials expose the inextricable links
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between law and theatre. The cultural import of the Wilde trials can only fully be
understood by examining their inherently theatrical elements; legal analysis does not
adequately capture the dynamic social drama at work. In addition, I will read the trials
against two literary works, Wilde’s own The Importance of Being Earnest (1895) and
Moisés Kaufman’s recent play about the trials, Gross Indecency (1998). These theatrical
texts expose the trials to help us better understand the nature of the trauma inflicted on
Wilde and the gay men in his historical wake. Theatre—whether it is discerned on a
stage or in a courtroom—allows for a healing transcendence of legal trauma. The
transcripts and performative rituals of the actual trials, Wilde’s dramatic masterpiece
Earnest, and Kaufman’s contemporary play, which attempts to make sense of what
happened, speak to one another in ways that can help us more fully understand the
cultural significance and legacies of the trials.
Like Felman, I will investigate the trials for resonant moments that provide
interpretive challenges: moments that require dramatic criticism for full understanding.
In addition, I will “compare a trial to a text” (55) by comparing the Wilde trials with
theatrical productions related or applicable to them. Such strategies offer an excellent
method for synthesizing the two disciplines of literature and law, and more specifically,
for comprehending how literary and legal theatres work and sometimes blend together to
create and control sexual minorities.
I will be synthesizing Felman’s and Jeffrey Alexander’s work in trauma theory
with those of scholars who claim that the Wilde trials produced a definitive modern gay
identity. Alan Sinfield, in his book The Wilde Century (1994), was the first to argue that
the Wilde trials crystallized the cultural image of the modern gay man:
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the trials helped to produce a major shift in perceptions of the scope of same-sex
passions. At that point, the entire, vaguely disconcerting nexus of effeminacy,
leisure, idleness, immorality, luxury, insouciance, decadence and aestheticism,
which Wilde was perceived, variously, as instantiating, was transformed into a
brilliantly precise image. . . . The principle twentieth-century stereotype entered
our cultures: not just the homosexual, as the lawyers and medics would have it,
but the queer. (3)
Sinfield’s argument is convincing because it allows us to make sense of the Wilde trials
in a modern context, and to re-evaluate their significance in terms of larger historical
trends. But I would like to deepen Sinfield’s assertion by showing the Wilde trials as just
one, admittedly spectacular, repetition in a particular history of trauma trials involving
male homosexuality.
The power and significance of the Wilde trials can only be fully understood when
we analyze the trials as a form of theatre. These trials theatricalized the traumatic
tradition of sodomy trials that preceded them. Reading the trials as a form of legal
theatre exposes law’s performative nature, especially as revealed in the procedures of
trials. Witnesses and attorneys perform dialogue to convince various audiences of truth
(judge, jury, the spectators in the courtroom, the larger culture reading press accounts).
These performances influence and potentially undermine final judgments. Legal trials
are inevitably theatrical in their production; fluid, sometimes ambiguous dynamics of
performance and spectatorship produce verdicts. In this sense, legal reality is produced
through actors performing and audiences interpreting those performances. Legal results
may seem to be naturally determined from the application of legal language to factual
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patterns, but in the context of especially criminal trials the determination of guilt and
innocence proceeds from rhetorical influence and theatrical effects. 10
Because theatre provides law with so much of its power and intelligibility, the
Wilde trials are further illuminated through the lens of a seemingly distinct text like The
Importance of Being Earnest, or by witnessing dramatizations of speeches and moments
from the trials in a production like Gross Indecency. Earnest playfully suggests that
gender identity is performative, in stark contrast to the legal conviction of Wilde that
equated the emerging gay identity with sexual criminality. Earnest comedically works to
transcend the trauma normally necessary for the creation of a sexual cultural minority
because the play denies the possibility of a stable identity. Wilde reveals the inevitably
reductive fictions of gender identity that were produced in part as a response to legal
discourse. In contrast, Kaufman’s play accepts the practical reality of gay identity as it
was traumatically produced in the Wilde trials. Gross Indecency has the hindsight of
history and can more directly evaluate the past. The play attempts to heal the repetition
of trauma that the Wilde trials enacted within the history of sodomy trials; it does this by
sympathetically refiguring Wilde as a modern gay martyr sacrificed at the beginning of a

In claiming that law is performative, I am drawing on Judith Butler’s theory of gender performativity,
that “Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory
frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being.” Judith
Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 33. Legal
trials operate in a similar fashion because their entrenched physical procedures can give the illusion of a
predetermined legal result to a conflict, a capital L “Law” that can be discoverable in any given instance.
This is similar to Butler’s idea that “gender” and “identity” are not actually predetermined essences, but are
rather produced from actions. In legal practice, rhetorical strategies and interpretive ambiguities subvert the
hope of logical legal truth and conclusions. For a discussion of the performativity of legal trials, see
Martha Umphrey, “Law in Drag: Trials and Legal Performativity,” 21 Colum. J. Gender & L. 114 (2012):
“trials are law-making (not just law-applying or law-interpreting) events because of their performativity.
They are performative in two senses: they not only enact law, both theatrically and linguistically, in their
very doing, but also performatively constitute the law they enact. By that I mean that, paradoxically, though
they are discrete and singular events, trials also proceed reiteratively, drawing upon and repeating particular
discursive formations and invoking conceptions of cultural and legal subjectivity whose sedimented
meanings have no final, non-contingent ground or origin” (120).
10
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political struggle for recognition and equality. These two dramatic texts provide theatres
of aesthetic and political justice amidst and against legal traumas.

A Brief Overview of the Trials
Before examining certain moments in the trials and analyzing them as theatrical
texts, I find it helpful to briefly rehearse the trajectory of Wilde’s foray into the legal
universe. Many people do not know that Wilde himself instigated the legal machinery
that began moving toward his own imprisonment. He brought a criminal libel charge
against the Marquess of Queensberry, father of Wilde’s lover Lord Alfred Douglas.
There had been animosity between Wilde and Queensberry for some time because the
latter was incensed that Wilde and Bosie (Lord Alfred’s nickname) publicly displayed an
appearance of sexual intimacy. Queensberry had intended to disrupt the opening night of
The Importance of Being Earnest on February 14, 1895, in fact, but was stopped because
Wilde cancelled his ticket and notified the police (Foldy 4). The libel materialized in the
form of a card that Queensberry left at Wilde’s club The Albermale on February 18,
1895. Queensberry wrote “For Oscar Wilde, posing as a somdomite” [sic]. This libelous
statement did not accuse Wilde of actually committing sodomy, but rather “posing” as the
kind of person who might engage in such activity. 11
The common law defense for a libel is the justification of truth; the only way that
Queensberry could avoid criminal penalty was to establish for a jury that in fact the
From Queensberry’s letter to Lord Alfred, dated a year earlier, 1 April 1894: “…I come to the more
painful part of this letter—your intimacy with this man Wilde. It must either cease or I will disown you
and stop all money supplies. I am not going to try and analyse this intimacy, and I make no charge; but to
my mind to pose as a thing is as bad as to be it. With my own eyes I saw you both in the most loathsome
and disgusting relationship as expressed by your manner and expression. Never in my experience have I
ever seen such a sight as that in your horrible features.” Signed “Your disgusted so-called father.” (qtd. in
Ellman 417-418)
11
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evidence showed that Wilde was posing as a sodomite—not that the act of sodomy was
actually occurring, which would have been more difficult to prove, but merely that there
was the appearance of such activity in Wilde’s behavior. During the libel trial,
Queensberry was represented by Edward Carson, who first used Wilde’s literature,
including his novel The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891), as evidence of such immoral
proclivities, and then introduced actual witnesses who would deliver oral evidence of
having improper relationships with Wilde. Wilde and his attorney, Sir Edward Clarke,
did not know that these rent boy witnesses had been brought to the courthouse. Carson
“knew that the physical evidence and the testimony of the defense witnesses would be
truly damning” (Foldy 6). These witnesses proved to be the turning point for Wilde’s
fortunes. The young men were prepared to give live testimony in the courtroom to not
only acquit Queensberry of libelous wrongdoing, but provide the Crown with enough
substantial evidence to bring a new criminal prosecution against Wilde for violating the
law against “gross indecency” between men. The men had apparently been promised
immunity in exchange for their testimony (Foldy 16).
In order to prevent the embarrassment of the rent boys’ testimony, Wilde
withdrew the charge of libel, but it was too late. Justice Collins ruled that the defense
had proven its justification for publishing the written accusation against Wilde. That
legal victory for Queensberry put Wilde in the defensive posture, because it provided
prima facie evidence that he had broken the law prohibiting “gross indecency” between
men. The law prohibited “any male person” engaging in or soliciting “in public or in
private […] any act of gross indecency with another male person.” Wilde and Alfred
Taylor, the head of the brothel that Wilde frequented, were put into prison to await trial
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and were charged with twenty-five counts of violating the Criminal Law Amendment
Act. The different counts were attributed to acts of gross indecency between the men and
the various working-class youth.
Wilde’s first criminal trial featured testimony from the young men, who admitted
in open court that they had engaged in homosexual activity with Wilde. The testimony
was at times graphic and salacious, and it all pointed toward Wilde’s legal guilt.
However, due to some legal confusion regarding Wilde’s joint trial with Taylor, as well
as the inadmissibility of some of the evidence from the libel trial, there was a hung jury
and Wilde was re-tried separately from Taylor. The second criminal trial involved much
the same testimony from the same witnesses; this time it resulted in Wilde’s conviction,
and he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.

Theoretical Context
Wilde’s trials had moments of compelling theatricality, whether it was Carson’s
riveting cross-examination of Wilde, Wilde’s famous speech from the dock, or the
dramatic sentencing by the judge. Popular press accounts were widely sold that
described the events in the Old Bailey.12 The Wilde trials were especially captivating,
although the setting and procedures of all English and American trials have always been
inherently theatrical. In his history of the trial, Sadakat Kadri describes the “judicial
theatricality” that has always pervaded English courts:

12

For analysis of the press accounts, see Ed Cohen, Talk on the Wilde Side: Toward a Genealogy of a
Discourse on Male Sexualities (New York: Routledge, 1993).
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The jury trial has been a drama for centuries, and no nation has clung to the
paraphernalia and props more tenaciously than England. … Judges survey their
domains from on high, clad in sashes of scarlet and purple, watching over
corralled defendants, boxed jurors, and counsel who remain confined behind long
wooden benches. Punctilious dress codes meanwhile identify who may and may
not speak. Colours, collars, and waistcoats all have their significance, and the
thrall of the horsehair wig remains so potent that any barrister who pleads without
hairpiece in place still courts career meltdown. (289)
Trials are complex performative rituals with very real consequences. They have an
inherent theatricality thanks to the way they have been constructed over the course of
centuries in England and the United States. A trial is in many ways set up as a theatre—
from the Greek theatron, or the “seeing place” where the audience sat in ancient Greek
theatres. Facts and their significance are contested; attorneys use rhetorical strategies to
extract valuable testimony from witnesses; and a judge, jury, and the assembled
spectators watch the events transpire, always evaluating the sincerity and significance of
every moment and utterance. A trial is, in many ways, a play.
The Wilde trials are an excellent opportunity for the interdisciplinary field of
“Law and Literature” to show its relevancy, but the trials have had little explicit treatment
under the theoretical frameworks that Law and Literature has provided. This is not to say
that Wilde’s trials have not been extensively analyzed in myriad contexts.13 Normally,

13

For a recent historico-cultural study, see Michael S. Foldy, The Trials of Oscar Wilde: Deviance,
Morality, and Late-Victorian Society (New Haven: Yale UP, 1997). Ed Cohen is the only recent booklength “literary” analysis of the trials, at least in terms of theorizing its cultural implications for male
sexuality. See Talk on the Wilde Side: Toward a Genealogy of a Discourse on Male Sexualities (New York:
Routledge, 1993). All scholars of the Wilde trials must live in the long shadow of H. Montgomery Hyde
and the different editions he published on the trials, the standard being The Trials of Oscar Wilde (London:
William Hodge, 1948). Until recently, Hyde’s account was the official narrative of the trials, being pieced
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however, the legal issues are analyzed separately from the literary and cultural theorizing
that occurs around them.14 Law and Literature has primarily been concerned with 1)
analyzing legal themes of law and justice in literature, and 2) reading law as literature, or
applying rhetorical and literary analysis to legal texts; i.e., common law (judge’s written
opinions) and statutes, as well as the testimony of lawyers and witnesses in a trial.15
I will be employing both of these approaches throughout this dissertation, but I
also want to make it clear in my methodology that because I consider it reductive to insist
on a neat dichotomy between “law” and “literature,” any strategy that acknowledges the
two discourses can blend is appealing to me; accordingly, reading law as literature,
literature as law, or comparing the effects of law and literature is more the spirit of this
project. Both genres blend into one another consistently; especially, I will demonstrate,
when it comes to representations of homosexuality and gay men since the Wilde trials
and up to the present day.
Shoshana Felman’s recent work has added new possibilities to how one
approaches the field of Law and Literature. In The Juridical Unconscious (2002), she
together from shorthand notes, court reports, and newspaper articles. Wilde’s grandson Merlin Holland
recently published the “real” trial transcript from the first trial, based on newly discovered trial transcripts:
The Real Trial of Oscar Wilde (New York: Fourth Estate, 2003). Holland’s edition is almost twice as long
as Hyde’s, and is undoubtedly more accurate. It is also more explicitly laid out in dialogue as a play is
written, moving away from the more “shorthand” impression that Hyde’s edition gives. However, see
Leslie Moran, “Transcripts and Truth: Writing the Trials of Oscar Wilde” for the problematic history of
supposedly “genuine” transcripts of the trials, even the supposedly “Real Trial” of Oscar Wilde recently
published by Merlin Holland in 2003.
14
For a legal analysis of the trials from an English lawyer, see “The Tragedy of Being Earnest: Some Legal
Aspects,” in Wildean 19 (2001): 35-42. An interesting article that deals with legal themes in Wilde’s art
and life is Angela Kingston, “The Law According to Oscar Wilde,” in Wildean 22 (2003): 46-54. One
article that lays claim to a “law and literature” approach to the trials succeeds only in making a strained
argument about privacy, “The Trials of Oscar Wilde: The Intersection Between Law and Literature,” in The
Importance of Reinventing Oscar: Versions of Wilde During the Last 100 Years (New York: Rodopi,
2002), 57-66.
15
Ian Ward makes this helpful, although necessarily reductive, breakdown into the two major fields of
inquiry, law in literature and law as literature, in his helpful introduction to the field, Law and Literature:
Possibilities and Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995). See also Kieran Dolin, Law and
Literature: A Critical Introduction. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007).
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applies trauma theory to law in a comparative study of twentieth-century trials and
literary texts. Felman reads seemingly disparate trials and literary texts against and into
one other, in the assumption that undertaking such synthesis can greater elucidate the
cultural contestations of a particular historical moment.
Felman provides a helpful definition of “trauma,” one that is adopted in some
sense by most contemporary trauma theorists:

The word trauma means wound, especially one produced by sudden
physical injury. The original use of the term derives from medicine; it has
later been borrowed by psychoanalysis and by psychiatry to designate a
blow to the self (and to the tissues of the mind), a shock that creates a
psychological split or rupture, an emotional injury that leaves lasting
damage to the psyche. Psychological trauma occurs as a result of an
overwhelming, uncontrollable and terrifying experience, usually a violent
event or events or the prolonged exposure to such events. . . . Oppressed
groups that have been persistently subject to abuse, injustice, or violence
suffer collective trauma, much like soldiers who have been exposed to war
atrocities. The twentieth century can be defined as a century of trauma.
(171)
Felman and Cathy Caruth often work with the Holocaust in their applications of trauma
theory, but these ideas can be fruitfully applied to other contexts. It is not my intention to
draw a comparison in the kinds or magnitude of trauma inflicted in the Holocaust with
violence, bodily or psychical, experienced by sexual minorities. (Although homosexuals
were among those persecuted by the Nazis and were included in the Holocaust’s trauma,
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so there is some overlap.) The kind of trauma at issue in this dissertation is the collective
trauma experienced by “[o]ppressed groups that have been persistently subject to abuse,
injustice, or violence.” There are some similarities among the traumas experienced by
racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities, but what specifically interests me here is
to what extent trauma formed the basis of modern gay identity. Specifically, to what
extent did legal trauma precipitate the forming of this sexual minority and its collective
understanding of itself?
Jeffrey Alexander’s sociological approach to cultural trauma is also helpful for
my purposes in this chapter. Alexander constructs a theory of trauma based on the
processes by which a group establishes its identity in response to perceived trauma. This
theory can be used to illuminate the cultural significance of the Wilde trials in interesting
ways, especially when we see the trials as part of a larger history of cultural trauma
extending back to early sodomy trials. The Wilde trials are a tipping point; they can be
symbolically conceptualized as part of the beginning of a history of identity formation
and political mobilization that would evolve through gay and lesbian liberation,
culminating most recently in the contemporary transatlantic movement towards
legalization and widespread acceptance of same-sex marriage. In 1895, men who
engaged in homosexual activity were ipso facto criminals. One-hundred-twenty years
later, in 2015, the United States, Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom (except
Northern Ireland) now sanction male-male sexual intimacy with the legal title and
benefits of marriage. That movement, that transatlantic trajectory, from gay men as
criminals to gay men as inter-marriageable, provides a set of historical and cultural
bookends worthy of investigative demarcation.
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Sociologist Kai Erikson investigates how communities can be formed from
trauma, which indicates how we might perceive the after-effects of the Wilde trials:
“traumatic wounds inflicted in individuals can combine to create a mood, an ethos—a
group culture, almost—that is different from (and more than) the sum of the private
wounds that make it up. Trauma, that is, has a social dimension” (185). Alexander
develops Erikson’s work by developing a specific theory of identity-group cultural
trauma:
Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been
subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group
consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity
in fundamental and irrevocable ways. … [C]ultural trauma suggest[s] new
meaningful and causal relationships between previously unrelated events,
structures, perceptions, and actions. (1)
Alexander extends Erikson’s idea by suggesting that the processes of cultural trauma not
only allow for groups to form various kinds of identity, but also enable other members of
a society to acknowledge the traumas suffered and identities thereby formed; this
promotes successful political movements that can rectify perceived injustices, through
which “societies expand the circle of the we” (Alexander 1). In other words, if
traumatized collectivities can successfully persuade other members of a society to
understand and sympathize with them, the persecuted group will be able to more
successfully assimilate into mainstream culture. Not all members of the collectivity may
want to assimilate, as we can see from feminist and queer critiques of gay marriage, for
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example.16 However, the option becomes available because a narrative of the group’s
trauma has been accepted by the larger society.
Alexander’s theory of the “social process of cultural trauma,” synthesized with
Felman’s work in trauma theory, allows us to complicate Alan Sinfield’s claim that the
Wilde trials catalyzed the emergence of a modern gay identity. Sinfield’s argument is
convincing, and even more so when we realize to what extent the Wilde trials were the
galvanizing moment in a larger historical process of cultural trauma, and hence identity
formation, for the class of men who would later come to identify as homosexual and then
gay.
According to Alexander, the processes through which cultural identities are
formed require efforts of imagination and representation (9-10). His sociological
methodology departs from Felman’s literary and psychoanalytical approach when he
contends that events themselves are not inherently traumatic; rather, he argues, trauma is
only produced as a sociological response to events. This response comes in the form of
“representations” by the group in response to the event(s), and they can come in the form
of aesthetic, legal, religious, scientific, mass media, or state bureaucracy discourses (1519). I will be focusing on the legal and aesthetic discourses that become intertwined in
many of the texts within and surrounding the Wilde trials. Trauma is only recognized,
internalized, and evaluated, Alexander claims, through cultural representations of that
emerging group identity. That group is often depicted as being persecuted in an unjust

16

See Michael Warner, The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (New York:
Free Press, 1999). See also Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), 267: “[T]hose who live outside the conjugal frame or maintain modes of social organization for sexuality that
are neither monogamous nor quasi-marital are more and more considered unreal, and their loves and losses
less than ‘true’ loves and ‘true’ losses. The derealization of this domain of human intimacy and sociality
works by denying reality and truth to the relations at issue.”
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way, or as being inherently similar to other members of the society so as to prevent the
dehumanization that justifies discrimination.
Trauma is thus created, Alexander suggests, through various discourses of art,
law, science, and government working cumulatively to make sense of a group’s treatment
at the hands of a larger society. These representations create a “new master narrative”
that makes sense of the group’s place in the larger society, and perhaps prompts political
compensation for injuries. Creating a “new master narrative” of trauma involves
storytelling: “this storytelling is … a complex and multivalent symbolic process that is
contingent, highly contested, and sometimes highly polarizing” (Alexander 12).
Alexander suggests there are “four critical representations” required for a master
narrative of group trauma to be successfully formed in a culture: 1) The injury must be
sufficiently articulated; 2) The “nature of the victim” must be expressed; 3) The
“Relation of the trauma victim to the wider audience” must be clarified; and 4)
“Attribution of responsibility,” or the presentation of an “antagonist” must be offered.
This antagonist “is always a matter of symbolic and social construction” (15).
To a large extent, gay legal theatre is the body of legal, literary, and legal-literary
discourses that work toward promoting Alexander’s “master narrative” in transatlantic
culture. Of course, I hasten to add there have been many unsympathetic productions
about homosexuality, ones that attempt to usurp the effectiveness of a sympathetic master
narrative. Unsympathetic texts belong in the canon of gay legal theatre as well, as they
reflect the highly contested nature of what is ultimately a political storytelling. But since
the Wilde trials, gradually gay legal theatre’s master narrative worked toward cultural
acceptance of gay identity because a significant number of productions adhered to
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Alexander’s criteria: the productions successfully portrayed an injury and the “nature of
the victim”; they indicated how the audience of the dramas connected with the characters
and events on the stage; and they suggested who was to blame (often implied as the
audience members themselves, or the larger society).17
The Wilde trials were undoubtedly a traumatic event, consciously or
unconsciously, for those spectators of the trials and readers of their press coverage who
shared Wilde’s proclivities towards same-sex desire. Whether that event was inherently
traumatic, as Felman and Caruth would argue, or was traumatic in how people began to
respond to it, as Alexander theorizes about how trauma is understood, does not ultimately
matter for my present analysis. I agree with Sinfield’s claim for the emergence of a gay
identity in the wake of the trial, but would like to add that this new identity was only able
to form so forcefully because the trial was implicated in a larger history of traumatic
experiences, and responses to those experiences, involving this particular class of men.
Alexander suggests we look for “new meaningful and causal relationships between

Alexander’s sociological theory in this chapter is echoed in Victor Turner’s anthropological theory of
“social drama” utilized in Chapter Four on contemporary same-sex marriage. Although I mainly use
Turner to understand the significance of American gay rights jurisprudence and same-sex wedding rituals,
Alexander’s theory could also be used in profitable ways to understand how the master narrative of “gay
rights” culminated in the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in the oral argument of U.S. v. Windsor
(2013), Chief Justice Roberts, who would eventually dissent on the losing side of the case, wanted to stress
that the cultural acceptance of homosexuality and gay rights had become more widespread, probably in
order to make a legal ruling against Edith Windsor, the lesbian plaintiff, more justified because Windsor
would not seem like a sympathetic victim of discrimination:
17

JUSTICE GINSBERG: How many states have Civil Unions now? … And how many had it in 1996?
MS. KAPLAN: I -- yes, it was much, much fewer at the time. I don't have that number, Justice
Ginsburg; I apologize.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I suppose the sea change has a lot to do with the political force and
effectiveness of people representing, supporting your side of the case? … You don't doubt that the lobby
supporting the enactment of same sex-marriage laws in different States is politically powerful, do you? …
As far as I can tell, political figures are falling over themselves to endorse your side of the case. (107-108)
In other words, Roberts was suggesting, there was no need to find a constitutional basis for protection of
gays and lesbians because politically speaking, they had already won control of the “master narrative” of
their collective identity, ensuring wider acceptance of them by the wider community.
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previously unrelated events, structures, perceptions, and actions” (1). Indeed, Felman’s
work with the “trauma trial” allows us to open up and contemplate a larger history of the
Wilde trials, as I will show in the next section.
This trauma trial had been evolving for hundreds of years, and would continue to
change in the future over the course of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first
century. The Wilde trials were repeated with different defendants in different legal
venues, but they also echoed in theatrical spaces as well, which in turn affected the
development of the laws related to homosexuality. Ultimately, the justice of the Wilde
trials was challenged by gay dramatists and later LGBT activists, thus gradually
transforming the sodomy trial ritual into the same-sex wedding rituals of the twenty-first
century (which in turn have been highly contested). Gay male identity tragically began in
criminalizing legal trauma; however, the overarching cultural narrative of gay men, as it
was produced through gay legal theatre, had an ostensibly comedic arc when we consider
the recent transatlantic events legalizing same-sex marriage.18 This cultural narrative
played out through the dialectical tensions and occasional blending between legal and
theatrical discourses.

Contextualizing Wilde’s Trials within a History of Traumatic Sodomy Trials
According to Felman, a culturally resonant trauma trial, a “trial of the century,”
has “three profound features: (1) its complex traumatic structure; (2) its cross-legal
nature, or the repetition it enacts of another trial; and (3) its attempt to define legally
something that is not reducible to legal concepts” (59). Felman analyzes what factors

18

I closely analyze the “social drama” of same-sex marriage in Chapter Four.

Barry 31
constitute a “trial of the century” in the twentieth century, focusing on the 1961
Eichmann trial in Jerusalem and O.J. Simpson’s 1995 trial. Her theory reveals that the
Wilde trials were so captivating in part because they were a traumatic repetition of the
English sodomy trials.

1. The Complex Traumatic Structure of the Wilde Trials
Wilde’s trials fit into the larger archetype of trauma trial as Felman describes it.
In the Simpson trial, the private trauma of a murder became—in a court of law under
intense observation—a culturally resonant moment of two collective traumas, gender and
race: Nicole Brown became the image of the battered wife, O.J. Simpson became the
image of racial injustice, and what started out as a simple murder case became a cultural
contestation over “the two cardinal societal traumas of race persecution and gender
persecution” (Felman 6).19
Similarly, Wilde’s trials involved a complex traumatic structure, in which two
opposing private traumas morphed into opposing collective traumas. Wilde started the
legal process by suing the Marquess of Queensberry for criminal libel. Libel is a minor
type of psychological “blow to the self”; Wilde indicated in a court of law that his
reputation was being injured, displaced. Queensberry’s subsequent arrest and defense
constituted an opposing individual trauma: if Queensberry lost the case, his identity
would be re-labeled as criminal, not upper-class. However, these individual private
traumas became culturally resonant because they came to symbolize larger, unresolved

Felman’s paradigm does not address the intersectional nature of minority trauma. In her
conceptualization, gender trauma is implicitly white trauma and race trauma is implicitly male. This may
be a weakness in her argument, but it also might simply capture the ways that culture erases intersectional
understandings of trauma and identity.
19
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cultural traumas that had never been fully understood, let alone healed. On the one hand
we have the injury and threat to the hetero-patriarchy that Wilde posed by sleeping with
Queensberry’s son, and the injury and threat that Wilde posed to class distinctions
himself and by his intimate treatment of the rent boys20; on the other hand, we have the
trauma inflicted on the body of gay men who began to emerge as an endangered sexual
class in the wake of the guilty verdict.
Also, if we agree with Alan Sinfield’s argument about modern gay identity
emerging in the wake of the trials, what can we make of the fact that this “identity” was
based on a highly traumatic ritual at the end of which that newly (re?)-discovered identity
was imprisoned, punished, and expelled? This phenomenon is not unique to gay identity.
Ron Eyerman persuasively argues in “Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of
African American Identity” that African Americans developed their group identity
through a collective traumatic memory of slavery. Legally, I would add, we can trace the
modern African-American identity to Supreme Court cases that categorized black identity
as a marginal and inferior status.21 In Dred Scott v. Sandford (1856), which was later
overturned by the 13th and 14th Amendments, blacks were denied U.S. citizenship, held to
be private property and therefore would have no individual access to courts of law.

20

David Schulz makes the argument that Wilde, in his trials, challenged the performative constructions of
the patriarchy, class boundaries, and gender. “Redressing Oscar: Performance and the Trials of Oscar
Wilde.” The Drama Review 40.2 (Summer 1996): 37-59.
21
Gay and African-American identity of course intersect in certain individuals, although historically these
intersections have been effaced. See David Eng, The Feeling of Kinship: Queer Liberalism and the
Racialization of Intimacy (Durham: Duke UP, 2010). Eng argues that recent political and legal victories
for gays and lesbians come at the cost of ignoring racial oppression. In the landmark case Lawrence v.
Texas (2003) that eventually led to the decriminalization of same-sex activity in the United States, the
illegal same-sex activity was also inter-racial in nature. Police were initially called to the scene in order to
investigate claims of an armed black man. See Dale Carpenter, “The Unknown Past of Lawrence v.
Texas,” Michigan Law Review 102 (2004): 1464-1527; Eng, Chapter 1, “The Law of Kinship: Lawrence v.
Texas and the Emergence of Queer Liberalism,” 23-57, 35.
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Later, in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), racial segregation was held constitutional under the
“separate but equal” doctrine; the case was eventually overturned by Brown v. Board of
Education (1954).
What is it about minority identity, and the way we construct and understand
identity, that lends itself to emerging through sites and processes of cultural trauma?
Further, why have traumatic constructions of identity often erased the intersections of
race, class, gender, and sexuality within individuals? Trauma narratives surrounding one
aspect of identity often neglect other traumatized aspects, and indicate further areas of
cultural prejudice that remain within the minorities involved and the culture at large.
Wilde himself has an answer, of course: as he writes in De Profundis: “Suffering—
curious as it may sound to you—is the means by which we exist, because it is the only
means by which we become conscious of existing; and the remembrance of suffering in
the past is necessary to us as the warrant, the evidence, of our continued identity” (884).
The Wilde trials served as a vehicle for an emerging class of gay men to “become
conscious of existing” because the trials catalyzed “the remembrance of suffering in the
past,” particularly the suffering endured in the sodomy trials.

2. A Traumatic Repetition of Earlier Trials
Felman writes about the cultural significance of the trauma trial: “What the trial
does, is, therefore, to repeat and to awaken, to reopen a traumatic history of trials” (63).
Unconscious repetition is a key aspect of trauma. Cathy Caruth claims, “What seems to
be suggested by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle is that the wound of the mind—
the breach in the mind’s experience of time, self, and the world—is not, like the wound
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of the body, a simple and healable event, but rather an event that … is experienced too
soon, too unexpectedly to be fully known…” (3-4). Therefore, psychological trauma is
experienced as a way for the psyche to re-visit the event in order to more fully experience
and understand it.
For example, Felman posits that the O.J. Simpson trial evoked “echoes” of the
Rodney King trial, which in turn evoked a distant memory of Dred Scott (63). The Wilde
trials have deep echoes as well and reopen the traumatic history of sodomy trials. The
sodomy trial was a kind of trauma trial that British and American culture practiced in
various permutations for hundreds of years. The Wilde trial, although it began as a trial
for libel and ended with conviction of the crime of gross indecency, is just such a
permutation, and it contains the traumatic cultural repetitions of past sodomy trials that
had been enacted for centuries. It was a way for the culture to revisit those old wounds,
and because the dramatist Oscar Wilde was the focal point, he more fully opened up the
legal discourse of the trial, allowing it to become a richer cultural event that blended legal
and literary languages.
In this respect, Alan Sinfield’s popularized claim that the Wilde trials crystallized
in the public mind the image of the modern gay man is rendered more complex when we
see the trials in the tradition from which they come. In 1534, Henry VIII’s Parliament
made a capital felony the “detestable and abominable Vice of Buggery, committed with
mankind or beast (25 Hen. 8, c. 6)” (qtd. in Gorton 24). In 1631, the Earl of Castlehaven
was infamously tried for rape and sodomy, the first recorded trial under Henry VIII’s
sodomy statute (Gorton 25). The earl was tried for raping his wife, committing sodomy
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with male servants, having them rape his wife, and several other sexual crimes. He was
executed.22
The culmination of early sodomy trials was death if the man was convicted. I am
claiming that a cultural trauma was gradually widened over the course of these trials and
executions. The trauma involved the complex relationship of the sexual activities of
these men, the legal categorization of those activities as immoral and worthy of death,
cultural condemnation of homosexuality, and the growing self-consciousness of these
men coming to realize that the desires of their body implied aspects of their identity.
The execution ritual for sodomy was repeated for hundreds of years. As a key
example, the Earl of Castlehaven’s execution was witnessed and described in this way to
the public:
Then he bowed himself, and went to the middle of the scaffold, kneeling down
and lifting up his hands and eyes to heaven … he prayed to God; which prayer
being ended … with a smiling countenance he took his leave of all men, and
desired their prayers to Almighty God for him; and then tying a handkerchief
about his face, most willingly and patiently laid down his body, submitting
himself to the power of the executioner, who with one small blow severed his
head from his body… (McCormick 62)
When Wilde stood in the dock and received his sentence, echoes of the above trauma
attached themselves to the scene at the Old Bailey. Although Wilde was not allowed to
be put to death, and was instead sentenced to two years of hard labor, the Judge’s

The salacious and disturbing details from the trial transcript can be found in Ian McCormick’s valuable
compilation Secret Sexualities: A Sourcebook of 17th and 18th Century Writing (New York: Routledge,
1997), 53-62.
22
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language implied that death would have been a fitting consequence. The Star newspaper
recorded the judge’s speech at the sentencing as follows:
Oscar Wilde and Alfred Taylor, it has never been my lot to try a case of this kind
before which has been so bad. One has to put a stern constraint upon oneself to
prevent oneself from describing in language I ought not to use the sentiments
which must arise in the breast of every man who has a spark of decent feeling in
him, and who has heard of details of these two terrible trials. … People who can
do these things must be deaf to every sense of decency which can influence
conduct. It is the worst case I have ever tried. … I shall, under the circumstances,
be expected to pass the severest sentence that the law allows. In my judgment, it
is utterly inadequate for such cases. The sentence upon each of you is
imprisonment with hard labor for two years. (Foldy 46-7)23
This moment in the trial, recorded in popular press accounts and in various legal
transcripts, certainly has dramatic power in addition to the simple legal procedure of
sentencing. Such dramatic moment in the trials blend law and drama into a hybrid ritual
of trauma. The Judge is a symbol for God the Father, and in physically delivering the
sentence—the Word—and its attendant moral disapproval, the scene becomes archetypal
in its cultural resonance. By indicating the sentence “is utterly inadequate for such
cases,” he suggests the penalty of death as in the earlier sodomy trials would have been
more appropriate. For the Judge and those supporting his moral disapproval, the law
inadequately dealt with the facts of the case. The letter of the law was insufficient to
fully contain the problem of male homosexuality.

The Star’s recording of the Judge’s speech is almost identical to Hyde’s account of the trials. See Hyde,
242.
23
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Sodomy trials, including their graphic testimony and the potential for execution if
convicted, were part of the cultural consciousness, although they were probably
interpreted/internalized differently depending on one’s relationship with the idea and/or
practice of homosexuality. Rictor Norton’s book Mother Clap’s Molly House (1992)
makes it clear that there was a thriving gay subculture in England long before the Wilde
trials. Ian McCormick has edited a compilation of sodomy trial transcripts in the
eighteenth century, most famously regarding the raids surrounding Mother Clap’s Molly
House and the ensuing trials of 1725-26. The men in the molly houses were rounded up,
tried, and executed (McCormick 72-82). Surely those men shared a similar selfconsciousness about their identity, but that consciousness could not be articulated
publicly in any way.
In 1836, the last execution for sodomy was performed in England; by 1861,
sodomy was no longer a capital offense (Cohen 118), but it was still a crime, and those
who transgressed against the law had to undergo some sort of public shaming. H.G.
Cocks has uncovered the statistics of British sex crime arrests and indictments in the
nineteenth century. More than 8,000 men were put on trial in the course of the century
for crimes involving sodomy and later gross indecency (Cocks 24-25).
Three important trials served as precursors to the Wilde trials: the trial of “Fanny
and Stella” in 1871, the 1884 Dublin Castle Scandal, and the 1890 Cleveland Street
Affair. As Morris Kaplan has shown, these scandalous trials were definitely in the
cultural consciousness during the Wilde trials. Ernest Boulton and Frederick Park,
“Fanny and Stella” as they called themselves when in drag, participated in a key cultural
precursor to the Wilde trials. The trial of Fanny and Stella highlighted in interesting
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ways the links between theatre and courtroom proceedings, as well the performative
nature of law and gender. Boulton and Park were involved in amateur theatricals and
enjoyed cross-dressing and parading about the West End, attracting many male admirers,
some of whom thought they were prostitutes. The public was intrigued by the pair when
they were charged with conspiracy to commit sodomy, and press accounts were fixated
by the notion of cross-dressing. The two of them were eventually acquitted by a jury, in
part because, as Kaplan argues, nineteenth-century Britain did not equate cross-dressing
with homosexuality, and the men’s theatrical background proved a convincing defense.
They were actors who simply loved the artifice of performance and playing this joke on
the public, the defense successfully argued (Kaplan 77).
In the Dublin Castle Scandal, which erupted in 1884, an Irish Nationalist
newspaper editor was sued for uncovering homosexual activities among Crown officials
working at Dublin Castle. In an uncanny precursor to the Wilde trials’ fact pattern, the
officials sued the editor and lost because men came forward and testified that they had
indeed had sexual relations with them. The officials were then tried: some were
acquitted, one was sentenced two years imprisonment, and one received “twenty years of
penal servitude” (Kaplan 176-78).
The next year, in 1885, the Labouchère Amendment to the Criminal Law
Amendment Act was passed, probably as a result of the Dublin Castle Scandal; this was
the “gross indecency” statute that would govern the Wilde trial (Kaplan 178). Although
sodomy was no longer a capital offense, David Schulz points to the fact that the
Labouchère Amendment simultaneously focused and widened the scope of same-sex
criminality, enlarging it from the original crime of sodomy—which had originally not
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been confined to male homosexual sodomy—to “any male person” engaging in or
soliciting “in public or in private […] any act of gross indecency with another male
person.” Schulz writes,
The language of the amendment shifted the focus of the law from the crime of
sodomy—a crime based on a specific act—to a crime against gender. The vague
phrasing, then, is not wholly an example of Victorian prudery, but rather a general
attempt to regulate male behavior. In short, this amendment effectively fosters
the legal institutionalization of masculinity through the articulation in the courts
of decent and indecent behavior between men. (47)
The language of the Labouchère Amendment, according to Schulz, not only regulated
homosexuality, but also attempted to regulate appropriate masculine behavior. The law
also infiltrated private spaces and merely soliciting such acts, which extended the law
from one prohibited sexual act to broad codes of behavior and mannerisms. Fanny and
Stella would have been charged under the Gross Indecency statute because their
performance in drag might be considered within the wider scope of the statute and its
prohibitions. Cross-dressing was certainly not conventionally masculine behavior; under
the new statute, Queensberry was right: to pose as a thing was as bad as to be it. Fanny
and Stella were therefore not just posing as women; in doing so, they would also have
been transgressing against what was now “the legal institutionalization of masculinity.”
The Cleveland Street Affair of 1890 was the first homosexual scandal that erupted
after the Labouchère Amendment was passed. Post office boys were found to have been
serving as male prostitutes for certain noblemen and high officials. The aristocrats fled
the country (Kaplan 166-171). That year, a critical review of Wilde’s The Picture of
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Dorian Grey criticized the novel as meant for “outlawed noblemen and perverted
delivery boys” (qtd. in Kaplan 225). In doing so, the reviewer indicated there was a
specific, albeit depraved, audience for homosexual-themed texts.
The historical context of sodomy trials and nineteenth-century sex scandals
deepens Sinfield’s popular line of argument that the Wilde trials crystallized a modern
gay identity. As we can see, similar rituals and punishments had been meted out for
centuries. There is a high probability that many of the spectators at the Wilde trials, and
the readership of its press coverage, had some sense of the history of the sex-crime trial
that they had come to witness. There is also a probability that some came, perhaps
unconsciously, to watch a repetition of the historic traumas of old sodomy trials, or more
recent sex scandals, be enacted again in the form of Wilde’s shame and punishment.

3. The Abyss of the Wilde Trials
Felman uses the metaphor of “the abyss” to describe seemingly un-resolvable
conflicts between human beings: “The expressionless, I argue, grounds both the legal
meaning of the trial and its inadvertent literary and dramatic power” (165). She argues
that law, especially significant trials, attempts “to throw a bridge over the abyss” while
“the purpose of the literary text is, on the contrary, to show or to expose again the
severance and the schism, to reveal once more the opening, the hollowness of the abyss,
to wrench apart what was precisely covered over, closed or covered up by the legal trial”
(95, emphasis in original). As a result of a comparative analysis of Tolstoy’s story “The
Kreutzer Sonata” and the O.J. Simpson trial, she is able to more fully capture the cultural
implications of the Simpson trial. Tolstoy’s fiction provides a closer look at the abyss of
trauma that the Simpsons trial tried to bridge. Felman works to “draw out Tolstoy’s
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insight, so to speak, into the O.J. Simpson case in order to illuminate legal obscurities
with literary insights and to reflect on ambiguities the trial has left by using textual issues
that will turn out (surprisingly) to be quite relevant to them” (55, emphasis in original).
In doing so, Felman uses Tolstoy’s literature to understand the true stakes of the Simpson
trial, and draws the following conclusions:
What was finally revealed at the trial’s end was . . . not the curtain’s fall,
not the closure of the case or a catharsis finally obtained by a legal
resolution, but here again only the terrifying opening, only the emptiness
of an ungraspable abyss: an abyss between the sexes; an abyss between the
races; an abyss between legality and justice; a gap in perception between
blacks and whites; . . . an abyss between conflicting views of the
significance or insignificance of domestic violence; an abyss between the
rich, who can buy justice, and the poor, who cannot afford to pay its price;
an abyss between conflicting views or contradictory emotional perceptions
of the verdict as a victory or as an absolute defeat. (Felman 90)
What is “the abyss” that the Wilde trials inadvertently open up? What abysses do the
trials try to avoid opening? What do they attempt to legally define that cannot be
reducible to legal concepts? Modern gay identity? Perhaps Sinfield is right after all.
Using Felman’s interpretive strategy as a guide, I will now analyze how The Importance
of Being Earnest may help to answer these questions.

The Importance of Being Earnest: A Comedic Jump into the Abyss
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Earnest opened on February 14, 1895, a month before Wilde brought his libel
action against Queensberry. The play continued to run until Wilde’s disgrace first forced
his name from the front of the theatre, and then finally resulted in the play being
cancelled altogether (Ellman 458). In the same city, performed in a legal and a
commercial theatre, two dramas played out that involved the crisis and anxieties
surrounding the production of a new identity; in fact, the crisis was over the nature and
possibility of any kind of substantial identity, but specifically a gay male identity.
I consider The Importance of Being Earnest the most perfect comedy in the
English language. Perhaps the key to its comedy is its treatment of nonsense and
nothingness. The irony in Earnest is that this “nonsense,” as Algernon states in this
chapter’s epigraph, suffuses the dialogue and plotline of a play that focuses on a man’s
search for his identity. Searching for one’s identity is supposedly an important
undertaking. What could be more important than discovering one’s own story, the secret
to one’s personality and destiny? Jack/Ernest politely asks, “I hate to seem inquisitive,
but would you kindly inform me who I am?” (53). Wilde’s play is supposedly centered
on the nature of identity, yet it consistently refuses to name names and articulate essences
and realities; even at the end when Jack’s identity as Ernest is revealed, things still retain
the air of affectation.
Recall that Felman uses the metaphor of the abyss to show how law and literature
attempt to address great issues of cultural concern. Law attempts “to throw a bridge over
the abyss” while “the purpose of the literary text is, on the contrary, to show or to expose
again the severance and the schism, to reveal once more the opening, the hollowness of
the abyss, to wrench apart what was precisely covered over, closed or covered up by the
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legal trial” (95). Felman is suggesting that law tries to cover the wounds of trauma, but
the nature of trauma defies legal compartmentalization.
In the context of dramatic literature, theatre provides a literal and figurative space
for a community to safely enter into the abyss and examine what is really there. A theater
is a cavernous space,24 dark and uncertain, but it is not an abyss, not a bottomless chasm.
The trauma leaves the unconscious and enters into the deliberate theatrical and cultural
consciousness. Theaters provide a seeing place in which to view, contemplate,
understand, and heal the larger cultural trauma at issue. Wilde’s masterwork confronts
the same abyss that in some respects was avoided in Wilde’s trial. This abyss involves
the cultural anxiety surrounding the emergence of the modern gay male identity. The
abyss of gay identity emerged through the site of culturally contested traumas in the
courtroom. Nearby, within the proscenium arch at The St. James Theatre, the same abyss
was being comedically exploited and widened in The Importance of Being Earnest. The
play exuberantly contended then, and continues to contend now over a century later, that
all identities are reductive fictions. In this sense, the play presciently captures queer
theorist Judith Butler’s critical insight, that “gender is a kind of imitation for which there
is no original.”25
Within the context of the trials, the legal system’s demand for sincerity, or
earnestness, was the method by which the truth of Wilde’s innocence or guilt would be
found. The trials worked to crystallize an aspect of Wilde’s identity by legally stabilizing
his theretofore aesthetic and ironic discourse. Mr. Gill concluded his opening speech for
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the prosecution in the second trial, “I ask you gentlemen, to give this case, painful as it
must necessarily be, your most earnest and careful consideration” (Hyde 191, emphasis
added). The legal system in Wilde’s trials, according to the scholarship of Cohen and
Salamensky, attempted to create this new identity by fixating on the male homosexual
body; by anchoring meaning in Wilde’s body, the law was able to produce the
justification of guilt, and thus metonymically the guilt of all homosexual bodies in the
larger society. In this sense, the Criminal Law Amendment Act functioned as what
Judith Butler terms a “regulatory regime” that produced “identity categories.” Butler
asserts, “identity categories tend to be instruments of regulatory regimes, whether as
normalizing categories of oppressive structures or as the rallying points for a liberatory
contestation of that very oppression” (13-14). Wilde as sexual criminal was a
“normalizing” identity label for the “regulatory regime” of compulsory heterosexuality.
However, those who saw this legal disposition as unjust began conceptualizing a more
positive gay identity in lieu of sexual criminal, as a “rallying” cry “for a liberatory
contestation of that very oppression.”
The Importance of Being Earnest utilizes rhetorical strategies that are anathema to
legal discourse and “regulatory regimes”: irony, punning, and paradox. The play
ironically prevents the self from achieving semantic or physical stability by
deconstructing it through language. In turn, language is figured as the vehicle for
transcending the reductive categorizations of identity. In the play, ironic language and
performance prohibit the physical body from holding precedence over language’s
meaning, because the play contends that meaning must be unstable when it arises from
language. Earnest counteracts the stabilizing trajectory of the trials’ discourse by
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exploding the very notion of a fixed identity to be discovered. In this sense, Earnest is a
queer play while the trials’ discourse generated a gay identity.
This queerness of identity is at the heart of Wilde’s philosophy, but is also
potentially his self-protective strategy of the closet. In other words, Earnest may only be
philosophically “queer” in its theorization about identity because Wilde works to mask a
very real gay desire. It is fairly easy to read Earnest as a closet drama, easy to analyze
the dialogue as straining against the closet, akin to what occurs in Tennessee Williams’s
A Streetcar Named Desire, in which Blanche Dubois can easily be read as a gay man.
Bunburyism and all of the talk about double lives make the “closet drama” reading a
persuasive interpretation of Earnest.26 Bunbury is Algernon’s fictional invalid friend
who serves as an excuse for missing social functions, but this kind of secret life also
becomes an activity, Bunburying: “I may mention that I have always suspected you of
being a confirmed and secret Bunburyist” (5); “Besides, now that I know you to be a
confirmed Bunburyist I naturally want to talk to you about Bunburying. I want to tell you
the rules” (7); “A man who marries without knowing Bunbury has a very tedious time of
it” (7). As Joel Fineman has observed, the word bunbury is one of the only earnest terms
in the entire play, indicating “a collection of signifiers that straightforwardly express their
desire to bury in the bun” (113).
David Parker’s work on identity in Earnest helps clarify how the play can be
profitably interpreted alongside the trial. Parker argues that Earnest is an investigation of
For readings that connect Earnest’s deconstructive language with gay identity, see Jonathan Dollimore,
“Different Desires: Subjectivity and Transgression in Wilde and Gide,” in Genders 2 (1988): 24-41;
Christopher Craft, “Alias Bunbury: Desire and Termination in The Importance of Being Earnest,” in
Critical Essays on Oscar Wilde (New York: G.K. Hall, 1991): 119-137. Craft claims that the use of puns
like Ernest/earnest “becomes homoerotic because homophonic. Aurally enacting a drive toward the same,
the pun’s sound cunningly erases, or momentarily suspends the semantic differences by which the hetero is
both made to appear and made to appear natural, lucid, self-evident” (131).
26
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identity’s insubstantiality: “Neither being earnest nor being Ernest is of much help when
confidence is lost in the substantiality of human identity. The concern with identity is
repeatedly underlined in the text of the play…” (176). Parker goes on:
Lurking always in the depths of the play is a steady contemplation of
Nothingness, of le néant, which is all the more effective for its being, in contrast
to most of its manifestations, comic in mode. Instead of making Nothingness a
pretext for despair, Wilde finds in it a challenge to the imagination. For him,
Nothingness in human identity, in human claims to knowledge, in the
organization of society, becomes a field to be tilled by the artist—by the artist in
each of us. (176)
As Lady Bracknell notes, “Until yesterday I had no idea that there were any families or
persons whose origin was a Terminus” (46). Wilde is playing with the idea of inversion
here, noting that his particular aesthetic is based on style trumping content. “He has
nothing, but he looks everything. What more can one desire?” (48). Underneath all of
the poses lies nothing; there is no essential self that the mask hides because the mask is
the entirety of identity (a point that sounds very much like Judith Butler’s idea of gender
performativity). As Wilde writes in “The Decay of Lying,” “Truth is entirely and
absolutely a matter of style” (CW 981). Truth is simply the pose one takes; there is
nothing substantial and “real” there. Identity is always a mask one wears, according to
Wilde, and underneath the mask is nothing, not an essential something.
Later deconstructionist readings of Earnest have supported and clarified Parker’s
earlier criticism. Christopher Craft’s analysis focuses on the deconstructively queer work
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of punning in the play, and what implications therefore arise in terms of identity. Craft
notes,
Wilde stated with a parodist’s clarity and a criminal’s obscurity that the
importance of being was neither X nor Y, male nor female, homosexual nor
heterosexual, Parker nor Grigsby, Jack nor Ernest. Being will not be disclosed by
the descent of an apt and singular signifier, a proper name naturally congruent
with the object it seeks to denominate. . . . Belying such notions of true being,
Wilde suggests instead that identity has always already been mislaid somewhere
between such culturally ‘productive’ binarisms as those listed above. (126)
Craft is investigating the slippage that occurs in Earnest and in much of Wilde’s literary
writing. Through the use of paradox and irony, Wilde is often able to have two
seemingly opposing things be true at the same time, or the truth shifts between the
opposing poles. The truth of his artistry lies in the oscillations between different
binarisms and a refusal to settle at one pole.
The role of tone is crucial in understanding the relationship between Wilde’s trials
and his masterpiece. Irony suffuses Earnest, and even at the end when irony seems to
collapse as a strategy, we are to understand that the collapse itself is ironic. The play’s
final line, “I’ve now realized for the first time in my life the vital Importance of Being
Earnest,” is so effective because it is simultaneously true and ironic. It is true in terms of
the pun of Earnest/Ernest because Jack realizes that is his name; it is ironic because the
discourse of the play has been so successfully and comedically ironic throughout, and
Jack only found his true identity by donning another one and being deceptive, thereby
showing Wilde’s and the play’s commitment to frivolity and irony as the prized mode of
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discourse. There is nothing authentic about any of the dialogue or characters in the play,
and the final scene mocks the very idea of heteronormative couplings and romantic love.
The three couplings at the play’s end, with everyone shouting “At last!” as they embrace,
ironize heterosexual romance not to reveal homosexual identity, but to ironize gender
itself as a performative process. The end of Earnest positions Jack as having located a
stable identity, but ironically undercuts this identity because he was only successful at
becoming earnest/Ernest by practicing deception throughout the play. All of the
characters have located their identities through Wilde’s parodic positioning of those
identities as hollow affectations. Jack discovers his identity by the play’s end, but the
audience knows he has found nothing more than the pleasures of irony, paradox, and the
pose.
Part of what cannot (or should not) be known, as Wilde implies through the
paradox and ironies of Earnest, is identity itself. Cathy Caruth observes that trauma
must be articulated in literary language, “ a language that defies, even as it claims, our
understanding” (5). This idea comes into better focus through a close look at the
language in Wilde’s play. Caruth argues that “literature … is interested in the complex
relation between knowing and not knowing” (3). She suggests it takes time and
repetition to understand trauma’s significance. Trauma, she writes, “is always the story
of a wound that cries out, that addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth
that is not otherwise available. This truth, in its delayed appearance and its belated
address, cannot be linked only to what is known, but also to what remains unknown in
our very actions and language” (4). There was something else unknown in the play
Earnest and in the discourse of the Wilde trials: that there was a political solution to this

Barry 49
repeated cultural trauma. A gay identity, reductive though it may be, was beginning to be
fashioned. This sexual minority was coming to recognize itself as a distinct cultural
group, not as “somdomite[s]” [sic], as Queensberry would vilify them, but whatever that
identity classification would prove to be without the connotation of guilt.

“Earnestness” on Trial
Earnest serves as Wilde’s preferred mode of discourse, one that he was
completely able to control in the confines of his own work of art. Wilde’s most
successful literary technique is the epigram, which he often injects with irony, puns, and
paradox. He tried to employ paradox and irony as rhetorical strategies in his first trial,
but Edward Carson used the literal discourse required of law in order to make Wilde’s
ironic discourse unsuccessful. Carson began by cross-examining Wilde about his
epigrams, in particular the “Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young.” Carson
wanted the epigrams to be used as evidence for Wilde’s immorality:
Carson: Listen, sir. Here is one of your ‘Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of
the Young’: ‘Wickedness is a myth invented by good people to account for the
curious attractiveness of others.’ (Laughter.)
Wilde: Yes.
Carson: Do you think that is true?
Wilde: I rarely think that anything I write is true. (Laughter.) (Holland 74)
At another moment, Wilde disclosed an important aspect of his philosophy:
Carson: Listen to this: ‘Pleasure is the only thing one should live for, nothing ages
like happiness.’ Do you think pleasure is the only thing that one should live for?
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Wilde: I think self-realisation—realisation of one’s self—is the primal aim of life.
I think that to realise one’s self through pleasure is finer than to realise one’s self
through pain. That is the pagan ideal of man realizing himself by happiness as
opposed to the later and perhaps grander idea of man realising himself by
suffering. (Holland 75)
Within the context of the trial, Wilde’s “essential” self was realized only through the
legal discourse of sexual crime. This realization of self is comedically ironized in
Earnest, which is perhaps Wilde’s artistic expression of “the pagan ideal of man realizing
himself by happiness.” The play is about one man’s search for identity, although he does
not realize that until the final scene, and that identity is never securely attained or
articulated.
Although Wilde had enjoyed some of his trademark witticisms early on in the
cross-examination, the tone of the trial pivoted, and Wilde’s fortunes soured, when Wilde
was asked about his possibly homosexual relationship with Walter Grainger (Holland
xli). In the dialogue below, notice how Carson relentlessly uncovers the truth lying
within Wilde’s supposed irony. I quote the entire section because this moment in the
trials is one of the center points of Wilde’s trauma. This excerpt is taken from Holland’s
version of the trial transcript. The cross-examination is presented in the form of a
theatrical dialogue:
Carson: Did you ever kiss him?
Wilde: Oh no, never in my life, he was a peculiarly plain boy.
Carson: He was what?
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Wilde: I said I thought him unfortunately—his appearance was so very
unfortunate—very ugly—I mean—I pitied him for it.
Carson: Very ugly?
Wilde: Yes.
Carson: Do you say that in support of your statement that you never kissed him?
Wilde: No, I don’t; it is like asking me if I kissed a doorpost; it is childish.
Carson: Did you give me as the reason that you never kissed him that he was too
ugly?
Wilde: (warmly): No.
Carson: Why did you mention his ugliness?
Wilde: No, I said the question seemed to me like—your asking me whether I ever
had him to dinner, and then whether I had kissed him—seemed to me merely an
intentional insult on your part, which I have been going through the whole of this
morning.
Carson: Because he was ugly?
Wilde: No.
Carson: Why did you mention the ugliness? I have to ask these questions.
Wilde unsuccessfully attempted to utilize irony at this point, but the strategy failed
because he was in fact being serious: he was not attracted to Grainger and was employing
a truthful homosexual logic, unsuccessfully masked in a heterosexual irony, which in turn
conflicted with the heterosexist logic of the criminal law. Wilde is also unsuccessful here
because there actually is a physical truth underneath his logic, and it is not based on pure
imagination, nonsense, and nothingness.
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Wilde: Pardon me, you sting me, insult me and try to unnerve me in every way.
At times one says things flippantly when one should speak more seriously, I admit
that—I cannot help it. That is what you are doing to me.
Carson: You said it flippantly? You mentioned his ugliness flippantly; that is what
you wish to convey now?
Wilde: Oh, I don’t say what I wish to convey. I have given you my answer.
Carson: Is that it, that there was a flippant answer?
Wilde: Oh, it was a flippant answer, yes; I will say it was certainly a flippant
answer.
Carson: Did ever any indecencies take place between you and Grainger?
Wilde: No, sir, none at all. (207-9)
I quote from this excerpt from the trial at such length to show Carson’s skillful use of
cross-examination. Michael Foldy observes that “[t]his exchange represented both the
dramatic climax and the endpoint of Carson’s cross-examination. Heretofore an endless
fount of cleverness and brilliant repartee, Wilde had been reduced to silence” (18). The
legal machinery of the trials had produced a bridge that attempted to cover one form of
trauma represented by Wilde: his threat to the hetero-patriarchy and class distinctions. In
that sense, it had resolved the issue and prevented injury and threat to the wider public.
From Wilde’s perspective, however, and the class of men that identified with him,
nothing had been bridged at all, and in fact the abyss had been widened by the trials’ end
to produce a second kind of trauma. This group of men needed more opportunities to
revisit the scene and contemplate the trauma in different ways in the future. Their gay
identity had been formed in a traumatic crucible of criminality. Opportunities for
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traumatic repetition would materialize in future theatricalizations of the trial, as well as
the development of twentieth-century gay drama and its dynamic treatment of an
emerging “master narrative” surrounding gay male oppression.
Wilde’s trials required a desiring subject who would fit neatly within the language
of the law. Wilde committed acts that fell within the criminal law’s reach, and therefore
his actions resulted in the neat correlation between legal language and embodied desire:
the criminal, the homosexual, the modern gay subject could be classified and punished.
The Importance of Being Earnest uncovers the abyss that the Wilde trials tried to bridge.
That is, the play revels in that (always failed) attempt to accurately locate an identity in
language in general, and through the lens of sexuality in particular. Earnest comedically
illuminates Wilde’s philosophical stance that there is no essential self, gay or otherwise.
In actuality, by the end of the trials, Wilde was reduced to silence and his identity was
reduced and revealed to be that of a sexual criminal. The traumas of the trials lie in the
conflicts inherent in the cultural process of recognizing a necessarily fictive identity—the
gay subject—in order to accommodate a growing body of self-conscious men and their
political aims. These traumas could not be fully understood without the blending of legal
and theatrical discourses.
Earnest comedically inverts the trauma that would attend Wilde at his trial, and
allows a space to more fully contemplate and re-visit past wounds. When the play is read
and performed in the historical wake of the trials, it serves to raise the specter of the
abyss and the philosophical ideas at the heart of the trials, but it does so without any
attendant trauma. That is what makes it such a perfect comedy: it reaches sublimity
without the need of suffering. Nevertheless, the play’s ultimate sublimity is only
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achieved by looking through its artistic lens, from the safety of a theater, into the abyss
exposed by the Wilde trials themselves. The play transcends the trials’ traumas, but first
makes us contemplate them once again. As for identity, Earnest’s queer vision of the
instability of identity categories allows us to better understand the modern gay identity
forged in the Wilde trials. We come to view the ascendant identity of the “gay man” with
suspicion, as a necessary fiction resulting from law’s limited discourse.

Gross Indecency: Witnessing as the Key to Justice
Sodomy trials are no longer enacted in England or the United States, but they are
still replicated in various permutations. The old trials can be re-surface with actual
violence, extending to murder and executions like the young gay American Matthew
Shepard in Laramie, Wyoming in 1998 at the hands of homophobic citizens. Kaufman’s
The Laramie Project (2000) serves as a cathartic re-visitation of that particular trauma
involving Shepard; the play transforms Shepard into a gay martyr, and gay people by
extension are portrayed as the sympathetic victims of homophobia.
Similarly, Kaufman presents Wilde as a heroic gay martyr in Gross Indecency
(1997) as a means of revising cultural understanding of the trials. In doing so, Kaufman
utilizes theatre to influence the “master narrative” surrounding gay male lives. This
begins with the play’s title, which obviously refers to the gross indecency statute that
ensnared Wilde, but also doubles as a condemnation of the grossly indecent homophobic
culture that would prosecute such a man. The play is a theatrical presentation of excerpts
from the actual trial transcripts and press accounts. The Wilde trials deserve the title
“trial of the century” because they worked “to repeat and to awaken, to reopen a
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traumatic history of trials” (Felman 63), namely the sodomy trials. Similarly, Gross
Indecency theatrically “reopens” the Wilde trials, but the play works to heal the trauma of
the collective gay identity that was formed in the trials. It does this by revising the terms
of social justice and using the traumatic repetition as a catharsis for the audience to
experience. The audience gets to experience and witness the Wilde trials as an unjust
tragedy, and through experiencing the catharsis of the performance, the play works as a
collective ritual of healing and transformation. Jeffrey Alexander views aesthetic
representations as a key “institutional arena” engaged with developing a collective
identity in the wake of cultural trauma: “Insofar as meaning work takes place in the
aesthetic realm, it will be channeled by specific genres and narratives that aim to produce
imaginative identification and emotional catharsis” (15). Kaufman provides such
aesthetic representations with his innovative approach to blending law and theatre: his
project in both The Laramie Project and Gross Indecency is ultimately about gay pride
and generating cultural sympathy towards gay oppression.
Theatre does work that the other genres of literature do not explicitly do: it brings
communities together to watch, experience, and evaluate performance rituals. The most
effective theatre infuses those rituals with cultural work of some kind. The power of
these social gatherings can allow us to contemplate historical and legal events in unique
ways. Through Kaufman’s play, the sodomy trial is repeated in contemporary theatres
for a new jury, the theatrical spectators/witnesses. The legal result is represented in the
theatre as it came down in 1895, but Kaufman’s theatre of traumatic re-witnessing
actually serves to first examine, and then attempts to close up the wound of trauma
inflicted on past victims of the injustice. In this respect, Gross Indecency departs from
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Felman’s description of literature. Felman claims that literature functions to open up the
traumatic wound in order to expose the persistent abyss of trauma, an abyss that law
cannot adequately bridge. Kaufman’s theatre tries to open the abyss and then not just
bridge it, but seal it in order to achieve some closure and an opportunity for new histories
to be made.
S.I. Salamensky would disagree with me. In “Re-Presenting Oscar Wilde:
Wilde’s Trials, Gross Indecency, and Documentary Spectacle,” Salamensky argues that
Kaufman’s play Gross Indecency problematically replicates the same reductive trajectory
that Wilde’s trials followed, that of containing Wilde’s unstable artistic philosophy and
discourse by legally reducing it to the body and its sex acts. Salamensky claims, “the
play champions Wilde’s side while re-endorsing the conceptual premises Wilde dedicated
his oeuvre and life to fighting against” (575). These problematic “conceptual premises”
suggest there was something about Wilde that needed to be uncovered—the naming and
shaming of the sexuality that was made to solely and reductively constitute the modern
homosexual—and, according to Salamensky, Kaufman’s play replicates this same
reductive arc instead of doing service to Wilde’s more unstable queer philosophy of art
and life. As I showed in the previous section, the legal discourse of the trial was built on
these flawed conceptual premises.
In the trial, Salamensky argues,
Wilde attempts to relocate the discourse of the courtroom from the genital region
of the physical Wilde to the linguistic faculty of a discursive Wilde-double. This
shifts the dominant Victorian paradigm toward more modern notions of fractured,
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decentered, multivocal identity, deconstructing notions of truth and identifiable
selfhood, and of the individual body as the locus of these constructs. (580)
In the legal setting of the courtroom, Wilde failed to “relocate the discourse,” and
“[w]hen finally faced with incontrovertible material evidence . . . his pose stance failed
him, reducing him from highly textural, self-referential, anti-earnest salon-type talk to
conciliatory, earnest speech-text discourse…” (Salamensky 582). Salamensky suggests
that Kaufman’s play, in order to do a real service to Wilde, would have to break free from
this discursive trajectory of aestheticized speech to earnestness, and instead celebrate the
“decentered, multivocal identity” that Wilde conjured in his aesthetic discourse as, for
example, in Earnest.
Although Kaufman may be contributing to a certain replication of the traumas
inflicted in the original trials, he enacts this repetition with Wilde as the protagonist, not
the criminal, as a means of putting an end to the trauma’s repetition by moving it from
the legal space into the dramatic one. Salamensky argues that Kaufman’s repetition of
the discursive trajectory is a weakness of Gross Indecency’s dramatic structure, but I
would suggest that re-enacting the trauma of the Wilde trials within the theatrical space
allows for not only a repetition of the traumatic experience, but also an opportunity to
heal it, and invert the original trauma that presented gay identity as the homosexual
criminal. In this sense, Kaufman is not reinforcing past trauma; rather, he is continuing
the work of developing a sympathetic “master narrative” of gay collective identity that
Wilde helped to develop in his trials. If Kaufman had completely re-worked the trials’
discursive trajectory, he might have made the trauma inherent in the trials
unrecognizable, thereby preventing effective catharsis within the audience.
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Watching the Rent Boys
A crucial turning point in the trials, as well as, by extension, in Gross Indecency,
occurs when the rent boys are called up as witnesses, in order to provide testimony about
their acts of gross indecency with Wilde. This occurred at the start of the second trial,
beginning the evidence for the prosecution. Kaufman in turn places this event near the
beginning of the second act, using language from the Hyde transcripts, but adding
theatrical staging and music to enhance the moment’s effect:
GILL: I will now proceed to question the men with whom Mr. Wilde is accused
to have committed the acts of gross indecency. I ask you to pay close attention to
the testimony of these boys.
(Music—“Rule Britannia” coming from a music box. Four young men enter in
Victorian underwear and set up the “shameful den.”) (Kaufman 88)
In the original production of Gross Indecency in 1997, directed by Moisés Kaufman, the
“shameful den” was indeed established through a change of lighting, from the starker
colors of the brightly lit courtroom to darker reds and blues evocative of a red-light
district. It was jarring and memorable because Kaufman theatricalized the fact that male
bodies were sexually objectified on the witness stand; he dramatized and accentuated this
by having the “young men enter in Victorian underwear.” The actors playing the rent
boys made seductive poses and the atmosphere became homo-eroticized, if a bit campy
considering the background music, establishing the mood of a gay brothel
memory/fantasy.
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The testimony of the rent boys provided some of the most sensational moments in
the Wilde trials. For example, Charles Parker revealed in his testimony the genderbending that occurred behind closed doors: “I was asked by Wilde to imagine that I was
a woman and that he was my lover. I had to keep up this illusion. I used to sit on his
knees and he used to . . . as a man might amuse himself with a girl. Wilde insisted on this
filthy make-believe being kept up” (Hyde 193). David Schulz argues that in the trials,
Wilde illuminated and challenged the performative constructions of the patriarchy, race,
class boundaries, and gender. According to Schulz, Wilde threatened the institution of
masculinity, and that institution had been codified in the Criminal Law Amendment of
1885. Wilde’s obvious threat was showing the fluidity of gender and class boundaries
(47). By dining and sleeping with working-class youth, Wilde destabilized the role of the
traditional gentleman in terms of class, gender, and sexuality (even as his exploitation of
the boys also served to reinforce class distinctions and, if we believe Parker’s testimony,
reinforce the gender binary by asking them to pretend to be submissive women).
There are two major traumas at work when the rent boys come forward to give
testimony as witnesses. Recall that Felman defines trauma as “a blow to the self . . . a
shock that creates a psychological split or rupture, an emotional injury that leaves lasting
damage to the psyche” (171). The first is the trauma inflicted on the hetero-male upperclass, those against whom the rent boys represented a material threat. These would be the
men in positions of power and privilege who would have vaguely interpreted Wilde’s
homosexual relationships as indicative of the performative construction of their own
hetero-patriarchal claim to power. But we cannot assume that the spectators were of a
monolithic perspective in their interpretation of the trials. There also may have been a
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spectrum of men for whom the rent boys’ materiality caused a psychic “blow to the self”
in terms of catalyzing a certain sexual self-consciousness, a glimmer of recognition.
They might have projected themselves into the dock with Wilde, and have seen that they
were in effect on trial as well.
And of course there is the self-consciousness of the rent boys themselves, who
provided self-incriminating testimony in exchange for immunity. What did they think of
themselves in the context of the courtroom? Did they conceive of their activities with
Wilde purely in monetary terms, or did some of them experience a “blow to the self” as
they became central to the trials’ trajectory? As Felman writes, “the body of the witness
is the ultimate site of memory of individual and collective trauma” (9). There are two
kinds of witnessing occurring in the trials as well as in the play: the rent boy witnesses
delivering their testimony, and the witnesses in the audience watching the witnesses.
Spectatorship, witnessing, and testimony combine to produce a rich cultural moment
worthy of analysis. In terms of watching the play, if a male audience member takes any
kind of erotic pleasure in watching the actors portraying the rent boys, he in effect shares
culpability with Wilde; in that sense, Wilde’s ordeal becomes the spectator’s as well.
What makes the rent boy witnesses and their testimony so interesting is the fact
that male sexuality is objectified in the public space of the courtroom and theater. Their
bodies were held forth as potential objects of desire for both sexes: the very fact of male
prostitution—sex for a price—implies that men are not essentially heteronormative in
their orientation, but are also influenced by custom, power, gender, race, and class
dynamics.27 As Charles Parker states in the play,

27

“[G]ender is a kind of imitation for which there is no original” (Butler, “Imitation” 378).
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I said that if any old gentleman with money took a fancy to me, I was agreeable.
(The audience gasps.)
I was agreeable. I was terribly hard up.
(Laughter) (89)
When gender is seen as fluid and subject to manipulation, any hierarchies in place that
institute gender inequality come to seem constructed rather than essential. As Shulz
argues, the Criminal Law Amendment of 1885 was ultimately about regulating
masculinity; Kaufman critiques that regulation through capitalizing on witnessing the
bodies of sexualized male witnesses in the theater. Some male audience members may
desire the witnesses, or at least see those witnesses’ bodies through the lens of Wilde’s
desire, thus sympathizing with and legitimating the homosexual desire of those bodies.
By having the audience share Wilde’s desire, Kaufman works to dissolve Wilde’s past
culpability.

Wilde’s Speech from the Dock
Another major dramatic moment in Wilde’s trials was his famous speech from the
dock during the second trial, in which he earnestly defended “the love that dare not speak
its name,” in reference to Lord Alfred Douglas’s poem “Two Loves.” Kaufman
successfully dramatizes the moment in his contemporary play Gross Indecency by using
the language from Hyde’s account of the trials.
Gill: What is the “Love that dare not speak its name”?
Wilde: The “Love that dare not speak its name” in this century is such a
great affection of an elder for a younger man as there was between David and
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Jonathan, such as Plato made the very basis of his philosophy, and such as you
find in the sonnets of Michelangelo and Shakespeare. It is that deep, spiritual
affection that is as pure as it is perfect. It dictates and pervades great works of art
like those of Shakespeare and Michelangelo, and those two letters of mine, such
as they are. It is in this century misunderstood, so much misunderstood that it
may be described as the “Love that dare not speak its name,” and on account of it
I am placed where I am now. It is beautiful, it is fine, it is the noblest form of
affection. There is nothing unnatural about it. It is intellectual, and it repeatedly
exists between an elder and a younger man when the elder man has intellect and
the younger man has all the joy, hope, and glamor of life before him. That it
should be so the world does not understand. The world mocks at it and
sometimes puts one in the pillory for it.
(Loud applause, mingled with some hisses.) (Kaufman 110-111)28
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See Hyde, 201. Kaufman basically takes the speech verbatim from Hyde’s “official” legal
account. However, as Leslie Moran has shown, the textual authenticity of Wilde’s speech is uncertain
because of the many different versions of the trial. Moran systematically compares the textual
discrepancies among the versions given in Millard’s Oscar Wilde: Three Times Tried (1912) and
Montgomery Hyde’s account of the trials. These discrepancies raise the issue of the ethics of transcription
and to what extent different editors added material (Moran 245).
Lucy McDiarmid’s scholarship uncovers equally provocative questions about the authenticity of
Wilde’s speech in the dock. McDiarmid claims the speech originally appeared in The Picture of Dorian
Grey (1890) five years earlier, when Dorian thinks about the kind of love that Basil has for him:
The love that he bore him – for it was really love – had nothing in it that was not noble and
intellectual. It was not that mere physical admiration of beauty that is born of the senses, and that
dies when the senses tire. It was such love as Michael Angelo had known, and Montaigne, and
Winckelmann, and Shakespeare himself. Yes, Basil could have saved him. (qtd. in McDiarmid
455)
Given the uncertainty, Wilde’s speech in the dock may not function as authoritative legal discourse. His
own testimony was literary in nature, considering that he was quoting from his own novel. The speech’s
hybrid composition—partly legal, partly literary—makes it perfect to include in the present study of gay
legal theatre.
It is also worth noting that Wilde’s speech from the dock falls in the tradition of such speeches
delivered by Irish patriots facing imprisonment or death for rebelling against English rule, stretching back
to the 1790s. See Speeches from the Dock, Part I: Protests of Irish Patriotism (Dublin: A.M. Sullivan,
1868), published as a Project Gutenberg e-book prepared by Jonathan Ingram and Martin Pettit,
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13112/13112-h/13112-h.htm. Viewed in this tradition, Wilde
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Kaufman utilizes legal testimony in order to solidify what Alexander terms the
“master narrative” of gay male identity shaped by the trauma that gay men historically
endured. When Wilde delivered some version of his famous speech from the dock during
the second trial (exactly what he said will never be known), the speech became a dynamic
site for the master narrative of gay male identity.29 Alexander observes that “storytelling
is … a complex a multivalent symbolic process that is contingent, highly contested, and
sometimes highly polarizing” (12). Because the speaker was a dramatist, and the speech
has been successfully utilized in artistic representations of the trials, it is relevant as an
important text that works toward establishing the “four critical representations” necessary
for creating such a master narrative30: 1) Wilde’s speech implies the nature of the pain
inflicted on him and other men who had to hide their desire or sexual activities, hence
“the love that dare not speak its name”; 2) Wilde sympathetically describes the “nature of
the victim” by placing this form of identity in the tradition of great artists like

the Irishman becomes martyred even more so when we consider his speech as an act of rebellion against
oppressive English law. See Éibhear Walsh, “The First Gay Irishman? Ireland and the Wilde Trials,” ÉireIreland 40.3-4 (Fall/Win 2005): 38-57, 42. In 1916, twenty years after Wilde made his speech from the
dock, Irish patriot Roger Casement followed in this rhetorical tradition in protest of his conviction of
treason for participation in the Easter Rising. For text of the speech, see “Roger Casement’s Speech from
the Dock.” New Statesman, 1 March 2010. Web. http://www.newstatesman.com/2010/03/irelandlaw-england-irishmen, date accessed 6 January 2016. Interestingly, British government officials used
evidence of Casement’s homosexuality, from Casement’s so-called Black Diaries, to undermine his
reputation after the trial and keep him from achieving martyr status (Jaeger 134). The shadow of
Casement’s homosexuality hung over the memory of his trial for treason and in effect reopened and
replicated the trauma trial as it had played out with Wilde. Thank you to Professor Mary Burke for
pointing out this fascinating connection. See Elizabeth Jaeger, “Roger Casement: How Effective was the
British Government’s Smear Campaign Exposing the Homosexual Black Diaries?” Éire-Ireland 46.3
(2011): 132-169; Lucy McDiarmid, “The Posthumous Life of Roger Casement” in Gender and Sexuality in
Modern Ireland, ed. Anthony Bradley and Maryann Gialanella Valiulus (Amherst: U of Mass P, 1997),
127-158.
29
Havelock Ellis wrote in Studies in the Psychology of Sex: “No doubt the celebrity of Oscar Wilde and the
universal publicity given to the facts of the case may have brought conviction of their perversion to many
inverts who were only vaguely conscious of their abnormality and, paradoxically though it may seem, have
imparted greater courage to others” (qtd. in Kaplan 264).
30
See Alexander, 12-15.
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Michaelangelo and Shakespeare. He portrays the victim as blameless and instead worthy
of admiration.
The third “critical representation” according to Alexander is the “relation of the
trauma victim to the wider audience”: “To what extent do the members of the audience
for trauma representations experience an identity with the immediately victimized
group?” (14). Alexander claims that in the beginning stages of developing a master
narrative, the wider audience may not fully share and sympathize with the victims of the
trauma (14). Indeed, we see that with the presence of the “hisses” as recorded by Hyde.
However, over time, if the master narrative successfully embeds itself in a culture,
members of the wider culture will begin to sympathize with the minority identity even if
they do not share the identity itself. There were undoubtedly never any hisses in the
audience of Kaufman’s play during this moment. That is because the fourth and final
critical representation was present in the play: locating an antagonist responsible for the
minority identity’s trauma. By the end of Kaufman’s play, that antagonist is
symbolically figured as the audience itself to stand for the larger homophobic society.
When Wilde came forth at the end of the second trial to answer for the previous
testimony, his sincere speech trying to justify and give revisionary witness to the “love
that dare not speak its name” was received in varying ways. Hyde writes that after he
finished the speech, there was “loud applause, mingled with some hisses” (236). It is
impossible to know what really occurred at that point in the trial, but the loud applause
gives one pause to consider the positive potentialities of re-enacting and dramatizing
historical trauma: the value of re-visionary martyrdom. Kaufman may partially replicate
the general trajectory of the trials’ discourse in the play Gross Indecency, but he does so
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with Wilde as the story’s hero. In asking the contemporary audience to shift their
sympathy and perspective toward those who gave “loud applause” after Wilde’s speech,
Kaufman in effect privileges the perspective of that minority for whom the witnesses
sparked a certain self-recognition or consciousness. In the play’s epilogue, the narrator
tells us, “By the year 1920, Oscar Wilde was, after Shakespeare, the most widely read
English author in Europe” (130). The audience is meant to re-evaluate Wilde’s trials as
unjust persecution, and instead sympathize with him as worthy of great admiration.
Kaufman attempts to solidify the master narrative of the gay martyr and the trajectory of
modern gay rights.
In legal discourse, the climax of a trial is the verdict. (“That’s why I could never
be a lawyer. In court all that matters is the verdict.”)31 In Kaufman’s play, however,
Wilde’s speech from the dock is the emotional climax: the moment when the dramatic
suspense is at its height, when the final possibilities of the narrative are still open; the
moment before the law is handed down as either a liberatory exculpation or an inexorable
sentence of condemnation. The initial rituals of gay legal theatre were the sodomy and
gross indecency trials; Kaufman’s play contributes to their reimagining and refashioning.
Gross Indecency repeats the trauma of the Wilde trials, which in turn repeated the
traumatic sodomy trials before them. However, the play is performed as a cathartic
repetition meant to heal the wounds inflicted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act of
1885, and by extension, the wounds from all laws that criminalized and stigmatized malemale sexual intimacy throughout the twentieth century.

Louis speaking in Tony Kushner’s Angels in America Part I: Millennium Approaches (New York:
Theatre Communications Group, 1992), 38.
31
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Chapter 2
Re-imagining the Law:
Coward, Orton, and 1960s British Gay Legal Theatre
Historical Timeline
1956

Wolfenden Report issued, recommending the repeal of Wilde-era
laws criminalizing all homosexual conduct

1958

The absolute ban on all theatrical depictions and discussions of
homosexuality lifted by Lord Chamberlain; only “serious”
discussions of homosexuality allowed on stage

29 June 1964

Orton’s Entertaining Mr. Sloane premieres

14 April 1966

Coward’s A Song at Twilight premieres

29 Sept. 1966

Orton’s Loot premieres

4 July 1967

Sexual Offences Act decriminalizes homosexuality in private
spaces. Only implemented in England and Wales.

10 Aug 1967

Orton murdered by his lover

1968

Theatres Act of 1968 abolishes Lord Chamberlain’s powers to
censor the theatre

1970

Gay Liberation Front formed in UK

1973

Coward dies
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Introduction
This chapter investigates how two gay British dramatists navigated
representations of homosexuality in the dynamic period that began in 1956, when the
British Wolfenden Report was issued, and spanned just over a decade. The report, which
was a long time coming after much public debate, recommended that the old Wilde-era
laws criminalizing all homosexual conduct be reformed to decriminalize private
homosexual conduct. Over the next decade, the British engaged in a cultural debate
regarding whether those old laws should be reformed: what were the implications of
such legal reform, the British citizenry asked itself, in terms of family, society, and
artistic expression? In 1958, the censor over British theatre, the Lord Chamberlain,
relaxed the absolute ban on all discussion and representations of homosexuality,
ostensibly allowing only “serious” references on the stage. This allowed the cultural
debate over legal reforms to be presented in public theatrical forums.
The sixties brought monumental cultural changes to attitudes surrounding family,
sexuality, and the theatre. Joe Orton’s and Noël Coward’s commercially successful
theatre produced during this time reflected and contributed to these changes. This
chapter will analyze how Orton’s plays Entertaining Mr. Sloane (1964) and Loot (1966),
and Coward’s last play A Song at Twilight (1966) positioned themselves in the cultural
and legal debate over homosexuality, and in particular how the plays contributed to the
political process underway that would culminate in decriminalization of private
homosexual conduct and the dismantling of the British theatre’s censorship apparatus.
So much of gay drama has arisen in response to the legal restrictions in place
upon homosexuality in the larger culture and within theatrical venues. The affectations
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and “camp” style of Wilde and Coward, for example, arose as a response to the strictures
in place against directly representing same-sex desires on stage and in public spaces. For
most of his career, Coward’s hallmark style, captured in plays like Hay Fever (1925),
never directly addressed the subject of homosexuality, in part because the Lord
Chamberlain prohibited it on the stage. But Coward’s inimitable style arose in response
to the prohibitions; when those prohibitions fell away, his last play, A Song at Twilight,
became less purely aesthetic and more directly political. Coward’s last play, in
retrospect, becomes the work of a Gay Liberationist, whether he would have admitted it
or not. A Song at Twilight dramatizes a gay man who has been crippled by the laws and
cultural biases surrounding homosexuality, and becomes a rather didactic plea for
change. That change would come one year after the play premiered, with the passage of
the 1967 Sexual Offences Act.
Coward and Orton in a sense were the dramatic predecessors, in that dynamic
decade of the sixties, of the later strands of Gay and Queer Liberation. They made
choices in their art, choices which would be mirrored politically in the decades to come.
For most of Coward’s career, when the laws surrounding homosexuality were seemingly
intransigent, he had pursued a coded discourse of camp as a successful strategy of
mounting commercially successful plays pitched to a variety of audience members, some
of whom were aware of a homosexual subtext, as Alan Sinfield argues in “Private
Lives/Public Theatre: Noël Coward and the Politics of Homosexual Representation.”
When the legal paradigm began shifting, though, his particular mode of gay drama was
transformed into the overtly political.
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Orton, on the other hand, contributed to legal and cultural reform in a different,
more radical way. His dramas utilized a queerly libertarian politics; Orton’s plays do not
characterize gay men as a distinct identity or even homosexuality as a distinct subject or
“problem” to be solved. Rather, his plays attempt to destabilize all institutional structures
and paradigms—legal, familial, as well as those governing gender and sexuality—in
order to highlight the futility and insidiousness of state intervention in matters governing
the family and sexuality.
Orton was personally and artistically obsessed with crime. His plays comedically
repeat taboo crimes again and again—blurring the line between normative behavior and
criminality—amidst real legal changes involving theatrical censorship and conduct
outside of theatres. By positioning the idea of crime as absurd, precisely at the moment
when the crime of homosexuality was coming under public scrutiny for potential revision
and repeal, Orton was able to call attention to the dangers of state regulation of morality
and sexuality.
In his play Entertaining Mr. Sloane (1964), following a few years after the
Wolfenden Committee issued its recommendations about changes to the law regarding
homosexuality that had been in place since Wilde’s lifetime, Orton argues that laws
governing intimate relationships have only limited power over the manner in which both
individuals conduct their private lives and families are actually constructed. Entertaining
Mr. Sloane suggests, in a libertarian spirit, that individuals should be free to establish
among themselves, contractually or otherwise, a multiplicity of familial and sexual
arrangements. Two years later in 1966, just one year before the Sexual Offences Act was
passed into law, Orton articulated a more radical critique of state laws in Loot.
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Interestingly, considering that the thrust of the Sexual Offences Act was to decriminalize
homosexual conduct in private, Orton’s play Loot suggests that private spaces are equally
subject to a corrupt state surveillance apparatus as public spaces. The play serves as an
anarchic complaint about the dangers of state intervention into family and sexual matters.

Dramatic and Legal Context
There are two sets of legal regulations worth exploring throughout this study
examining gay drama and the law: those governing same-sex activity in the world
outside the theatres, and those involving representations of homosexuality on the stage.
The two sets of laws influence each other, and sometimes collide.
In his history of British homosexual law reform, Stephen Jeffery-Poulter
illuminates how laws surrounding homosexuality have been slow to change because
political reformers often hesitated to begin or enter the debate, lest they be thought to
condone homosexual activity. Laws punishing homosexual behavior in England have
roots in the Middle Ages, when Ecclesiastical Courts had the power to burn those
convicted of sodomy. In 1533, Henry VIII reformed the court system as part of the
Reformation and the crime came under the authority of state courts, which would still
inflict the death penalty for it (Jeffery-Poulter 9). In the 1820s, although over a hundred
crimes were removed from being capital offences, “buggery” remained on the books, in
part because “[d]uring the debates on these reforms the Victorian MPs could not bring
themselves to use the word buggery and instead referred to it as the crime ‘INTER
CHRISTIANOS NON NOMINANDUM’ –‘not named amongst Christians’” (9).
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Finally, the death penalty was removed as the punishment in 1861; instead, life
imprisonment was the new sentence given, or ten years for those attempting the crime.
The Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885 actually widened the reach of the
previous laws, in that it included not just acts of sodomy, but any homosexual activity
between men in public or private. The governing language of the 1885 statute reads:
“Any male person who, in public or private, commits or is a party to the commission of,
or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of any act of gross
indecency with another male person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” The language
here is quite broad; basically, anyone in the company of other men who might be
interested in homosexual activity could be charged with gross indecency.
The British Lord Chamberlain banned all stage representations and discussion of
homosexuality or homosexuals until 1958 (De Jongh, Politics 82). In 1958, because
homosexuality was becoming more openly discussed, “Only ‘serious’ plays would be
allowed, presumably because homosexuals were considered an improper subject for
laughter” (Politics 83). Nicolas De Jongh notes, “‘Embraces’ of the homosexual kind or,
worse, ‘practical demonstrations of love’ (as [the Lord Chamberlain] called them)
‘between homosexuals’ would still be outlawed. As a final concession, he solemnly
announced ‘We will allow the word ‘pansy’ but not ‘bugger’” (Not in Front 90).
1967 proved to be a pivotal year for legislative reform of sexual morality. New
laws were passed regarding homosexuality and abortion, and a law governing divorce
was almost passed. Mark Donnelly argues that these legal reforms were based on a shift
in the paradigm for thinking about the role of state regulation: “Reform essentially arose
from the utilitarian philosophical position which held that the criminal law should be

Barry 72
used to serve the public good rather than to impose a particular pattern of moral behavior
on individuals” (120). That shift for purposes of homosexual legal reform was
recommended by The Wolfenden Report of 1956, which concluded that the purpose of
criminal law “was to preserve public order and decency, and to protect the weak from
exploitation. It was not to impose a particular pattern of moral behavior” (Weeks 165).
The 1967 Sexual Offences Act decriminalized all homosexual conduct in England and
Wales between adult men in private spaces.32 That same year, abortion was legalized
under certain conditions: “The new law permitted an abortion within the first 28 weeks
of pregnancy provided that two doctors confirmed it was necessary either on medical or
psychological grounds. Thus, for the first time, an abortion could be allowed on ‘social’
grounds, rather than exclusively on the narrow justification that a termination was
required to safeguard the mother’s health” (Donnelly 120-21).33 A bill to reform divorce
was almost passed that year as well, but failed to get through because the legislators ran
out of time; however, the Divorce Reform Act of 1969 introduced no fault divorce into
Britain for the first time (Donnelly 121).
The laws governing “private” and “public” homosexuality, on stage and in the
wider culture, later collided in spectacular fashion in 1982, when the director of Howard
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The Sexual Offences Act only applied in England and Wales, not Scotland and Northern Ireland. The
statute defined “two adult men” as older than twenty-one, whereas the age of consent for heterosexual
activity was sixteen. In addition, the statute did not apply to the merchant navy and the armed forces. See
Jeffrey Weeks, Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain from the Nineteenth Century to the Present
(London: Quartet, 1990), 176. Scotland did not see homosexual decriminalization until The Criminal
Justice Act of 1980. See Roger Davidson, “Sexuality and the State: the Campaign for Scottish Homosexual
Law Reform, 1967-80,” Contemporary British History 20.4 (2006): 533-558. Northern Ireland did not
decriminalize private homosexuality until the Homosexual Offences Order of 1982 as a result of the case
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (1981) in the European Court of Human Rights. The Republic of Ireland did
not decriminalize until 1993 as a result of the European Court of Human Rights case Norris v. Ireland
(1988).
33
“In effect the responsibility for policing abortion passed from the police themselves and the courts to
(usually male) doctors. There was no question, however, that abortion was now being defined in terms of a
woman’s ‘right to choose’ (Donnelly 121).
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Brenton’s The Romans in Britain was “charged with attempting to procure an act of gross
indecency between two males in defiance of the Sexual Offences Act” (Politics 246).
The play featured a simulation of male rape, although the rape is really a vivid allegory
for the British colonization of Ireland. The Attorney-General intervened and the case was
withdrawn, but not before Mr. Justice Staughton issued a ruling “that the Sexual Offences
Act could, in theory, be applied to performances on stage and that the simulation of
buggery on stage might constitute gross indecency” (Politics 246). The problem, as The
Guardian noted at the time, was “The draftsmen…forgot to ensure that statutory as well
as common law could not be invoked against the theatre” (qtd. in Politics 246). In other
words, because the theatre was a public space, the Justice’s ruling implied that even
representations of homosexuality were not in the protected zone of decriminalization.
Part of the problem lay with the law’s insistence on maintaining a fragile
public/private dichotomy. This dichotomy breaks down most apparently in Orton’s queer
dramatic vision, as I will explore later in the chapter.

Coming Out: Noël Coward’s A Song at Twilight
When three men published and signed an open letter proclaiming their
homosexual identity to the New Statesman in 1960, they became the first British men to
publicly divulge their gay identity to a society that legally condemned their acting on that
identity. They advocated not just legal reform, but also the necessity for a larger cultural
reform, as they were among the first to come out of the closet in a spectacularly public
forum of a newspaper:

Barry 74
[“The homosexual situation”] is a problem only because of the prevailing
attitude towards it, and because the law encourages such an attitude and
hinders every attempt to overcome it. Even so, law reform, although
essential, is only a first step; there will remain the much larger and longer
task of dissolving centuries of accumulated and deeply ingrained
misconception. (qtd. in Jeffery-Poulter 67)
“Coming out” became an important political focus of the emerging Gay Liberation
Movement in both the United States and the United Kingdom. The British Gay
Liberation Front formed in 1970; the organization promoted three central political aims:
coming out, coming together, and eradicating sexism generally (Weeks 191). Coming
out was a new phenomenon that bridged the transition from assimilationist political
strategies to more liberationist ones. Assimilationist strategies downplayed differences
between gays/lesbians and straight society, in order to advocate for legal reform on the
basis of a shared humanity. Nikki Sullivan writes:
The aim of assimilationist groups was (and still is) to be accepted into, and
to become one with, mainstream culture. Consequently, one of the
primary tenets of assimilationist discourses and discursive practices is the
belief in a common humanity to which both homosexuals and
heterosexuals belong. And this commonality—the fact that we are all
human beings despite differences in secondary characteristics such as the
gender of our sexual object choices—is the basis, it is claimed, on which
we should all be accorded the same (human) rights. (23)
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The distance between legal and cultural reform—and between assimilation and
liberation—is highlighted in Noël Coward’s swan-song, A Song at Twilight (1966).
Coward’s last play makes a direct plea for homosexual legal reform in Britain on the
basis of the real damage existing laws inflicted on gay men. The main character, Hugo
Latymer, represents the liminal period between assimilation and liberation. The play
ultimately critiques assimilation as a failed strategy that ruined lives, and works toward a
fledgling liberationist politics. Hugo realizes that his assimilationist careerism, which
caused him to conceal his homosexuality from the public in order to achieve fame—came
at a great personal price that fills him with elegiac dread by play’s end.
Although reviews of the play throughout its production history, and scholarly
criticism of the play, have always tended to downplay it as a quaint or lackluster product
of an aging, increasingly irrelevant Coward, the play mirrors the cultural trajectory
toward open visibility for gays and lesbians. The larger cultural changes in the sixties,
when “gay men and lesbians began to see themselves as a specific, oppressed minority
with its own identity and culture,” informed the work of Gay Liberation (De Jongh, Not
in Front 87). A Song at Twilight was a commercially successful drama that, in the course
of its performance—specifically at the end of Act I—“outs” itself as an explicitly gay
drama, just as Coward a little less explicitly outed himself by performing in the main role
on stage. Assimilation is positioned as a failed strategy, and the play points toward a
liberationist politics.
Although a master of camp and the veiled gay code throughout most of his
dramatic career, in plays such as The Vortex (1924) and Design for Living (1932), and a
publicly closeted gay man himself, Coward saw the culture changing throughout the
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twentieth century. In Twilight, he dutifully follows the censorship rule set out in 1958
that only “serious” discussions of homosexuality were allowed on the stage. A Song at
Twilight adheres to the censorship regulations in the theatre, and although nominally a
comedy, it is an earnest, elegiac response to the legal landscape of the 1960s: elegiac in
the sense of a mourning for all of the gay lives marred by an oppressive legal regime. It
is a political call for reform, painting a loosely autobiographical picture of a man whose
life was plagued by the secrets he had to keep from the public.
Coward followed the debates surrounding homosexual law reform, as noted
several times in his diaries. On 13 February 1966, just two months before Twilight
premiered in London, Coward reflected on the imminent passage of the Sexual Offences
Act:
The Homosexual Bill has passed through the House of Commons with a
majority of fifty-five votes. I read the debate in the Telegraph. Really
some of the opposition speeches were so bigoted, ignorant and silly that
one can hardly believe that adult minds, particularly those adult minds
concerned with our Government, should be so basically idiotic. However,
now all will be well apparently and the law will be changed at the next
session. Nothing will convince the bigots, but the blackmailers will be
discouraged and fewer haunted, terrified young men will commit suicide.
(Diaries 624)
The play takes place in a luxurious Swiss hotel room in 1966, in which the aging
author Hugo Latymer spends time reflecting on the twilight of his life and career. Hugo
is described in the stage direction as “an elderly writer of considerable eminence” (9),
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which certainly sounds like Coward at that point in time. He lives with his wife Hilde,
but the relationship is strained and infused with bitterness. Act I involves the entrance of
Carlotta Gray, an actress who had an affair with Hugo many years before. She has come
to convince Hugo into letting her publish their old love letters for her soon-to-be
published memoirs. Publishing the letters would give Carlotta’s book an added appeal
and commercial success. When Hugo refuses, Carlotta blackmails him by divulging that
she is in possession of another set of love letters: ones that Hugo wrote to his male
secretary, Perry Sheldon many years before. The element of blackmail echoes Coward’s
thought in his diaries about the need for legal reform. Act I ends with the startling
revelation of Hugo’s homosexuality:
Hugo. What do you know about Perry Sheldon?
Carlotta. Among other things that he was the only true love of your life.
Good night, Hugo. Sleep well. (80-81)
If performed properly, this revelation should be a surprise for the audience. I attended
the 2014 Hartford Stage production, directed by Mark Lamos, and there were audible
gasps in the audience when this revelation was made. I imagine there were similar
sounds in the 1966 production. There are few indicators that Hugo has homosexual
tendencies, except for some muted interactions with his butler, a “startlingly handsome
young man of about twenty-eight.”
Coward said that the premise for the play came from W. Somerset Maugham’s
relationship with his secretary Gerald Haxton, and his later disavowal of that relationship.
In Coward’s play, Carlotta criticizes Hugo for referring to Perry Sheldon as merely an
“adequate” secretary. However, what complicates this premise for the play is the fact
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that Coward himself played the role of Hugo in the British production in 1966. Even
though Coward tried to distance himself from the character of Hugo, there is clearly an
autobiographical linkage there. Nicholas de Jongh develops the link: Coward “would
pose as the sophisticated heterosexual, never quite finding the ideal woman. He lived off
and through facades. In public he was all perfect pose” (Not in Front 127). Clive Fisher
describes Coward’s embodiment of Hugo as that of a “live polemicist: by appearing on
stage, even disguised as someone else, Coward was exposing himself in a way which was
entirely uncharacteristic” (247). Fisher’s term “live polemicist” is a striking term of art
that captures the metamorphosis Coward underwent in style and politics in his final play.
He was coming out in his own spectacular fashion: not as directly as the brave men who
wrote to the newspaper in 1960, but by presenting his physical body as the representation
of the time period’s gay man, Coward was courageously making a stand of his own. His
last performance should be considered a political statement suffused with Gay
Liberationist ideals.
The character Hugo Latymer’s physical and emotional stagnation is reminiscent
of the decrepit Oscar Wilde depicted in David Hare’s The Judas Kiss (1998), in which
Wilde spends his last days drunk and lonely in an Italian flat, even though Hare
continuously casts him as a Christ figure. Coward himself was physically declining when
he played the part, and even though reviews were kind to him, it was noted that he had a
difficult time remembering his lines and had to occasionally have the prompter’s help,
along with the aid of his fellow actors (Fisher 250). In the 2014 Hartford Stage
production of A Song at Twilight, directed by Mark Lamos, Hugo, played by Brian
Murray, spent the bulk of the production slouched over, physically and emotionally
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drained, in a chair. The play was an exercise in stagnation. The Hartford Stage
production evoked the twenty-first century legal and cultural debates surrounding samesex marriage, especially when Carlotta and Hugo discuss the laws of the 1960s:
Hugo. According to the law in England homosexuality is still a penal
offence.
Carlotta. In the light of modern psychiatry and in the opinion of all
sensible people and unprejudiced people that law has become archaic and
nonsensical.
Hugo. Nevertheless it exists.
Carlotta. It won’t exist much longer.
Hugo. Maybe so, but even when the actual law ceases to exist there will
still be a stigma attached to “the love that dare not speak its name” in the
minds of millions of people for generations to come. It takes more than a
few outspoken books and plays and speeches in Parliament to uproot
moral prejudice from the Anglo-Saxon mind. (105)
This moment in the play is the most earnest and political, but Coward problematizes any
easy sympathy by making the character of Hugo rather unlikeable. He treats his wife
Hilde dismissively, at times contemptuously, and is generally a misogynistic, hypocrital
old prig. He cares everything for outward appearances, even if the reality of his marriage
and inner life is grim. The bulk of his life has been in service of assimilationist goals,
even though he is starting to realize the personal cost. Towards the end of play, after
Hugo’s same-sex relationship has been uncovered, he criticizes Hilde for spending time
socializing and drinking with a friend, whom he labels “that leather-skinned old
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Sapphist” (124). However, Coward seems to be criticizing Hugo’s life choices. Carlotta
asks Hilde, “You don’t find it humiliating to have been used by him for twenty years not
only as an unpaid secretary, manager, and housekeeper, but as a social camouflage as
well?” (133). Hilde remarks, “The conflict within him between his natural instincts and
the laws of society has been for the most of his life a perpetual problem that he has to
grapple with alone” (136).
But Hilde is no helpless victim; in fact, she is the moral center of the play: her
steadfast devotion to Hugo is not ultimately a pathetic show of powerlessness, but a
pragmatic choice that she made with full knowledge of Hugo’s sexual proclivities. She
admits to never having been in love with Hugo, either, but “thought that it was a most
realistic and sensible arrangement and, what is more, I think so still” (136). Hilde, a
German, was in love once with “one of my own countrymen, who was destroyed by my
own countrymen in 1944” (136). It is ambiguous why the Nazis killed her lost love: was
he Jewish? Gay? Whatever the reason, it goes unspoken, which deepens the play’s
theme of repressed identity. Hilde “recognized [Hugo’s] need for a ‘façade’ and was
quite content to supply it” (136), in order to extricate herself from post-War Germany.
The two form a marriage of convenience that suits both of them, to a point.
It is ultimately Carlotta’s devotion to Hugo, despite his imperfections, that saves
Hugo from public outing. Carlotta sees that Hilde has an admirable loyalty to Hugo, and
agrees to return Perry’s letters. Hilde escorts Carlotta out and returns moments later, as
Hugo painfully reads over some of the old love letters. The last moments of the play are
evocative of the ending of Edward Albee’s Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf” (1961), as a
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married couple attempt to communicate on a new threshold of reality and
communication:
Hugo. (after a long pause) I heard you come in.
Hilde. (almost in a whisper) Yes. I thought you did.
Hugo continues reading the letter as
The curtain slowly falls.
The future of Hugo and Hilde is uncertain and ambiguous. Will they continue in their
imperfect yet sustaining relationship, or will they part ways? That interpretation can vary
depending on directorial vision and actor performance choices. Textually, it seems they
will stay in the pattern they’ve established over the years.
Reviews of A Song at Twilight during Coward’s time, and for more contemporary
productions of the play, have consistently been luke-warm. In his biography of Coward,
Philip Hoare characterizes the reviews in 1966 as “eulogistic,” and ultimately implies
they praised the play more in the vein of a Lifetime Achievement award than for the
merit of the actual production (503). Oddly, Coward wrote that the play was “far and
away the best-constructed play I have ever written, and when I played it I knew as an
actor that as a writer I had served myself very well; there is an almost mathematical
precision to it that in no way detracts from the reality of it” (qtd. in Fisher 253). Perhaps
the word “reality” is key to Coward’s esteem for his final work. The play follows the
letter of the Lord Chamberlain’s law that only “serious” discussions of homosexuality
were allowed on stage. Coward solemnly comes out in support of gay liberation. The
age of the dandy was officially over; the poses were put aside in favor of a new
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conception of gay identity, which would solidify in the 1970s through the Gay Liberation
movement.
In the 2014 Hartford Stage production, when Hugo talked of his past relationship
with Perry Sheldon, two young nude men were illuminated behind a scrim upstage to
indicate his memory of that past, idyllic relationship. Coward certainly didn’t call for any
such flourish in the play’s stage directions, but the directorial choice added a layer of
contemporary relevance. Even though the New York Times was tepid in its praise of the
Hartford Stage production, lamenting like almost all reviews of the play since its first
production that it did not match up to Coward’s earlier works, it did note that, “To
suppose that the play would someday be presented with nude men embracing on the
stage, before audiences that might easily include men married to each other, would have
seemed sheer folly. And to suppose that its themes would still feel relevant — well, Mr.
Coward might well have imagined that” (Gold). Even though the play was a didactic
plea for homosexual law reform in 1960s Britain, Coward also understood the limitations
of law in terms of cultural prejudices and envisioned his play as a way to help to
influence those attitudes, even in a small way. Most recently, the Hartford production
attempted to catalyze cultural acceptance of gay lives as a way of increasing support for
the contemporary legal reform movement involving same-sex marriage.

Joe Orton’s Critique of Law: Queer Families & the Surveillance State
As Coward was entering into his twilight, Joe Orton’s star was rising. If Coward
for the most part worked within the censorship laws surrounding productions of his plays,
Orton was interested in anarchically dismantling all legal regimes in his dramatic
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universe. Like Wilde, Orton spent some time in prison; unlike Wilde, he seemed to enjoy
at least the nominal status of criminal. Orton and his lover were charged with defacing
library books in 1962 and sentenced to six months in jail. In Prick Up Your Ears: The
Biography of Joe Orton (1978), John Lahr illuminates how prison affected Orton’s
attitude toward legal authority:
Orton was never abused by the police, but he felt threatened. ‘I wasn’t
actually beaten up,’ he said. ‘But they hovered around…I found that the
best thing was to be as nice as possible and as utterly vulnerable as
possible because it was no use standing on your rights once they’ve got
you in their power.’ Privately, he contended that their severe sentence was
“because we’re queers.” (Lahr 86)
According to Lahr, “Orton found a focus for his anger and a new detachment in his
writing” from his experience in prison (90). This anger and detachment would focus
most directly on legal themes in his plays Entertaining Mr. Sloane (1964) and Loot
(1966). Whereas Coward’s play fairly directly calls for legal reform, Orton’s plays
problematize the notion of law in order to question the need for government regulation of
sexuality and family arrangements.

“An Arrangement to Suit All Tastes”: Contractual Families in Entertaining Mr.
Sloane
Nicholas de Jongh has also found it fruitful to compare Coward’s A Song at
Twilight with Orton’s Entertaining Mr. Sloane, claiming the two plays could
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have been written in two different centuries for all their
similarities…Coward’s style of camp depended upon languid affectation.
Here it had become so decrepit and listless that it could not even aspire to
artificiality. Homosexuality, in his twilight dramatizing, is the cause of
guilt, concealment and evasion. It is the cause of blackmail by virtue of
reveal-all letters. Entertaining Mr. Sloane, by contrast, is the sight and the
sound of the future before it occurs. Homosexuality loses its old gloss.
The stereotypes vanish. The accretions of negative myths and fictions are
discarded—a few years before the designation “gay” replaces homosexual
and begins to be taken as an identifying badge of pride. A great cultural
change is coming on and Entertaining Mr. Sloane is a faint premonition of
the changing of consciousness. (Not in Front 87).
De Jongh’s juxtaposition of A Song at Twilight and Entertaining Mr. Sloane is admirable;
however, he mischaracterizes Coward’s play as somehow outdated or responsible for
circulating outdated stereotypes. Twilight is about the need to bury the self-defeating
stereotypes surrounding homosexuality in order to move toward some semblance of gay
liberation; it is a mistake to dismiss Coward’s play as an already outdated artifact.
Twilight is gesturing towards the future, and by Coward himself embodying the role of
Hugo Latymer, he participated in a theatrical “coming out,” a process that Gay
Liberationists would be championing by the end of the decade.
However, to be fair to Orton, he does gesture far beyond the time period in his
plays, towards a twenty-first century, progressive vision of intimate relationships and
family law. Orton comically presents gender, sexuality, and law as unstable, de-centered
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forces that are constantly shifting and responding to new circumstances and desires. In
brief, the plot of Entertaining Mr. Sloane is as follows: an attractive young man, Sloane,
is brought into a flat inhabited by a woman, Kath, her brother Ed, and their father Kemp.
Sloane is invited to rent a room in the flat, although it is implied he will be paying
through sexual services to both Kath and Ed, who are more than interested in taking such
payment. The father, Kemp, recognizes Sloane as the murderer of his employer, and
threatens to tell the police; this causes Sloane to savagely kick Kemp to death. The third
act of the play involves the family renegotiating its boundaries and contractual terms,
resulting in an arrangement by which Ed and Kath will sexually share Sloane, in
exchange for not turning him into the police for murdering their father.
Sloane works in an absurdist vein, akin to Harold Pinter, and the dramatic
universe presented in Orton’s play seems so outrageous and far-fetched that it was
allowed to be performed despite the contemporaneous theatrical censorship regulations
by the Lord Chamberlain. Sloane revolves around an emerging “family” that is
constantly negotiating, and circumnavigating, its own illegality. There are hints of incest,
homosexuality, prostitution, and rape throughout the play, although very little physical
touching occurs on stage. The play is not “about” homosexuality in a central sense, but
rather about intimate relationships and sexuality more generally, which is why I think it
did not meet serious objections with the Lord Chamberlain. Orton’s subversion of the
typical homosexual stereotypes theretofore presented on the stage probably also helped
allow the play’s depictions of homosexuality to slip through censorship regulation.
The vaguely sinister, but comedically absurdist comedy, an influential
predecessor to Pinter’s The Homecoming (1965), arises from the familiar British
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drawing-room setting being subverted by the representation of a working-class flat and
illegal and taboo activities. In fact, Sloane was performed a year before The
Homecoming, indicating Orton’s influence on that play’s unconventional contractual
family arrangement. The Homecoming is the heterosexual version of Entertaining Mr.
Sloane. Perhaps that is partly why The Homecoming eclipsed Sloane as a canonical text.
Orton wrote that “The Homecoming couldn’t have been written without Sloane. And you
know, in a way the second act—although I admire it very much—isn’t true. Harold
[Pinter], I’m sure would never share anyone sexually. I would. And so Sloane springs
from the way I think. The Homecoming doesn’t spring from the way Harold thinks” (qtd.
in Lahr 131). Orton links his own sexual identity to the quality of his drama.
Biographical criticism seems appropriate and at times necessary when investigating a
body of texts like “gay drama.”
Sloane involves a sinister visitor intruding into a space, a Pinteresque trope that
dramatically works to heighten tension and interest. Sloane is an ambiguous figure and
hard to categorize, but he is sexualized and supposed to be very attractive. He is open to
sex with both men and women, and has blood on his hands but may be an innocent
victim. Ed and Kath are the brother-sister pair who welcome him into the home and both
sexually desire him. It is inferred that Kath could very well be Sloane’s mother in an
Oedipal echo. The father of the household, Kemp, recognizes Sloane as the man who
killed his boss, but it seems that Sloane killed the man after he threatened to publish
pornographic photos of Sloane.
Entertaining Mr. Sloane was “the first play in which homosexuality was a simple
if sexy fact of life” (De Jongh, Politics 120). De Jongh notes, “In style, though not in
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content, the play was oblique and ambiguous. Orton did not beat about the bush, but his
diction was veiled in the euphemism of lower-middle-class pseudo-gentility. For his
time, though, Orton was a homosexual radical” (Politics 119). Sloane as a character is
incapable of being categorized: he simply gives his body to the men or women who can
help him. The character Ed is the closest Orton gets to a gay character in the play. Ed is
portrayed as a masculine, “principled” character, who happens to be interested in very
young men. Orton wrote in 1967, “In Sloane… I wrote a man who was interested in
having sex with boys. I wanted him played as if he was the most ordinary man in the
world, and not as if the moment you wanted sex with boys, you had to put on earrings
and scent. This is very bad, and I hope that now that homosexuality is allowed, people
aren’t going to continue doing the conventional portraits there have been in the past”
(qtd. in Lahr 156). Literary critics are divided over whether Orton can even be
considered as producing gay drama, because the characters are mainly bisexual. John
Clum notes, “While this bisexuality may seem transgressive, it also denies the possibility
of exclusive homosexuality. Orton’s boys—Sloane, Hal, Dennis, Nick—are never gay”
(105). Alan Sinfield similarly questions whether the bisexuality isn’t a way for Orton to
avoid offending his audiences, suggesting it “keeps a distance from very many actual
homosexuals; it was not how Orton lived, or others that he knew” (qtd. in Clum 105).
Although Sloane describes his parents as wealthy, there is a sense that he could
very well be lying, and in the first act the audience member/reader gets the impression he
could very well be Kath’s son. Sloane is put forth as an orphan boy who could be a
substitute for the child that Kath had to put up for adoption. Kath asks Sloane to become
part of her family:
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You’ll live with us then as one of the family?
Sloane. I never had no family of my own. (67)
In this there are hints of mixed-up identities and the misplaced babies of Wilde’s Earnest.
But Orton tries to make the audience much more uncomfortable than Wilde ever did.
The hint of incest appears when Kath begins flirting with Sloane:
Sloane. You’re not alone.
Kath. I am. (Pause.) Almost alone. (Pause.) If I’d been allowed to keep
my boy I’d not be. (Pause.) You’re almost the same age as he would be.
You’ve got the same refinement.
Sloane. (Slowly.) I need…understanding.
Kath. You do, don’t you? Here let me take your coat. (Helps him off
with his coat.) You’ve got a delicate skin. (Touches his neck. His cheek.)
He shudders a little. Pause. …
Sloane. (clearing his throat.) How much are you charging? I mean---I’ve
got to know. (68-9)
The familial and sexual arrangements in Sloane are constantly in flux, approaching and
then retreating from the taboo subjects of incest, prostitution, and homosexuality. Sloane
asks Kath how much she is charging, with the hint not only of the room rate but also for
her body.
Echoing the Oedipus myth, as Orton himself acknowledged in 1964 (Lahr 147),
the boy and his mother consummate their relationship at the end of Act One. This was
the part of the play that caused the Lord Chamberlain the most consternation.
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The funny thing about the Lord Chamberlain,’ Orton said, ‘was that he cut
all the heterosexual bits and kept in all the homosexual bits.’ The Lord
Chamberlain disallowed Sloane’s pinching of Kath’s breasts and warned
that any simulation of intercourse when she rolled on top of him at the end
of Act I would be interpreted as obscene. … Homosexual passion could
not be so explicit; and the play benefited from the necessity to be oblique.
(Lahr 159)
Over the course of the play, it is not so much Sloane who emerges as the play’s
main focus, but rather the character Ed, a closeted gay man who orchestrates his father’s
murder and rewrites the rules governing family morality in order to fulfill his sexual
desire for Sloane. The underlying father-son conflict is revealed when Kemp discloses
why he hasn’t spoken to Ed in twenty years. The falling out was a result of Kemp
discovering his son Ed participating in homosexual activity:
Kemp. Then one day, shortly after his seventeenth birthday, I had cause to
return home unexpected and found him committing some kind of felony in
the bedroom.
Sloane. Is that straight?
Kemp. I could never forgive him.
Sloane. A puritan, are you?
Kemp. Yes.
Sloane. That kind of thing happens often, I believe. For myself, I usually
lock the door.
Kemp. I’d removed the lock. (71)
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We have here a direct reference to the illegality of all homosexual activity, whether in
public or private, that had been the governing statute since the Criminal Law Amendment
Act of 1885. When Sloane premiered, though, that law was being negotiated and
contested to only outlaw public acts of homosexuality, and to allow its legality, if not
sanction its existence, in private spaces. Sloane’s reaction to Kemp characterizing Ed’s
act as a “felony” indicates Orton’s view of the antiquated laws surrounding
homosexuality: “A puritan, are you?” Sloane’s comment supports the direction that the
law was heading in the upcoming Sexual Offences Act of 1967: “That kind of thing
happens often, I believe. For myself, I usually lock the door.” In other words, the
“problem” of homosexuality was not going away and all it really needed was the
protection of privacy. Kemp’s reply, “I’d removed the lock,” is the 1885 old legal
ideology, which is being eclipsed by more progressive legal and cultural reforms favoring
privacy: “For myself, I usually lock the door.”
Kemp policed his son’s sexual activities, rather than allowing the privacy a lock
affords. His interest in law and order, however, exists only to the extent that it promotes
a superficial appearance of propriety:
Sloane. Why didn’t you go to the police?
Kemp. I can’t get involved in that type of case. I might get my name in
the papers.
Sloane. I see your point of view. (73)
Romantic love doesn’t exist in Orton’s dramatic world, but Ed feels as close to
love for Sloane as Orton permits a character. Ed is jealous that Sloane spends time with
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Kath and some friends. When he discovers that his car is being used by Sloane and his
friends to take women out, Ed feels sexual jealousy:
Ed (emotionally). Oh, boy…Taking birds out in my motor.
Sloane. Would you accept an unconditional apology?
Ed. Telling me lies.
Sloane. It won’t happen again.
Ed. What are your feelings toward me? (111)
When Ed discovers that Sloane has been beating his father and has impregnated his sister,
his initial indignation quickly subsides at the chance of cementing his relationship with
Sloane. “My word, you’re unforgiveable. (Pause.) I don’t know whether I’m qualified
to pronounce judgment” (120).
The play turns toward its climax when Ed decides to forgive Sloane his
transgressions in order to keep him as his own sex-slave/employee. He forgives a murder
in order to allow his own gay relationship with Sloane the sanctioned privacy he desires
for it:
Appeal to his better nature. Say you’re upset. Wag your finger perhaps. I
don’t want you to be er, well…at each other’s throats, boy. Let’s
try…and…well be friends. (Pause.) I’ve the fullest confidence in your
ability. (Pause.) Yes…well I’m going out now. (Pause.)…it’s a funny
business en it? … I mean…well, it’s a ticklish problem. (Pause.) Yes…it
is. (123)
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Suddenly, Ed realizes that someone is willing to actually murder his father (echoing the
Oedipal myth), whose presence rankles Ed and prevent him from constructing his own
private relationships in a dwelling place.
Laws surrounding morality and sexuality become contested and relativized, and
the characters work to rationalize Sloane’s murder of Kemp in order to position law as a
relative, ultimately meaningless positionality:
Kemp. You’re a criminal.
Sloane. Who says I am? (123)
Indeed, Sloane’s crime is quickly forgiven in light of the ascendancy of
contractual sexual exchange by the end of the play. Next to crime, another theme that
runs through Sloane is the idea of victimization and blamelessness; Orton portrays
characters that transgress laws, but those same laws have also victimized the characters in
some way. Every crime in the play has some kind of justification. Kath may have been
raped by Ed’s friend; even though Kath is comedically portrayed as a sex-starved
simpleton, there are hints of her own victimization. Sloane may have been the victim of a
pedophile, which is why he ended up killing the man who was Kemp’s old boss; and Ed’s
complicity in his father’s murder resulted from being unjustly branded a criminal and
persona non grata by his father.
After Sloane makes a speech about being victimized by a pedophile, Kemp
refuses to sympathize with the story and labels Sloane a queer: “Liar…lying little
bugger. I knew what you was from the start” (126). Kemp says he is going to call the
police, at which point Sloane beats him to death, an artistic vehicle for Orton to express
his rage against a homophobic society.
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The characters negotiate their own interpretation of laws in order to position their
own interests. The law is also positioned as an inscrutable force, subject to random
change depending on political will and interpretation.
Ed. They’ll hang him.
Pause.
Kath. Hang him?
Ed. They might. I’m not sure. I get confused by the changes in the law.
(137)

This exchange sounds like a direct reference to the uncertain trajectory of the homosexual
law reform movement in the 1960s; the Wolfenden report was constantly debated in
Parliament, but nothing was passed into law for many years, keeping the status of gay
men in limbo.
The ending of Sloane has other striking parallels with Pinter’s The Homecoming,
namely the negotiation of a contract among adults entering into a non-normative sexual
arrangement. It should be noted here, in a relevant biographical linkage, that Orton and
his lover Kenneth Halliwell drew up wills naming “the other as sole beneficiary” (Lahr
3). Instead of turning Sloane into the police, and in order to keep Kath from having
Sloane all to herself, Ed thinks of “an arrangement to suit all tastes” (147). Ed and Kath
will share Sloane sexually. Ed says, “I’ve got no objections if he visits you from time to
time. Briefly. We could put it in the contract. Fair enough?” (149). Pinter must have
been cognizant of this exchange when he fleshed out the ending of The Homecoming a
year later, when Ruth and Lenny negotiate the terms of her sexual contract:
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Ruth. I would naturally want to draw up an inventory of everything I
would need, which would require your signatures in the presence of
witnesses.
Lenny. Naturally.
Ruth. All aspects of the agreement and conditions of employment would
have to be clarified to our mutual satisfaction before we finalized the
contract. (93)
One response to these emphases on contractual familial and sexual arrangements is that
they are a logical legal response to the issue of state-control of private relationships:
allow people to enter into private contractual relationships, rather than be governed by
universal standards. Orton’s comedy does not end in marriage; in fact, the characters
explicitly refuse that state-sponsored solution to their lives several times. As Kath says,
“I don’t mind about marriage as long as he doesn’t leave me” (148). We are left with a
queer family: a family that escapes neat categorization, but also one based on a private
contractual arrangement of marriage. The individuals within that family queerly avoid
reductive labels; they turn to the flexibility of contractual arrangements to define their
destinies, not a state-sponsored decree of their relationships’ validity. Criminal laws of
the state regarding murder, prostitution, and homosexuality are ignored in the play, and
private contracts become the defining boundaries of personal relationships. However,
these “private” contracts are queered in the play, performed as they are in a public forum,
indicating that the public/private binary of family relationships and sexuality does not
have rigid boundaries. In that sense, Orton’s play criticizes the 1967 Sexual Offences
Act before it is passed, noting its oppressive policing of “private” spaces, and instead
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encourages the law to move beyond a private/public conceptualization of intimate
relationships.
Both Coward and Orton belong in a canon labeled “gay drama,” to be sure, but
Orton’s vision is also queer because he moves beyond and critiques identity categories.
Orton presents a broader vision of acceptable intimate relationships and “arrangements,”
contractual or otherwise. Coward’s character Hugo Latymer is revealed to be a gay man
oppressed by laws that, if changed, according to the play, could help to lessen that
oppression and result in some semblance of gay liberation. Orton, on the other hand,
conceives of the law as a constantly shifting, uncertain locus of authority; as Ed says, “I
get confused by the changes in the law” (137). This line reflects the uncertain trajectory
of the homosexual law in the 1960s as the Wolfenden Report was debated. The political
process shaped the law and in turn the law became subject to the vagaries of popular will.
With the exception of Ed, Orton doesn’t present gay characters; instead, he presents
characters freed from identity labels.
In terms of their relationship with law, Orton’s plays enact a queer legal theory of
family. Graeme Austin writes, “Queer legal theory contests the desirability of advancing
the causes of sexual minorities within the confines of a liberal, rights based agenda” (46).
Orton is not characterizing gay liberationists because he considers state-sponsored
legislation as irrelevant, and potentially damaging, to the ordering of human lives and
relationships, and because he does not characterize gay identity on the stage. It is in
Orton’s libertarian, contractual emphasis on “An arrangement to suit all tastes” that the
linkage to a progressive, queer legal theory can be found.

Barry 96
Orton puts forth a queer, libertarian approach to marriage and family – a
celebratory if farcical vision of myriad personal relationships, marital or otherwise.
Legal scholar William Eskridge writes, “Modern family law in … [the twentieth] century
has been characterized by a shift in emphasis from status to choice, from the status-based
roles imposed by communal tradition to the consensual duties created by contract” (277).
Eskridge was elaborating on Sir Henry Maine’s statement that “the movement of
progressive societies has hitherto been a progression from Status to Contract.” Indeed,
by avoiding an essentialized formulation of gay identities on the stage, contra Coward’s
Hugo Latymer, Orton mirrors Maine’s theory of the contractual trajectory of family law.
This trajectory played out in both British and American law over subsequent decades, and
in many ways it paved the way for legal recognition of same-sex marriage in both
countries. Although same-sex marriage has been grounded in rights-based identity
politics and legal theories, its gradual cultural acceptance has been helped by general
societal shifts toward characterizing marriage as a contractual arrangement that can be
formed and broken at will. These changing legal conceptualizations of intimate
relationships, as mirrored in Orton’s prescient plays with their emphasis on accepting a
multiplicity of adult relationships, contributed to the gradual legal passage of same-sex
marriage laws in the twenty-first century.
Scholars have varied in their reactions to Orton’s parodic portrait of a modern
family, often indicating more their own cultural moment. In 1988, Bert Cardullo
expressed his disgust in The Explicator at the “profoundly disturbing” vision that Orton
prophetically conjures: “writing a parody on the Oedipal theme in 1964, Orton foresaw at
the same time the age of test-tube babies, sperm banks, single-parent families, and
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homosexual fathers and mothers” (51). Cardullo is right that Orton was prophetically
envisioning some semblance of these things; however, Cardullo’s characterization of
single-parent families and gay and lesbian parents as “profoundly disturbing” indicates
that twenty-five years after Sloane was published, scholarly interpretations were built on
the political and cultural biases of the 1980s.
What is legitimately disturbing about Entertaining Mr. Sloane, though, or
somewhat unsettling for some people, is the suggestion that because law is not ever
Law—not some static set of dictums and clear regulations—people are free to negotiate
their own values of ethics and morality. This can be considered a positive indication of
liberty, hence the libertarian strand of thought in the play, or it can lead to a more
nihilistic, anarchic view of a society in which no person or institution deserves the
authority that law provides. These ideas come to full fruition in Orton’s play Loot.

Loot: On the Cusp of the 1967 Sexual Offences Act
Loot, Orton’s dramatic diatribe against the British police, and against law as a
legitimate societal authority, is a response to the contemporaneous legal reforms being
implemented regarding homosexuality. The same law that ensnared Wilde was still in
place in 1966 when Loot was first performed. Men who engaged in same-sex practice,
even in the confines of a home, were subject to arrest and prosecution. The 1967 Sexual
Offences Act would finally decriminalize homosexual conduct in private spaces,
ostensibly protecting same-sex intimacy from certain intrusions by the state. Loot
premiered in the year before this law was passed; the play can be read as a critique of a
corrupt legal system and surveillance state. Orton suggests that even if legal reforms
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came, queer individuals would still be subject to disturbing surveillance and infiltration
of their lives.
Homosexual law reform involved the push to enact laws that decriminalized
homosexual conduct in private, but Loot critiques homosexual law reform efforts as
insufficient and actually dangerous because there are no such things as secure private
spaces when a police force is corrupt. The proposed 1967 Sexual Offences Act actually
required a policing of the boundaries between public and private spaces, Loot reminds us,
with the constant threat of infiltration of any space.34 Because the play’s performance
transforms a private space into a public one within the space of the theater, Orton is
trying to suggest the limitations of the proposed legal reform. In this sense, Loot stands
in direct contrast to Coward’s political and legal reform efforts in A Song at Twilight.
Coward’s play seems to suggest that allowing gay men private spaces for their sexuality
will result in gay liberation. Orton, on the other hand, suggests in Loot that there are
ultimately no such things as private spaces protected from the forces of societal and
government surveillance.
Orton’s biography illuminates the play’s meaning. Not only did Orton think he
was discriminated against in prison because of his perceived homosexuality, but he was
almost denied a visa to visit the United States for the Broadway rehearsals of

Jeffrey Weeks notes that the 1967 Sexual Offences Act “absurdly restricted the meaning of ‘private’: for
the sake of the Act, ‘public’ was defined as meaning not only a public lavatory but anywhere where a third
person was likely to be present” (176). Mark Donnelly describes the consequences of the law: “The Act
never challenged the assumption that homosexuality was ‘abnormal’, and it insisted that individual
freedoms in this area could be exercised only behind closed doors. Definitions of ‘public decency’ meant
that activities such as importuning in public lavatories and cruising grounds remained offences. The police
were keen to enforce this distinction between private and public behavior: between 1967 and 1976 the
number of prosecutions of males for indecency trebled and the number of convictions quadrupled. Thus
the Gay Liberation Front, which was founded in October 1970, was less than satisfied with the 1967 Act,
insisting that further change had to recognize the absolute validity of homosexuality as a sexual
orientation.” Mark Donnelly, Sixties Britain: Culture, Society and Politics (London: Pearson, 2005), 120.
34
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Entertaining Mr. Sloane; he was asked about his criminal history and was asked whether
he was a homosexual, which he denied (Lahr 174). C.W.E. Bigsby writes, “Loot,
completed in October 1964, was the first evidence of a shift in Orton’s work away from
the Pinter-influenced absurdism of the early plays to the absurdist world of anarchic
farce. It was very clearly an act of public revenge for the humiliations society had
inflicted upon him in an equally public way” (41). Bigsby’s term “anarchic farce”
perfectly characterizes the energy of Loot, and especially its thematic insistence on
destabilizing every possible avenue for legal and moral authority.
Orton’s sendup of law’s hypocrisy not only reflects his personal experience in
prison, but also has contemporaneous historical resonance. There was a sense in much of
the British press coverage of the time that the legal punishments being meted out for
homosexuality in private were inconsistently and incompetently applied. The real push
for homosexual law reform in Britain—the drive to revisit and revise the Criminal Law
Amendment Act of 1885—began after the Crown mishandled the gross indecency trial of
Lord Montagu in 1953.35 Lord Montagu’s trial was among several other high-profile
cases that brought the current laws into closer public scrutiny. (One prominent case

See Weeks, 161-62; Harry Mount, “Dandy peer and the sex trial that changed Britain: Lord Montagu,
who’s died at 88, was at the pinnacle of society – until he was jailed for homosexuality,” Dailymail.com, 31
August 2015. Web. 6 February 2016. Lord Montagu, who died in 2015, was a young aristocrat caught up
in a sensational trial reminiscent of the Wilde trials in its press coverage and general public interest.
Originally accused by two boy scouts of molestation in 1953 (after he had accused them of theft),
Montagu’s trial on the charge was botched and he was awaiting a retrial when the Crown brought a new
charge against him. Montague and Peter Wildeblood, a Daily Mail reporter, were charged in 1954 with
conspiring to commit gross indecency with two British airmen. The Crown promised immunity to the
airmen if they agreed to testify against Montague and Wildeblood. In the trial, the prosecution quoted from
the Wilde trial and drew similarities to that case, such as the difference in class position among the men: “It
is a feature, is it not, that inverts or perverts seek their love associates in a different walk of life than their
own?” (Weeks 161). The two men were convicted of committing private homosexual acts and spent over a
year in prison. Although an apparent repetition of the Wilde trial, Montagu’s trial met with public debate
over the way he was treated. Public opinion was changing, and the movement for homosexual law reform
continued for the next fourteen years until the 1967 Sexual Offences Act was passed.
35
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involved distinguished actor Sir John Gielgud, who pled guilty to attempting a
homosexual act in a public lavatory and was fined in 1953.) Montagu’s trial was botched
and declared a mistrial due to shoddy police work and corruption. His residence was
searched without a warrant, they refused him access to a lawyer, and his passport was
altered while in police custody (Jeffery-Poulter 17). When Montagu and others caught up
in the scandal were convicted, the public was divided over the justice of the result. The
Sunday Times penned an editorial in 1954, “Law and Hypocrisy,” calling for legal
reform:
The law, it would seem, is not in accord with a large mass of public opinion. That
condition always brings evil in its train: contempt for the law, inequity between
one offender and another, the risk of corruption of the police…The case for a
reform of the law as to acts committed in private between adults is very strong.
The case for an authoritative enquiry into it is overwhelming. (qtd. in JefferyPoulter 18).
The “authoritative enquiry” came in the form of the Wolfenden Committee’s work and
eventual report in 1956, which recommended homosexual law reform. However, because
British politicians were reluctant to publicly engage in the debate, the actual legal reforms
were delayed eleven more years until 1967. Although a portion of the public was
outraged at the hypocrisy apparent in the Montagu case, the actual subject of
homosexuality was still fraught with potential political peril for those seriously engaged
in promoting policy changes.
In Loot, Detective Truscott is Orton’s characterization of a corrupt police
authority and the laws they enforce. Truscott’s hypocrisy reflected the public unease
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over the Montagu trial, but the character was also based on an actual person, Detective
Sergeant Harold Challenor, who made news as a corrupt and brutal policeman in 1964
(Lahr 196).
Truscott: The process by which the police arrive at a solution to a mystery
is, in itself, a mystery. … It’s for your own good that Authority behaves in
this seemingly alarming way. (With a smile.) Does my explanation satisfy
you?
Mcleavy. Oh, yes, Inspector. You’ve a duty to do. My personal freedom
must be sacrificed. I have no further questions. (250-51)
Orton suggests that the solution the Sexual Offences Act provides—giving
homosexuality free reign in private spaces only—has limited consequence because the
boundary between private and public spaces needs to be policed by a corrupt civil
authority. The need for surveillance of the boundaries results in an oppressive regime.
As Alan Sinfield claims in his discussion of the 1967 law’s formulation of the
public/private dichotomy, “the idea of private space might seem to free an autonomous
zone for self-expression, but the effect, rather, is a focused policing of the border between
the two” (Out on Stage 239). Orton puts queer pressure on the private/public binary,
and exposes it as insidiously policed by an authority with no regard for due process:
Fay. You must prove me guilty. That is the law.
Truscott. You know nothing of the law. I know nothing of the law. That
makes us equal in the sight of the law.
Fay. I’m innocent till I’m proved guilty. This is a free country. The law
is impartial.
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Truscott. Who’s been filling your head with that rubbish? (254)
Loot is a farce about the nature of crime, and Orton revels in presenting characters
that transgress against written and unwritten codes. The bisexual robbers, Hal and
Dennis, are sleeping together when they are not robbing banks. They bring the money
home and Hal thinks of a perfect place to hide the loot: his mother’s coffin. They
remove the corpse from the coffin, stuff her into a wardrobe, put the money in the coffin,
and undress the corpse so the body can’t be identified. As they remove the corpse from
the coffin, Hal and Dennis discuss how their crime is so shocking and new there is not a
name for it:
Dennis. Seems a shame really. The embalmers have done a lovely job.
They lift the coffin from the trestles.
There’s no name for this, is there?
Hal. We’re creating a precedent. Into the cupboard. Come on.
They tip the coffin on end and shake the corpse into the wardrobe.
(208)
This performance of a crime so great it has no name, evokes the “unspeakable” crime of
sodomy in the Victorian era. But Orton is concerned with crime and taboo more
generally, and works to truly shock the audience with a character’s casual and
disrespectful handling of his mother’s dead body.
Just as with Entertaining Mr. Sloane, the Lord Chamberlain was not concerned
with homosexuality in the play, partly because the sexual relationship between Dennis
and Hal is oblique; once again Orton’s characters have a sexuality that defies easy
categorization and stereotype. In part, this choice may be a pragmatic solution to
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generating mainstream commercial success for his plays, something that John Clum and
Alan Sinfield criticize; however, Orton’s vision of gender and sexuality is queer, not gay,
and I would suggest this dramatic strategy was just as politically and legally productive
as the representation of gay characters like Coward’s Hugo Latymer.
Orton is not writing a play “about” homosexuality; rather, the play is about the
nature of crime: what constitutes crimes, and how and why crimes make us
uncomfortable. The Lord Chamberlain was instead concerned about the treatment of the
corpse as potentially obscene, and demanded the following before a license was given:
1. The corpse is obviously a dummy.
2. The corpse remains fully clothed throughout the play and is not
undressed, even behind a screen, at any time; and the accompanying
dialogue is adjusted accordingly. (qtd. in Lahr 189)
Some audience members were still offended by the play: dozens of people left the touring
production performance in Bournemouth, upset with, as The Times reported, “dialogue
which uses the word brothel and which satirizes sex, patriotism, death and the law” (qtd.
in Lahr 207). Police had to attend the performance in Manchester to ensure public safety
(Lahr 207), but by the time it arrived in London, there was general critical acclaim and
commercial success for the play, and Orton won the 1966 Evening Standard Award for
Best Play.
Although the play is a farce, it has serious undertones. Orton wrote in the
production notes for the American production, “Loot is a serious play … Ideally, it
should be nearer The Homecoming than ‘I Love Lucy’ … The play shouldn’t be one long
giggle—there should be depths” (Lahr 200). Indeed, Truscott is a somewhat sinister
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character, especially in certain moments of physical violence when he savagely beats
Hal:
Truscott kicks Hal violently. Hal cries out in terror and pain.
Truscott. Don’t lie to me!
Hal. I’m not lying! …
Turscott (shouting, knocking Hal to the floor). Under any other political
system I’d have you on the floor in tears!
Hal (crying). You’ve got me on the floor in tears. (235)
In a final indication of the police’s corruption, Truscott takes a bribe from Hal to keep the
robbery a secret. After Mcleavy tries to get another police officer to intervene, Truscott
has him arrested and agrees to have him killed in prison. Mcleavy, the one character who
had respect for the law and legal authority, ends up being falsely imprisoned:
Mcleavy. You can’t do this. I’ve always been a law-abiding citizen. The
police are for the protection of ordinary people.
Truscott. I don’t know where you pick up these slogans, sir. You must
read them on the hoardings. (274)
The ending of Loot echoes Sloane’s ending, in which Hal, Dennis, and Fay might
set up a bisexual love-triangle, but don’t only because of the way that would appear; in
other words, the private space of the flat is subject to the public surveillance of state and
society:
Hal (pause, to Dennis). You can kip here, baby, Plenty of room now.
Bring your bags over tonight.
Fay looks up.
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Fay (sharply). When Dennis and I are married we’d have to move out.
Hal. Why?
Fay. People would talk. We must keep up appearances. (275)
The ending of Loot collapses the private/public binary; after all, the “appearances” that
Fay references are consistently exposed as bogus. Loot ultimately indicates that as long as
the State is given authority over matters concerning intimate relationships and sexuality,
every individual is in a public space of state control.

Conclusion
Coward and Orton were two of the most prominent gay dramatists engaging in
cultural debate over the place of homosexuality in Britain, on stage and off. In terms of
the law, these playwrights positively contributed to the legal reform efforts culminating
in the 1967 Sexual Offences Act. Although Orton was skeptical of any legal regulation
of intimate relationships and sexuality, his plays are ultimately an argument for legal
reform. Everyone who attended and engaged with one of these popular plays became a
part of that debate to a degree. The plays’ commercial success indicates that they
positively contributed to cultural and legal reform. Those reform efforts would continue
in Britain with alternative theatre companies like Gay Sweatshop, which began mounting
more directly political productions in the 1970s.
Gay Sweatshop also included women in the productions and involved issues
pertaining to lesbians. For example, the theatre company produced Care and Control
(1977), scripted by Michelene Wandor; the play was a dramatization of actual court cases
involving legal disputes over lesbian mothers’ custody rights over their children. This
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strategy of using legal controversy as the basis for theatrical performance was similar to
what Moisés Kaufman would later pursue in The Laramie Project and Gross Indecency
in the United States.
But in a central sense, the 1967 Sexual Offences Act and the subsequent abolition
of theatrical censorship in Britain marked a turning point in representations of gay
characters and the focus of British gay drama. Of course, legally speaking, homosexual
sex was still only allowed in private spaces—hence the outrage over the simulated male
rape in Brenton’s The Romans in Britain (1980)—but with the abolition of censorship,
representations of same-sex intimacy, like kissing, were gradually introduced.
Sometimes dramatists would test their newfound freedoms for the purpose of shocking
audience members out of their complacency: the In-Yer-Face theatre of the 1990s, for
example. Mark Ravenhill’s Shopping and Fucking (1996) pushed dramatic
representations of homosexuality to the threshold, and occasionally past the threshold, of
obscenity and pornography. The threshold was now obscenity, though, not
homosexuality or same-sex intimacy per se. In other words, all forms of sexuality on the
British stage were now theoretically governed by obscenity laws. Homosexuality did not
have its own subset of proscriptions.
In the United States, however, these debates would continue for several more
decades on stage and in courtrooms. Although most states ended theatrical censorship of
homosexuality in the 1960s, there would not be a definitive legal resolution to the larger
cultural issue of homosexuality at the Federal level until the Supreme Court case
Lawrence v. Texas (2003), which basically fulfilled the same function as the 1967 Sexual
Offences Act in Britain: the decriminalization of homosexuality. The next chapter will

Barry 107
analyze popular gay American drama as mirroring particular debates in United States
Supreme Court gay rights jurisprudence. American legal reform efforts did not mainly
focus on statutory resolutions to these issues, as the British had done. American gay
rights lawyers, and even some gay dramatists as I will argue in the next chapter, instead
focused their efforts on the United States Constitution and the growing genealogy of
sexual privacy case law. The focus on the legal and cultural place of homosexuality in
American culture yielded a hermeneutic question: what are the best interpretive
strategies to pursue when reading America’s central text, the Constitution?
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Chapter 3

Domestic Spaces in American Gay Legal Theatre:
The Boys in the Band and Angels in America
Introduction
Hanna Scolnicov argues in Woman’s Theatrical Space (1994) that spatial
constructs within modern drama reflect “the growing awareness of the specificity of
gender differences and the changing attitudes to woman and her sexuality” (1). In
modern drama, particularly that of Ibsen and Chekhov, the space of the home is
represented as “a dated convention, out of pace with social, political and economic
changes. . . . it is woman’s emancipation that has overthrown the traditional scenic
conception, because it has severed her emotional bonds with her house” (125).
I recognize an analogous spatial logic occurring in twentieth-century gay and
lesbian drama. As the century progressed and different legal regimes took shape and
were modified, representations of gay men and lesbians on the American stage portrayed
the often fraught relationship these people maintained with domestic space. For most of
the twentieth century, gay and lesbian characters on stage—whether closeted or
otherwise—were somehow exiled from the domestic space and any kind of home.
Classic examples include the offstage lesbian suicide at the end of Lillian Hellman’s The
Children’s Hour (1934) and Mr. Dulcimer’s murder in his flat at the end of Mordaunt
Shairp’s The Green Bay Tree (1933). As laws relating to transatlantic homosexuality in
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society and on the stage began to change in the 1960s, dramas began to reflect the
changing understanding of the proper place and home allowed to gay and lesbian
characters.
This chapter analyzes the kinds of spaces that two popular gay dramas imagined
for sexual minorities. I will look first at the closeted apartment under siege by the law in
the 1960s world of The Boys in the Band (1968), and then the more abstract
conceptualization of the domestic national and constitutional spaces allotted to LGBT
citizens in Angels in America (1992). Premiering in New York one year before the
Stonewall riots, a watershed moment for the contemporary gay rights movement in the
United States, Crowley’s play marks the beginning of the uncloseted gay tradition in
American drama. The Boys in the Band reflects the oppressive legal situation for gay
men in the late 1960s, even as its breakdown of barriers between actor and audience and
normative and gay experience works to create and sustain a queer spatial aesthetic. In
depicting gay domestic spaces that appear to be collapsing because they are legally and
culturally unsustainable, Crowley forces the audience to imagine offstage a place for gay
existence and domestic viability. In this sense, he queers the performance space of the
play. Boys blurs and subverts the boundaries between characters and audience,
performative as well as sexual. In so doing the play encodes the growing but still
uncertain space for sexual privacy being recognized in Supreme Court jurisprudence by
the end of the 1960s.36

36

Just as drama can be traced in traditions, so too can bodies of case law and legal precedent. Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965) held there is a right to marital privacy for contraceptive use. This ruling was extended
a few years later by Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), which held that unmarried heterosexual couples could buy
contraceptives for private use. Those cases built the foundations for later rulings decriminalizing
homosexuality (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003) and allowing for same-sex marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges,
2015).
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Kushner’s epic Angels in America, in turn, is partly a response to the Supreme
Court decision Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), which reversed the apparent trend in case law
by holding that sexual privacy did not extend to homosexual activity. Kushner takes his
gay characters outside of domestic spaces in order to subvert that legal decision and
imagine a new space for gay and lesbian Americans. Angels is a dramatic text and
theatrical performance—a particular cultural response to the legal text and cultural effects
of Bowers. Kushner queers the composition of family structures and mirrors a liberal
American constitutional hermeneutics, akin to the “living Constitution” method of
Supreme Court jurisprudence that allowed the domain of sexual privacy to culminate in
private LGBT spaces in Lawrence v. Texas (2003). A cultural precursor to Lawrence
and eventually the case that legalized same-sex marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges (2015),
Kushner’s drama offers an expansive, inclusive vision of domestic space and intimate
relationships.

Guilt and Spatial Logic in Gay and Lesbian American Drama, 1933-1993
For at least a sixty-year period in the United States, gay and lesbian characters
were represented as needing to resolve an internalized sense of guilt regarding their
sexuality. Earlier in the twentieth century, gay and lesbian characters were expelled or
sacrificed from the drama in order to purge their guilt: a consuming atonement was
necessary but forgiveness impossible. A prominent example of this is Tennessee
Williams’ Suddenly Last Summer (1958), at the end of which the gay character Sebastian
Venable is literally eaten alive for his homosexual and pedophilic crimes. Sebastian
Venable is sacrificed and consumed in order to purge the guilt of his homosexuality. Pre-
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liberation gay and lesbian drama demanded the atonement of guilt through reparations
made by sacrificing the characters. Besides Suddenly Last Summer, prominent examples
of this trope include Lilian Hellman’s The Children’s Hour (1934), Mordaunt Shairp’s
The Green Bay Tree (1933), Meyer Levin’s Compulsion (1957), and two other Williams
dramas, A Streetcar Named Desire (1947) and Cat on a Hot Tin Roof (1955). Early gay
and lesbian drama often reinforced the legal rituals of crime and punishment involving
transgressions against laws governing normative sexuality.
Wilde’s conviction of gross indecency established a new aesthetic for the proper
place of gay men and lesbians: the dock and the jail cell. The Wildean dandy was
uncovered for his deviant sexuality, and the artifice at the heart of aestheticism was seen
to be a mask covering up criminal inclinations.37 A little over forty years after the Wilde
trials, Mordaunt Shairp’s successful play The Green Bay Tree (1933) would re-introduce
the Wildean dandy as a barely disguised pervert. Although it premiered in London, the
play had a popular run on Broadway with Laurence Olivier in the role of Mr. Dulcimer.
The effete Mr. Dulcimer is portrayed as a malevolent force of sterility as he attempts to
keep his adopted son, Julian, from entering into marriage. The play ends with Julian’s
natural father shooting Dulcimer in order to save his son, but the effects of Dulcimer’s
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Of course, homosexuality was not only produced and contained through legal regulations. The medical
model of homosexuality also circulated in England and the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, which made the asylum and hospital other aesthetic (and literal) spaces for gay men and lesbians.
Medical and legal discourse often worked together to classify and contain homosexuality. See Jeffrey
Weeks, Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain from the Nineteenth Century to the Present (London:
Quartet, 1990): 23-32. Early medical theories had potential implications for criminal law, such as the
congenital theory formulated by German lawyer Karl Heinrich Ulrich (1825-1895) that homosexuality was
in essence a natural biological manifestation. Accepting such a model of homosexuality would relieve gay
and lesbians of any moral blame (Weeks 26-7). However, the medical model of homosexuality as a sign of
disease more often resulted in further social stigmatization, and prompted punitive medical treatment such
as castration and aversion therapy in the United States and Europe. Aversion therapy, practiced through the
1960s, involved “making people nauseous and inflicting electric shocks on them while viewing pictures of
same-sex people to whom they [were] attracted” (31).
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lifestyle are an unstoppable contagion: Julian inherits Dulcimer’s money, forsakes
marriage, and retreats into the queer and sterile space of the dandy’s flat.
Guilt in The Green Bay Tree resides unambiguously in Dulcimer, and its
atonement comes through the sacrificial murder of the corrupted dandy at the play’s
conclusion. Shairp reinforces the laws and cultural understanding of homosexuality in
the 1930s: homosexuality as a crime and disease. In terms of its ritualistic function, the
play repeats and amplifies the legal rituals being enacted against those who broke
sodomy and gross indecency laws. However, even some of the earliest plays in the gay
tradition negotiate an ambiguous relationship with the legal disposition of homosexuality.
Lillian Hellman’s The Children’s Hour (1934) superficially seems to replicate the same
trajectory as The Green Bay Tree—the lesbian character is expelled and destroyed by
play’s end—but the play’s message is ambiguous. It remains unresolved whether Martha
actually deserves her fate. Hellman’s drama involves legal themes and enacts legalistic
rituals of guilt and punishment, but it remains unclear whether justice has been achieved
at the end.
The Children’s Hour is based on an actual court case in 1810 Scotland against
two teachers for sexual misconduct (Sinfield, Out 94). The play presents two female
teachers being accused of homosexuality by a spoiled schoolgirl. One teacher, Martha, is
set up as a potential lesbian, as she seems sexually jealous of the other teacher Karen’s
impending marriage. In an echo of the Wilde trials, the women bring a libel suit against
their accuser, the mother of the spoiled girl. They lose the case, as did Wilde, and that
legal resolution has a profound effect on both of the women. Even though it is only
Martha who is portrayed as possibly lesbian, Karen equates the results of the trial with

Barry 113
actual guilt. She now believes she is a lesbian because the legal verdict implied as much.
They set up a dreary household together, coded as lesbian, and the heterosexual
relationship falters between the engaged Dr. Cardin and Karen Wright.
Losing the case has a negative impact on the women, making them lose
confidence in their ability to stabilize their lives and identities through the use of
language. Although Karen denies having any involvement with Martha, she cancels the
marriage to Cardin. Karen says to Cardin: “And every word will have a new meaning.
Woman, child, love, lawyer—no words that we can use in safety any more. (Laughs
bitterly) Sick, high-tragic people. That’s what we’ll be” (73). Words with seemingly
stable meanings—“woman, child, love, lawyer”—are no long accessible to them. With
the legal imputation of homosexual guilt, they both internalize new understandings of
themselves, but have a difficult time because of the historically “unspeakable” nature of
homosexuality and lesbian identity. The legal system is depicted as an imprecise
mechanism for resolving questions of non-normative desire and identity. Martha equates
their loss of the libel case with proof of her guilt, and comes to a realization that soon
causes her to commit suicide: “I have loved you the way they said” (78).
Martha: I’ve got to tell you how guilty I am.
Karen (deliberately). You are guilty of nothing.
Martha. . . . It’s there. I don’t know how, I don’t know why. But I did
love you. I do love you. I resented your marriage; maybe because I
wanted you; maybe I wanted you all along; maybe I couldn’t call it by a
name… (79)
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In an allusion to the Wilde trials, Martha’s desire for Karen is unspeakable: it is “the love
that dare not speak its name.”38 Martha shoots herself off stage soon after this scene.
The potential lesbian is expelled from the action, but more intriguing is Karen’s fate.
Even though there is ample evidence that she had a heterosexual orientation, the legal
rituals have labeled her otherwise and change the course of her life. She leaves the
school at the end of the play and seems destined for a lonely, closeted, lesbian life.
Sometimes the hybrid nature of the legal theatrical ritual allows for an
imaginative adjudication of the gay or lesbian character, never fully resolved like the
finality of legal judgment and sentence. In the final moments of the play, Martha is dead
in the other room and Karen is gauging the future. Mrs. Tilford asks, “You’ll write me
sometime?” “If I ever have anything to say,” replies Karen (86). Karen is suspended in
the now sterile domestic space, forced to live a solitary life of atonement for the sins of
living with Martha, for “acting” like a lesbian. But her future is uncertain because she
has not been fully silenced; she acknowledges there might be something to say in the
future, if her gender and sexual identity can somehow be resolved. There remains the
possibility she could eventually articulate a protest against the legal and cultural censure
of lesbian identity.

38

Lesbian desire and sexuality was doubly unspeakable, considering its historical absence from antihomosexual legislation in the United Kingdom and United States. Just as the Labouchère Amendment only
targeted men, the sodomy laws in the United States did not include women until oral sex was included
within prohibited behavior in many states after 1880. “Oral sex could also be perpetrated by women with
other women, and for the first time in Anglo-American history lesbian relationships could be made illegal
(although few states did so before World War I). … Although most states had sodomy laws … few if any
of them applied to same-sex activities between women, and none of them was enforced against women
having sex with women.” William Eskridge, Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999), 159-60. Women were occasionally prosecuted under “lewdness” statutes,
but historically they were not the prime targets of the laws governing homosexuality (157).

Barry 115
In mid-century American drama, gay characters were often displaced and hidden
from view, put into a closet of containment. John Clum claims that Tennessee Williams’
A Streetcar Named Desire (1947) “is the quintessential closeted gay play, and Blanche
Dubois is in many ways the quintessential gay character in American closet drama”
(123). In this sense, Blanche is invisible because her symbolic status as a gay man is
veiled from the audience. The one gay character, Blanche’s husband Allan Grey, never
appears on stage: he committed suicide when she discovered and outed his
homosexuality. Clum convincingly points to Blanche’s artificial theatricality as symbolic
of the roles gay men had to play in order to pass as heterosexual. When she finally is
revealed in the play, it is as a sexual deviant, someone who slept with a seventeen year
old boy and was promiscuous, perhaps even prostituting herself. In the end, Stanley
rapes Blanche, which can be read as punishment for a gay man’s contamination of the
heterosexual domestic space. Blanche’s fate as a character is a result of her domestic and
sexual transgressions, and she is taken away to a mental asylum at the end of the play. In
Streetcar, the outed and closeted gay figures are ejected from the dramatic action.
Williams uses similar strategies of gay displacement in Cat on a Hot Tin Roof
(1955), which recounts the suicide of the tortured Skipper because of his homosexuality.
Like Allan Grey, then, Skipper kills himself to atone for the sin of loving another man,
Brick, and is never visible in the play. The visible protagonist Brick’s anguished, selfdestructive character stems from his own internalized homophobia, if we understand that,
as Brenda Murphy demonstrates, Williams intended to represent “a gay man trapped in a
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heterosexual marriage.”39 Brick is displaced from the gay relationship he should have
had with Skipper, and is instead struggling in a relationship he should never have entered.
Admittedly, Cat also describes the more positive relationship between the former owners
of the plantation, Jack Straw and Peter Ochello. Straw and Ochello left great wealth
behind and are described as a successful and loving gay couple. As the opening “Notes
for the Designer” describes their bedroom, “It is gently and poetically haunted by a
relationship that must have involved a tenderness which was uncommon” (15). In this
sense, a positive gay relationship suffuses the physical space of the play and provides a
model that Brick is not able to realize because of his own homophobia. 40 However, the
promise of a healthy gay relationship is not realized by the visible characters in the
play.41
Some gay and lesbian dramas repeat and entrench legal rituals of crime and
guilt centering on homosexuality. For example, Meyer Levin’s play Compulsion (1957),
based on the “trial of the century” Leopold and Loeb case, dwells on the homosexual
relationship between the two men, Judd and Artie, as being at the root cause of their
criminality. Alan Sinfield views the play as “encourag[ing] the inference that
homosexuality may be at the heart of a criminal personality” (212).

Compulsion is a

ritual of forensic drama that enacts a theatrical punishment for a murder and the
homosexuality that caused it.

Brenda Murphy, “"Claustrophobia: Containment and Queer Spaces in Tea and Sympathy and Cat on a
Hot Tin Roof” in Critical Insights: Gender, Sex & Sexuality, ed. Margaret Sönser Breen (Ipswich, MA:
Salem Press, 2014): 181-94, 193.
40
Ibid, 189. See also Michael Bibler, “A Tenderness which was Uncommon: Homosexuality, Narrative,
and the Southern Plantation in Tennessee Williams’s Cat on a Hot Tin Roof,” Mississippi Quarterly 55.3
(2002): 381-400, 384.
41
John Clum notes, “the positive image the love of Jack Straw and Peter Ochello provides is presented only
in the stage directions: otherwise, the silence and invisibility surrounding homosexual desire are
maintained” (127-28).
39
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There was a changing arc of resolution to this guilt post-Stonewall and when
AIDS dramas began appearing in the 1980s. Writers gradually moved the internalized
guilt of the gay subject and the (self)-sacrifice necessary for its atonement and imposed
the guilt onto the national body. In recent gay drama, such as William Hoffman’s As Is
(1985), Moisés Kaufman’s Gross Indecency (1998) and The Laramie Project (2000), and
Terrence McNally’s Corpus Christi (1999), this same ritual of atonement and potential
forgiveness must be enacted by America itself, demanded because of its transgressions
against the gay subject. The new national dramatic ritual enacted in gay American drama
is consistently connected to the fate of America itself.
Tony Kushner transforms the old ritual of atonement onto the national body in
Angels in America: A Gay Fantasia on National Themes (1992). Kushner does more
than champion the lives and rights of sexual minorities; he engages in a larger project of
national re-imagining. Beginning with Part I: Millennium Approaches, followed by Part
II: Perestroika, the United States is figured as needing blessing and forgiveness for
transgressing against gay men, lesbians, and the victims of AIDS. Because Angels
achieved not just popular but also canonical status in American drama, a remarkable
thing happened. The culminating protagonist of twentieth-century American drama, not
just gay drama, is a gay man living with AIDS. The margin becomes the center.
Moreover, Kushner directly intervenes in legal debates surrounding gay and lesbian
rights. Angels re-imagines the Constitution as an expanding text, symbolic of the kind of
liberal interpretive strategy that would later result in landmark legal victories in the
LGBT rights movement.
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Spatial Strategies in The Boys in the Band
Kushner’s critique of LGBT legal oppression can be traced directly back to 1968,
when Mart Crowley’s landmark play The Boys in the Band premiered. Boys became the
first commercially successful play about gay men, running for 1,002 performances,
officially beginning the uncloseted gay tradition in American drama. The play was
produced at a unique cultural and historical moment. Cultural productions like The Boys
in the Band helped precipitate the 1969 Stonewall Riots, widely considered to be the
beginning of the modern gay rights movement. There was a simmering anger against
police harassment that exploded over the course of that weekend in June, 1969.42 LGBT
people rioted at the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar in Manhattan, in response to police
harassment. Crowley captured some of that anger and bitterness in his play the year
before, and helped stoke the discontent that would soon materialize in violence and more
direct political action.43
It is important to recall the socio-legal situation for gays and lesbians in the
1960s. Legal scholar William Eskridge writes in his book Gaylaw: Challenging The
Apartheid of the Closet (1999):

42

For a description of the events of the dramatic weekend, see John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual
Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970 (Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1983), 231-33. When Allen Ginsberg got to the Stonewall Inn on Sunday, he noticed a shift in
the mood of its patrons: “They’ve lost that wounded look that fags all had ten years ago” (232).
43
The Gay Liberation Front was founded a month later, which took a more radical, confrontational
approach to gay and lesbian rights. THE 1969 GLF statement of purpose stated: We are a revolutionary
group of men and women formed with the realization that complete sexual liberation for all people cannot
come about unless existing social institutions are abolished. We reject society’s attempt to impose sexual
roles and definitions of our nature. We are stepping outside these roles and simplistic myths. We are going
to be who we are. At the same time, we are creating new social forms and relations, that is, relations based
upon brotherhood, cooperation, human love, and uninhibited sexuality. Babylon has forced us to commit
ourselves to one thing—revolution!” (qtd. in D’Emilio 234).
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The homosexual in 1961 was smothered by law. She or he risked arrest and
possible police brutalization for dancing with someone of the same sex, crossdressing, propositioning another adult homosexual, possessing a homophile
publication, writing about homosexuality without disapproval, displaying pictures
of two people of the same sex in intimate positions, operating a lesbian or gay bar,
or actually having oral or anal sex with another adult homosexual. The last was a
serious felony in all states but one, and in most jurisdictions also carried with it
possible indefinite incarceration as a sexual psychopath. (98)
The term “homosexual,” as Timothy Scheie writes in his recent article about The Boys in
the Band, is “a juridico-medical term of pathological provenance” (4); indeed, the play
shows the negative effects that legal and medical discourses have in shaping the selfconceptions of stigmatized populations. It was not until 1973 that the American
Psychiatric Association voted to remove homosexuality from its catalogue of mental
disorders. Medical and legal discourse worked in tandem in their treatment of gays and
lesbians, but I am focusing on the law here because while medical discourse definitely
informs the internalized homophobia of all the men in the play, the play’s main dramatic
crises are propelled by legal themes.
The characters in The Boys in the Band were under threat of criminal prosecution
by engaging in homosexual activity. Private consensual “sodomy” (a capacious term
encompassing heterosexual and homosexual activity) was a felony in New York, where
the characters live, until 1980, when the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Onofre
held that the state anti-sodomy law was unconstitutional because it violated the right of
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privacy (Nelson 320).44 Not only were private gay spaces subject to surveillance and
prosecution, but public gay spaces were as well. In his history of the emergence of the
homosexual minority in the United States, John D’Emilio writes,
As a gay subculture took root in twentieth-century American cities, police
invoked laws against disorderly conduct, vagrancy, public lewdness, assault, and
solicitation in order to haul in their victims. Gay men who made assignations in
public places, lesbians and homosexuals who patronized gay bars, and
occasionally even guests at gay parties in private homes risked arrest. (14)
In 1964 and 1965, almost all the gay bars in New York City were closed in anticipation
of the World’s Fair (Rosen 167). The closures were largely achieved through exploiting
the laws governing liquor sales and raiding gay bars under the pretenses of enforcing
liquor laws. In his work on police harassment of gay men in New York City during the
time period, Steven Rosen observes, “Because New York bartenders believed that liquor
licensing laws subjected bar owners and their staffs to legal liability for serving persons
known to be homosexual, they prohibited men from dancing together or touching each
other in most bars, and some did not even allow men to enter unless they were
accompanied by a woman” (167). This harassment of gay men in public spaces like gay
bars would eventually lead to the Stonewall riots, when not just men, but lesbians and
trans people, resisted this kind of spatial infiltration.45

44

Historically, sodomy laws were enforced in the original American colonies as part of the English
common law or through statute. The Labouchere Amendment of 1885 in Britain included oral sex in the
sodomy laws. “After 1885, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia … amend[ed] their sodomy laws
to include oral sex...” (Eskridge 157)
45
For a description of the diverse LGBTQ crowd of about 2,000 people that formed, see D’Emilio, 231233.
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Although the laws regulating homosexuality in society were strictly enforced, two
kinds of legal regulations were beginning to change in the sixties: laws governing
theatrical representations of homosexuality, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding
sexual privacy. Boys was able to achieve commercial success in part because laws
regulating the depiction of homosexuality on stage in the United States gradually began
to relax in the sixties. New York state lifted its ban on theatrical representations of
homosexuality in 1965. In addition, American constitutional law in the 1960s began to
recognize the right to sexual privacy within certain tightly defined heteronormative
domestic spaces. The right to marital privacy emerged in the Supreme Court case
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965). Griswold conceptualized spatial “penumbras” and
“emanations” from the Bill of Rights that protect “zones of privacy” for the marital
space. In particular, the case recognized the right of married couples to use contraception
within their protected space: to have non-procreative sex, which logically makes it more
difficult to justify criminalizing homosexual activity. However, these gains for sexual
privacy did not yet extend to protecting private gay activity. “With two dissenters from
the judgment and at least four Justices explicitly denouncing ‘homosexuality’ and the
opinion for the Court stressing the marital context of the contraception, Griswold did not
appear to protect private gay spaces” (Eskridge 105). Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)
extended Griswold to include and protect the space of unmarried heterosexual couples; it
allowed them to buy contraceptives for use in their private sexual space. Sexual privacy
was expanding, although it did not yet include LGBT people and practices.
Although these legal precedents would provide the support to overturn state
sodomy laws in future decades, and eventually allow for constitutional protection of
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same-sex marriage, at the time The Boys in the Band premiered in New York City, gays
and lesbians had not won any substantive legal rights for themselves. This was the legal
and cultural background to the 1968 production of The Boys in the Band and the
characters it presented.
Crowley’s play takes place in the New York apartment of a gay man, Michael,
who is throwing a birthday party for his friend Harold. The play’s central crisis arises
when Michael’s ostensibly straight college roommate makes an unexpected arrival on the
scene as the men are dancing together. What results is an increasingly nasty and
embittered clash between two worlds, one the heteronormative cultural majority and the
other a slice of gay subculture.
Although the play was highly successful and was later made into a film, little has
been published on its significance, and nothing substantial has been said about the role of
the law in the play. The majority of the characters are figured as some version of the
self-hating homosexual—as Michael puts it, “You show me a happy homosexual, and I’ll
show you a gay corpse” (128)—and both critics and playwrights have expressed a
discomfort with the play’s portrayal of self-loathing gay men. Although he initially
praised the drama for its bold representation of the subject matter, New York Times critic
Clive Barnes eventually wrote in his final review of the play in August 1970, that he was
“more and more disturbed by the antihomosexual element in the play” (qtd. in Scheie 5).
Gay liberationists Dennis Altman and Peter Fisher critiqued the play in the 1970s for its
stereotypical representations of gay men (Scroggie 238). In 1995, Joe Carrithers blamed
the play and film adaptation for privileging heterosexual viewers and their stereotypes of
gay men. Doric Wilson’s play Street Theater (1982), according to Timothy Scheie,
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“crystallizes this sentiment in a scathing indictment of Crowley’s characterizations” (6).
Wilson’s play presents characters that parody Michael and Donald from Boys, and the
play’s theme is the importance of gay activism rather than self-loathing.46
Despite these valid critical concerns, The Boys in the Band provided the closest
thing possible to a commercially viable theatrical gay space in 1968. John Clum notes
that the play “has become for its detractors, particularly those who did not experience gay
life before Stonewall, a paradigm of politically incorrect drama. For some, this antipathy
to the play is based on its lack of a sense of the sadder elements of gay history” (203).
Indeed, historical context is crucial to understanding the significance of The Boys in the
Band. The play mirrored and challenged the depictions and treatment of gay men in the
1960s by showing the ways in which gay identities were shaped by both breaking the law
and capitulating to its dictates.
The law’s oppressive influence is deployed within Crowley’s dramatic strategies
that involve the use of gay domestic space. The dramatic space, Michael’s apartment,
functions as a metaphor for closets literal and figurative. The apartment is at various
times invaded, repulsed, conflated, rejected, and collapsed, all done because of the law’s
simultaneous authority and illegitimacy with regard to its treatment of the play’s
characters. Because of its fluid borders and multiple trajectories, the apartment’s space
works both within the law, at times being complicit with it, and against the law. The
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Obviously, the political and historical situation for gays in 1982 afforded such a viewpoint,
coming as it did after the Stonewall Riots and the decade that had since passed. Interestingly, Street
Theater was performed “in a small space in Tribeca and then in the Mineshaft leather bar. Its gay audience
and use of a gay space stand in telling counterpoint to the mainstream appeal of The Boys in the Band”
(Scheie 6). Street Theater’s 1982 celebration of a sexualized gay space like the Mineshaft came just as the
AIDS crisis was emerging, which in turn would cause gay men to have a more ambivalent attitude toward
such spaces; there was a newly discovered threat of infection in sexualized spaces, not just sexual
liberation.
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dynamic relationship between the law and gay spaces produces part of the trauma that
necessarily attended late 1960s United States gay identity.
The Boys in the Band reflects this anxiety of gay men being subject to police
harassment and legal prosecution in public spaces like gay bars, and even in their own
homes. The play is set in an apartment in the East Fifties in Manhattan. The setting is a
private space—although of course it is performed in the public space of a theater. John
Clum notes, “In . . . The Boys in the Band, the gay world is a dangerously closed society.
Domestic space becomes a refuge from the hostile terrifying world. ‘Out there’ are
hostile heterosexuals; inside, gay men face their own private demons (created by the
people out there). Isolated within the domestic space, the creative gay man is at a dead
end” (207). All of the characters in Crowley’s play are under surveillance. The audience
watches their behavior, and so comes to recognize particular gay sub-cultural codes.
Moreover, implicitly within the dramatic fiction itself, the characters are under the
constant threat that the police or some other un-friendly outside force will enter into the
private gay space.
So, for example, after the first scene between Donald and Michael ends, the
buzzer sounds and they think it is going to be Alan, an old college friend of Michael’s,
who has unexpectedly called Michael in tears and has asked to come over. Suddenly,
several of the other characters are described as “bursting in,” with Emory, the
stereotypically effeminate character, shouting, “ALL RIGHT THIS IS A RAID!
EVERYBODY’S UNDER ARREST!” (24). Emory’s humor comes from a group of gay
men, led by the most effeminate of them, mocking the idea of the police raids that could
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occur at any instant. They are generating humor from actual fear, a grounded fear that
pervades much of the play.
Emory is the most susceptible to police harassment, as he is the one most
obviously gay. The next time the buzzer sounds, he yelps, “Oh my God, it’s Lily Law!
Everybody three feet apart!” (38), to campily indicate a potential undercover police
officer. When Michael opens the door to meet the delivery man with the cake—the plot
is built around a birthday party for their friend Harold—the stage directions have him
close the door behind him. The men do not want anyone outside of their group to witness
their social interactions.
Such witnessing of course happens soon thereafter when Alan walks in on the
group of them dancing together. Alan typifies the threat of Lily Law and all outside
heteronormative surveillance. Significantly, he is a Washington lawyer whose entrance
into the space is the dramatic catalyst for the play’s main events. Alan’s entrance is
meant to be a dramatic moment of tension, and Michael turns off the music abruptly
because the men have been “caught.” There is some general awkwardness and rising
tension. Act I culminates with the theretofore highly polished Alan beating Emory in a
rage, drawing blood and screaming anti-gay epithets. Then, oddly, Alan collapses
moaning into the arms of Hank, the most masculine gay character who holds Alan’s
respect because he appears normative.
According to William Eskridge, one of the first main goals toward “end[ing] the
tyranny of the closet” after Stonewall in 1969 was “to protect private gay spaces against
spying and intrusion of the police” (15). Even before Stonewall, Crowley’s play does
some of this political work. The Boys in the Band dramatically transforms a private gay
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space into a public forum on the legitimacy of police harassment and gay oppression in
general. Alan articulates a stereotypical question posed to gay people: “I couldn’t care
less what people do—as long as they don’t do it in public—or—or try to force their ways
on the whole damned world” (51). Alan is referring to Emory’s campy behavior in the
private space of the apartment, yet he is still conceptualizing that space as public. For
Alan, a public space is a space subject to anyone’s view. In trying to formulate an
argument for protecting private gay spaces, the play also queerly indicates the fragile
dichotomy between private and public.
Michael’s apartment functions as a metaphor for the closet, which is, as Eve
Sedgwick claims, “the defining structure for gay oppression in this [20th] century” (71).
Even when its inhabitants are hermetically sealed within it, the dread of infiltration sets
in, and the effect is a “claustrophobic space.” Brenda Murphy coins this term in her
analysis of queer space in Tea and Sympathy (1953) and Cat on a Hot Tin Roof. 47
Murphy defines queer space in those two plays as a dramatic setting or effect “in which
both gender identity and sexuality are far more fluid than the heteronormative conception
prevalent in the fifties allowed for, and the setting and transgression of boundaries takes
place constantly” (183). I think the idea of queer space also works well in application to
Boys. The inhabitants of Michael’s apartment may be asked, as Michael does of Donald
and Emory, to “play it straight” and change their behavior, and therefore it is also never
completely a “gay” space because the men are always self-consciously monitoring their
behavior for ambiguous entrants like Allan. The claustrophobic space of Michael’s
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Brenda Murphy, "Claustrophobia: Containment and Queer Spaces in Tea and Sympathy and Cat on a Hot
Tin Roof” in Critical Insights: Gender, Sex & Sexuality, ed. Margaret Sönser Breen (Ipswich, MA: Salem
Press, 2014): 181-94, 183.
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apartment is ultimately presented in a state of multiple tensions, and the sustainability of
its gay characters has an uncertain future.
The main spatial trajectory of Act One involves the infiltration of gay domestic
space by a threatening normative space: Alan literally occupies that normative space and
brings with him, as a lawyer, the authority, condemnation, and harassment that the law
imposed on gay men in the late 1960s, even as his own questionable sexuality
problematizes the legitimacy of that authority. After Alan’s violent beating of Emory,
Michael stands in the center of the room as if in a trance. He sees the havoc wrought by
the collision of the gay and heteronormative worlds, and from then on he selfdestructively works to destroy the domestic space as a viable site for gay existence. An
alcoholic who had been sober for five weeks, he promptly walks to the bar and begins
guzzling gin, and the act ends as Harold, the birthday boy, enters the apartment, sees the
party’s general wreckage, and “laughs and laughs and laughs.” As a character, Harold
evinces an inscrutability and general weirdness that, memorably portrayed in the 1970
film by Leonard Frey, effectively changes the mood of the play and helps to create the
unpredictability of events in the darker and more tragic second act.48
Act Two involves a spatial trajectory opposite to that of the first act. Michael gets
drunk and turns into a more sinister character as, with an obvious nod to the games in
Edward Albee’s Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, he tries to orchestrate a party game
called Affairs of the Heart. (Albee refused to be a producer for the play because of the
negative gay stereotypes within it.) Michael creates a contest whereby the men are

Harold’s dark queerness is reminiscent of Lenny’s in Harold Pinter’s The Homecoming (1964). Both
men use desire and sexuality as weapons. Both characters also do a lot of watching. Harold enters at the
end of Act I to survey the damage and laugh into it. Lenny stands at a distance at the end of The
Homecoming, watching his father and brother become enslaved to their desires.
48
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supposed to telephone the one person they’ve truly loved: “If you make the call, you get
one point. If the person you are calling answers, you get two more points. If somebody
else answers, you get only one. If there’s no answer at all, you’re screwed” (91). Donald
retorts, “You’re screwed if you make the call” (91). While this seems like a silly game
that middle-school children might play, the men conceive of the game as a transgressive
push out into normative spaces, to either win by appropriating them or lose and be
subdued by them.
Two characters, Emory and Bernard, are crushed by the game because they are
unable to articulate their love for the heterosexual man at the other end of the phone.
Emory calls his first unrequited love, Dr. Delbert Botts, now a married dentist, but is
unable to say he loves him. Instead, Emory call himself “nobody,” after which Botts
hangs up on him. Michael forces Alan to make a phone call, accusing him of being gay
and that he should not call his wife, but rather Justin Stuart, another college friend with
whom Michael thinks Alan had an affair. Alan actually calls his wife, which devastates
Michael, and then leaves the apartment, although it is unclear if Alan is actually gay but
just rejecting the miserable gay community he’s been presented with over the course of
the evening. Michael doesn’t play the game, probably because, as Harold puts it, “He’s
never loved anyone” (118). Michael has a breakdown and flees the apartment. He wants
to collapse the domestic space into itself, asking near the play’s end, “Do you suppose
there’s any possibility of just burning this room?” (129). He retreats to a midnight mass
where he can presumably ask forgiveness in a holy space. The church’s sacred space
serves as a counterpoint to the damned, burning domestic sphere of the gay man.
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It is actually the couple Larry and Hank who win the game. (Technically they tie
with Alan, but Alan’s ambiguous exit from the party puts his adherence to the game’s
rules in doubt). Hank and Larry manage to tell each other that they love one another over
the phone: Hank leaves a message on their answering service, telling an operator about
his love for Larry. This is meant to be a dangerous act; there is a sense that, while he is
not literally breaking the law by giving voice to such sentiment, Hank is opening himself
up for some sort of police harassment or public stigmatization. Larry and Hank then go
up to Michael’s bedroom upstairs to make love. While they are the only victors in the
game and play, they have not escaped the potential trauma of criminal persecution. In the
invisible space of the bedroom, they are breaking the law. They have appropriated the
space for their own, but are still subject to legal threat at any time for breaking the law.
Larry and Hank retire to a somewhat private sexual space—as private as such a space can
be when its inhabitants are breaking the law—but they have not been violently ejected
from the dramatic action as in earlier gay dramas. They will continue living together in
the future, but Larry demands a more flexible understanding of a domestic arrangement
that allows for sexual freedom. He wants “Respect—for each other’s freedom. With no
need to lie or pretend. In my own way, Hank, I love you, but you have to understand that
even though I do want to go on living with you, sometimes there may be others” (116).
The open queer “marriage” that is depicted between Hank and Larry is actually a
quite radical dramatic representation, especially considering the time period of the play’s
premiere. The invisible bedroom inhabited by Hank and Larry offstage at the end of
play—a queer space—is suggestive of any number of sexual and domestic realities.
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However, Joe Carrithers argues that the play and film privilege the heterosexual gaze and
spectator, and that Boys circulates
images that are antithetical to the redefinitions of sexuality and relationships
supported by many gay men of the post-Stonewall generation. Such mediated
depictions comfort the straight audience--primarily its men--by not forcing them
to encounter (and, by extension, perhaps to accept) the possibility of other forms
of sexuality, particularly non-monogamous gay forms. (64)
Carrithers disregards the negotiations that Hank and Larry undertake as they attempt to
form a long-term relationship that may be non-monogamous. I disagree that the play and
film privilege any particular gaze; rather, they suggest a multiplicity of viewpoints and
queer any solid framework in which to categorize Hank’s and Larry’s relationship. The
Boys in the Band, and by extension much of gay drama, queers the space in which it is
performed. Gay dramas can destabilize ostensible borders between the performative
spaces that the gay characters inhabit and those filled by spectators in the audience.
Spectators are removed from the action, but only to a point, and in effect share the same
space as gay characters, which may generate greater sympathy for those gay characters.
Because the boundaries between the “gay” theatrical play and its spectators are porous
and fluid, the energies that flow within the entire space(s) and between the actors and
audience are queer.
Jean-Ulrick Désert provocatively writes in his theorizing about queer urban space,
‘A queer space . . . is at once private and public. Our cities, our neighborhoods, our
homes are loosely defined territories inscribed not merely by the laws of proprietary
ownership but by implicit and shifting inflections of presence, conspicuous or otherwise’
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(21). In his essay ‘Queer Space,’ Désert formulates helpful definitions: ‘”Space” is
commonly defined as a delineated or loosely bounded area occupied cognitively or
physically. . . . This terrain of physical space, both natural and designed, increasingly
includes literary, media, and electronic space. Queer space crosses, engages, and
transgresses social, spiritual, and aesthetic locations…’ (20). Because it is impossible to
discern the boundaries between actors and the characters they inhabit, and the nature and
desires of the audience members as they watch and emotionally respond to those
characters and actors, dramas like The Boys in the Band queer their performance spaces.
The energies that flow between actors and audience members are incapable of
categorization. When an audience is asked to emotionally respond to gay and queer
characters, the theatrical space is queered and a cultural subtext is performed
simultaneously to the theatrical production. The space in which a “gay” play is
performed can no longer be assumed to be a heterosexual space. Representing LGBT
characters destabilizes, queers that particular cultural space.
The Boys in the Band highlights the injustice of the law’s treatment of gay men.
By focusing on the need for protection of private gay spaces, the play contributed to the
first main goal of the gay liberation movement as articulated by William Eskridge. The
play also points to the ultimate political and legal goal of the movement as Eskridge
views it: that of “equal gay citizenship,” demanding “public equality and equal treatment
on their merits as employees, soldiers, immigrants, and parents” (15). The trajectory
from protection of private spaces to the ultimate goal of equal gay citizenship is a logical
legal progression, one that is more forcefully mapped out in Tony Kushner’s Angels in
America (1992).
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Crowley’s play employs a spatial logic that served as a literary-theatrical
springboard to the modern gay rights movement. More specifically, it foreshadowed the
rhetoric and spatial logic imbedded in the landmark 2003 Supreme Court case Lawrence
v. Texas, written some thirty-five years after Boys opened in New York City. Lawrence
held unconstitutional all state anti-sodomy statutes and has paved the way for state
Supreme Court judicial opinions legalizing same-sex marriage. Justice Kennedy wrote
the Lawrence majority opinion, which employs spatial rhetoric throughout, such as the
“more transcendent dimensions” of liberty that all individuals possess. (An influence
perhaps from the 1965 Griswold opinion’s spatial rhetoric of “zones of privacy,”
“penumbras,” and “emanations.”) Kennedy’s rhetoric in Lawrence establishes a link
between the understanding of family arrangement and of individual identity:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a
dwelling or other private places. In our tradition, the State is not omnipresent in
the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the
home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends
beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant
case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent
dimensions. (539 U.S. 562)
The language of this important judicial opinion employs a rhetoric that bleeds into
the literary. Justice Kennedy’s understanding that liberty has not only spatial, but also
“more transcendent dimensions” shows an interest in identities, those intangible things
that so many minority groups had come to prize by the end of the twentieth century.
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However, although Kennedy rhetorically attempts to move outside of the realm of space
entirely, he is unable to completely escape spatial metaphors when he refers to the
transcendent “dimensions” and “spheres” of our existence. This shows an inevitable
overlap between the ideas of private space and the free person. If people are granted
privacy, the state is in effect affirming their worth as individuals. Hank and Larry
deserve privacy in their upstairs bedroom as they negotiate the physical and emotional
contours of the relationship; they deserve this privacy, because following Justice
Kennedy’s argument, “there are other spheres of our lives and existence” that deserve
respect, namely “an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct.”
“Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.” In other words, true liberty, the kind
protected in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is unencumbered by spatial
constraints: it has no boundaries. By moving away from spatial privacy and making a
nod toward universal, intrinsic human rights, Justice Kennedy rhetorically conceptualizes
freedom as space-less, or infinite, in order to grant equal gay citizenship. Justice
Kennedy, the unlikely conservative gay rights champion on the Court, employs the
rhetoric of queer space when he lays out the reasoning of the Court’s opinion. As Dèsert
theorizes, we queer our literal and figurative spaces when we attempt to transgress or
revise existing social codes. Queering space is a rhetorical strategy that is employed in
aesthetic and legal discourses. Mart Crowley utilizes it aesthetically in his drama in order
to help usher in the modern gay rights movement. Justice Kennedy makes a similar
intellectual move within legal discourse in an opinion many consider the beginning of the
end of the struggle to attain equal gay and lesbian citizenship.
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Angels in America: Re-Mapping Guilt and the Constitution
The Boys in the Band urges the protection of private gay spaces in the political
agenda of the gay rights movement, and by extension works to influence the direction of
gay rights jurisprudence. The play mirrored much of twentieth-century gay drama in that
it located guilt in a gay man, Michael, and expelled him from the drama. However,
Crowley uses the strategies of queer space to begin changing this paradigm and actually
helped galvanize the modern gay rights movement.
Tony Kushner’s epic Angels in America, in turn, is concerned with achieving
equal citizenship for all minorities in the public space of democratic pluralism. He does
this by advocating for a national re-imagining of the spatial logics of the closet and the
United States Constitution. Constitutional law, and in particular the hermeneutics that are
applied to constitutional interpretation, includes a more abstract understanding of
domestic space, if we interpret “domestic” as encompassing the national homeland, the
United States.
Kushner’s epic is a meditation on the best way of interpreting the American legal
and social domestic space. Angels in America advocates a liberal method of legal
interpretation with the political aim of LGBTQ equality. It does so by championing a
“living Constitution” and envisioning the nation’s most important legal document as
constantly expanding outward and moving forward in time. Running parallel to this
theme is the dramatic device of taking gay characters out of closeted domestic spaces,
and placing them at the center of the national domestic space of the future. Our methods
of interpretation are vitally important to the ways in which we construct ourselves. The
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nature of identity is dependent on the nature of its hermeneutics, whether constructed
through legal or dramatic texts.
At the end of Angels in America, Prior describes a desire to re-enter and re-claim
some vision of America and a new kind of American: “We will be citizens.” The desire
for full and equal citizenship is considered by many to be the desired end of the gay
liberation movement. Legal scholar William Eskridge describes the trajectory of the
movement in this way: 1) Protection of “private gay spaces”; 2) Achieving protection
and gaining control over “institutions of gay subculture”; 3) Attaining “equal gay
citizenship” (15). While Crowley is mostly concerned with the first part of the gay rights
movement—protection of private gay spaces—Kushner is clearly interested in achieving
full equality: not just for gay men, but all disempowered people. Although Angels is a
“gay fantasia on national themes,” it has an intersectional political vision because
Kushner consistently draws attention to overlapping identities, and advocates different
groups of people banding together to solve the problems brought on by the AIDS crisis.
Intersectional identity is shown through Kushner’s use of characters that hold several
identities.
The characters of Angels depict a wide diversity of religion, sexual orientation,
gender identity, race, class privilege, and HIV-status. For example, both Louis and Prior
are white, gay men, but the partners also have significant differences: Louis is a middleclass Jew and Prior is a Protestant with a trust fund; Prior has AIDS, while Louis is HIVnegative. Belize is a gay African-American who uses his drag name instead of his birth
name, Norman Arriaga. In performance, such as the 2003 HBO miniseries, Belize is
often played flamboyantly, in contrast to the more traditionally masculine, closeted gay
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character Joe. AIDS links many of the characters together, and although no female
character has AIDS, Hannah, Joe’s mother, is deeply affected by her friendship with
Prior, and becomes an LGBT ally and someone interested in addressing the problems of
the AIDS crisis. In addition, cross-casting techniques require many characters to play
multiple parts in order to reinforce an intersectional political vision. So, for example,
Emily the nurse is performed by the actor cast as The Angel, and the Man in the Park
with whom Louis has sex is performed by the actor cast as Prior. These diverse
characters and cross-casting choices paradoxically draw attention to a common thread of
humanity that runs throughout all people. The play reveals that AIDS was never just a
gay issue because people cannot be confined to one axis of identity and human beings are
deeply interconnected. All significant social problems are the responsibility of everyone
to solve, and indeed can only be solved by finding common purpose.

The New High Priests of America: Absolving America the Closet
On his death bed, Roy Cohn eulogizes himself because no one else will:
“Lawyers are… the High Priests of America. We alone know the words that made
America. Out of thin air. We alone know how to use The Words. The Law: the only
club I ever wanted to belong to” (Perestroika 87-88). However, it is clear that Roy’s and
Joe’s facility with legal language has not helped them navigate emotionally successful
lives. Although they are gay, these two characters experience the fate of past characters
in gay drama: they are expelled from the action. (Roy memorably so, as he is finally,
albeit comedically, depicted as burning in Hellfire.)
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The new High Priests of America, symbolized in Prior Walter, are gay artists who
can orchestrate communal rituals of forgiveness. By extension, Kushner portrays himself
as such an orchestrator as the epic’s playwright. The two-part play deals with the themes
of law, transgression, justice, and forgiveness, often through spatial metaphor and device.
Forgiveness was a new theme in the gay drama canon. Forgiveness denotes a full and
absolute pardon, and is different in nature from atonement, which, besides its JudeoChristian meaning, requires reparations for a crime or injury in order to expiate guilt.
Forgiveness may follow from atonement, but not necessarily. Some acts can be atoned
for, but are not forgivable. In an interview about the play, Kushner mentioned his focus
on forgiveness:
Forgiveness is a very complicated thing. It certainly became, as I wrote
Perestroika, the chief issue because it became a big issue in the world, starting
with perestroika, and all of these sort of democratic revolutions that were going
on, not just in Eastern Europe, but also in Latin America for instance, where
people really had to ask themselves, “Can you let go of the past?” Can you
forgive somebody that’s done something really, really terrible to you? It’s
undertheorized and underdiscussed in the Left. (Cunningham 62-63)

Kushner explores the theme of abandonment, and whether such abandonment can
be forgiven, in several forms: by lovers, family members, the state, the state’s law, and
finally by God. Gay men are equally prone to actually be the ones doing the abandoning,
as we see with Louis leaving his sick lover Prior and Joe leaving his wife Harper. Fathers
leave their unloved children, as Joe’s father did to him; the state abandons those with
AIDS, as the Reagan administration did; laws governing those with AIDS abandon them
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at the time of their greatest need; and above all, at the end of the twentieth century and
the last millennium, as this great plague descended on America and it seemed that so
many things, including history, were coming to an end, Kushner’s drama presents God
Himself as having abandoned the country.
God the Father, the ultimate Judge and arbiter of all laws, has abandoned His
children, and this abandonment is presented as perhaps the only unforgivable act in the
play. Prior tells the angels that they “should sue the bastard. That’s my only contribution
to all this Theology. Sue the bastard for walking out. How dare He” (Perestroika 130).
Cohn volunteers to be God’s lawyer in such an event, but advises his client, “I gotta start
by telling you you ain’t got a case here, you’re guilty as hell, no question, you have
nothing to plead but not to worry, darling, I will make something up” (Perestroika 141).
Louis learns that his abandonment of Prior is to a certain extent unforgivable as well,
although importantly their relationship as friends does survive. Even Roy Cohn is
forgiven when Belize, Louis, and Ethel say the Kaddish, the Jewish prayer for the dead,
to “thank him” for the AZT pills that he is leaving behind for them to take. Louis is
incredulous as to the very concept of forgiving Roy, to which Belize responds: “He was
a terrible person. He died a hard death. So maybe…A queen can forgive her vanquished
foe. It isn’t easy, it doesn’t count if it’s easy, it’s the hardest thing. Forgiveness. Which
is maybe where love and justice finally meet. Peace, at least” (Perestroika 122).
Angels in America enacts a cultural ritual of forgiveness, similar to what August
Wilson accomplishes in Fences (1983). Fences deals with themes of judgment and
forgiveness, and ultimately works to orchestrate a communal healing of past racial
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wounds inflicted on African Americans. Angels does the same thing for not only the
victims of the AIDS crisis, but also a range of LGBT communities.
The trope of sacrificing or expelling gay and lesbian characters in twentiethcentury American drama can in part be explained through the concept of containment:
the need to establish boundaries around perceived threats. Drawing on cognitive theory,
Bruce McConachie has investigated how Cold War rhetoric and the concept of
containment infiltrated numerous ways in which Americans conceptualized the world and
each other, which in turn was mirrored in American theatre. Containment was such a
pervasive concept after World War II because the United States was worried about
containing the spreading threat of Communism. There were perceived external and
internal threats posed by Communism to the future of the United States, but the idea of
containment also spread to gender roles of the time. McConachie employs the term
“Empty Boy” to describe the ways in which American culture came to understand and
value masculinity and the idea of America during the Cold War. Boys were considered
empty containers that could realize the potential of America, but could also be infiltrated
by insidious outside forces. McConachie contends that, “In the popular imagination, the
American boy represented the potential strength of the nation” (57).
Moreover, in taking on the burden of representing the future of America, the
American male became in effect a symbol for America itself:
The popular mythology surrounding the ‘good war’ tended to conflate American
boys with America itself. . . . Most believed that the American boy, an
embodiment of what was best in the nation, was the first line of defense in the
Cold War. In the postwar quest among public intellectuals to identify an
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American ‘national character,’ the figure of the Empty Boy often stood behind
their characterizations. The notion of national character was itself a Platonic
abstraction intended to define the essence of Americanness in the expectation that
this essence would be sharply different from its Soviet counterpart. In addition to
confronting an external danger, the construct of national character posed an
internal question of authenticity: Are we being true to ourselves? (58)

McConachie identifies homosexuality as a perceived cultural threat of the time to the
empty containers that boys and young men represented in American culture, and
documents how gays and lesbians were targeted in general. David Savran highlights the
similar cultural connections made between Communists and homosexuals: “Zealots such
as Senator McCarthy and Senator Kenneth Wherry, the Republican floor leader, insisted
that there was an inevitable link between Communists and homosexuals,” and making
such connections “was extremely productive for the Cold War hegemony insofar as it
rationalized the exercise of containment on the domestic front” (Communists 86). Not
only did Communism need to be contained, but also the threat of homosexuality;
otherwise, the Empty Boy—America itself—would be contaminated and the contagion
would spread.
Because containment was such a pervasive spatial metaphor for Cold War
American culture, we can apply its meanings to the treatment of homosexuality in
American drama, and especially the spaces that gay characters inhabit in popular gay
dramas. Containment helps to further contextualize the closet as a spatial metaphor; after
all, the closet functions as a form of containment for gays and lesbians.
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The Cold War ended in 1989, on the cusp of a decade that would see striking
changes in gay lives and their representations in American drama, most notably in Tony
Kushner’s Angels in America. The title Perestroika, the second part of the epic,
explicitly refers to the ending of the Cold War as a major theme of the work. It is the
Russian word for “restructuring.” Indeed, perestroika’s economic reforms contributed to
the ending of the Cold War. The juridico-medical discourse surrounding homosexuality
had also changed by the century’s end, engendering larger legitimate spaces for gays and
lesbians.
Restructurings also occurred within the dramatic devices used within popular gay
dramas of the time, specifically in terms of the traditional expulsion or sacrifice required
of gay and lesbian characters depicted in American drama. Angels in America is perhaps
the most prominent example of a drama that subverts older gay dramatic rituals. As
McConachie notes:
Kushner subverts metaphors of containment that shape personal identity and
human interaction. Whereas the cold warriors of Angels act on their belief that
identity is evident in the reality of either skin (Joe Pitt) or innards (Roy Cohn)—
the boundary or the essence of a contained self—other characters come to
understand that such Platonic metaphors avoid the messy complexities of identity
and change. (197)
This highlights Kushner’s blurring of the spaces allotted to any identity, including those
of sexual minorities. McConachie argues that Americans had often equated boys and
young men with the empty vessels and containers of America itself. This perspective
reveals how Kushner uses cognitive metaphors of contamination, strategies of metonymy,
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and the theme of forgiveness to subvert Cold War perspectives and American drama’s
methods for dealing with gay subjects. In the process, Kushner’s plays demand a reexamination not only of America’s gay inhabitants, but of America itself.
In speaking to the audience at the end of the play, and in fact blessing them, Prior
invokes a tremendous forgiveness upon not only the spectators in the theater, but also
metonymically all Americans and America itself. He serves as a new High Priest of
America, by in effect re-conceptualizing the spatial logic of the closet:
This disease will be the end of many of us, but not nearly all, and the dead will be
commemorated and will struggle on with the living, and we are not going away.
We won’t die secret deaths anymore. The world only spins forward. We will be
citizens. The time has come.
Bye now.
You are fabulous creatures, each and every one.
And I bless you: More Life.
The Great Work Begins. (146)
The walls of the closet are pushed to the boundaries of the United States. Because “we
are not going away,” the closet is rhetorically disbanded. Everyone is equalized in the
audience, regardless of identity affiliation: everyone is equally fabulous and everyone has
somehow been forgiven. As Eskridge claims, the end result desired for the gay liberation
movement is equal citizenship. The previous paradigm of gay drama has been reversed:
in Kushner’s vision, America has sought and been granted absolution by its gay subjects.
Kushner continues Crowley’s use of queer space as well by re-conceptualizing the spaces
of the closet and the country.

Barry 143
David Savran interprets Kushner’s strategy in terms of an empty gesture of
“dissensus”: merely the “rhetoric of pluralism and moderation,” which he argues is in
fact only a mode of consumption that is ultimately “reaffirming a fundamentally
conservative hegemony” (220). I find that argument too cynical for my taste, but in this I
may be acknowledging predilections of consumption that Savran is highlighting as the
problem. In contrast to Savran, David Román thinks that the spectator’s engagement in a
process of consuming a marathon performance of Angels—living through a day of
dramatic representations about AIDS, remembering actual people living with the disease
or who have died from it—actually constitutes a transformative “ritual of hope” (221).
I agree more with Román’s interpretation of Kushner’s achievement, mostly
because I read Perestroika as successfully intervening in one of the recurring rituals in
gay drama, going beyond what Savran thinks is merely the “rhetoric of pluralism and
moderation,” but actually instituting a theatrical praxis that has been so commercially
successful precisely because it engenders a catharsis from a diverse pool of spectators.
The final moments of Perestroika perform an act of judgment on the audience, one that
culminates in collective absolution and encouragement to try again, “more life.” In the
process, it simultaneously breaks apart previous boundaries of containment and
strengthens the community’s earnest commitment to liberal pluralism, which, despite
Savran’s Marxist critique, is still the most valuable thing about the American project.
Gay drama has always been inextricably linked with resonant images of crime and
its attendant guilt, atonement, and in recent years a potentially reconciling forgiveness.
Successful performances of cultural forgiveness work towards a place, in the words of
Kushner's character Belize, “where love and justice finally meet” (Perestroika 122). The
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Empty Boy, metonymically figured as the unrealized potential of American masculinity
and the American national body itself, has been fully and finally contaminated by
unabashedly acknowledged homosexuality and the literal disease of AIDS. However,
instead of using his protagonist as a warning about the threats to American masculinity
and national direction, this “contaminated” character, Prior Walter, emerges as the only
one who holds a potential answer to the future of America.
David Savran observes that Angels works by “placing this oppressed class at the
very center of American history, by showing it to be not just the depository of a special
kind of knowledge, but by recognizing the central role that it has had in the construction
of a national subject, polity, literature, and theatre” (Ambivalence 227). Ron Scapp
makes a similar argument with respect to AIDS and the significance of Prior’s speech at
the end of Perestroika: “The cause of those dying of AIDS becomes the cause of
America, of humanity. This moment evokes a universal act of transgression, of
trespassing the boundaries of some prior state of exclusion and denial (and political
wickedness)” (92).
Angels achieves this remarkable shift in the representational paradigm by
moving the main thrust of its gay drama away from the traditional rituals of gay drama.
Despite Crowley’s subversive use of queer space in The Boys in the Band, his play still
depicted collapsing gay male bodies (Michael, Emory, even the ambiguous Allan all
collapse at one point) and a tenuous domestic space, given Michael speaks of burning his
lonely apartment and Hank and Larry are only imagined offstage. Instead, Angels
becomes a collective ritual of expiating criminal and moral guilt through the act of
forgiveness, not punishment. Angels in America figures the guilt as being projected onto
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and thereby internalized in the American body politic for having committed sins against
its LGBTQ citizens.

The Constitutional Hermeneutics of Angels
Like The Boys in the Band, Kushner’s text is a cultural precursor to the landmark
legal decisions Lawrence v. Texas (2003), U.S. v. Windsor (2013), and Obergefell v.
Hodges (2015). But Angels in America is equally a rebuke to the case Lawrence would
eventually overturn, Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), which held that state laws criminalizing
homosexual conduct were constitutional. By extension, the play also rejects the kind of
constitutional interpretation that resulted in the Bowers opinion.
In order for any liberation movement to occur, people must often first break
existing laws in order to establish new ones. As Joe Pitt envisions an empty Hall of
Justice in Millennium Approaches because its laws hold nothing for his particular
identity, Louis tells him, “Sometimes, even if it scares you to death, you have to be
willing to break the law” (Millennium 73). Joe literally works in the shadow of Bowers v.
Hardwick. He writes judicial opinions from a Hall of Justice connected with the very
legal regime that is silencing his identity. Bowers was issued in 1986, the year in which
much of Angels is set. The cultural power of Bowers manifests in Joe Pitt and Roy Cohn,
the two gay lawyers of the epic, who remain closeted in order to preserve their public
personae. Kushner produces a dramatic text and performance that resists a legal text: the
Bowers decision. The play is a cultural act of transgression. Simply to acknowledge
one’s gay identity—and certainly to act upon it—could be considered a transgression
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under the Bowers holding. All states were free to make homosexuality illegal, although
New York state had repealed its sodomy laws.
David Thompson reads Angels and Lawrence against each other in an effort to
understand how both texts understand “the place of sexuality in our notion of the person
and, more broadly, about the place of the person in our notion of the law” (244). He
argues that the Lawrence decision’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
clause to formulate its holding indicates a view of personhood similar to that espoused in
Angels in America. Thompson writes, “In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court nudges
us toward a more subtle, more expansive, more transcendent understanding of what it
means to have the acts of love that one engages in branded as ‘deviant’ and criminal, and
of the violence that is done to the persons whose identities take shape within a system of
laws that brand people and their activities in this way” (252).
Bowers was wrongly decided because the Court framed the issue too narrowly.
The judicial opinion asked whether the plaintiff had a fundamental right to practice
homosexual acts, as opposed to the broader holding of Lawrence which made the issue
about a fundamental right to liberty, supported by the right to privacy. Bowers became
the law of the land in 1986, and through the legal doctrine of stare decisis, it became
entrenched as the law. Stare decisis, Latin for “to stand by things decided,” is the
inherently conservative legal doctrine that establishes precedent in judicial opinions.
Supreme Court precedent has the greatest weight. Lower courts cannot overturn
Supreme Court precedent and must follow it. Only the Supreme Court can overturn its
own precedent, and it does so cautiously. This causes certain judicial opinions to become
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culturally entrenched, and makes case law and legal interpretation inherently
conservative.49
Law, both divine and human, has failed to uphold its promise in Angels in
America: Kushner envisions the Hall of Justice as empty on earth, and Heaven is a
rubble-strewn earthquake zone without anyone in charge. Justice is figured as cold and
un-adaptable to the complexity of human relationships. Louis thinks that American
justice is too concerned with the verdict rather than the process of evaluating an
individual’s worth. This deliberative process is what Louis calls “the act of judgment” as
opposed to the always reductive nature of a verdict: “it should be the questions and shape
of a life, its total complexity gathered, arranged and considered, which matters in the end,
not some stamp of salvation or damnation which disperses all the complexity in some
unsatisfying little decision” (Millennium 38-39). This temporal process of evaluating the
merits and crimes of the individual and the American nation is in many ways the
underlying purpose of Angels in America, and part of what provides its epic nature.
America is being judged, over the course of a marathon set of performances if one is to
see both parts, after which America is forgiven in order for collective survival in the face
of the global challenge of AIDS and the unknown challenges of the new millennium.
Angels looks and longs for anchorage and stability in texts and lives—some order
or plan to follow in the wake of AIDS, but Kushner knows that textual stability can also
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In the Lawrence opinion that overturned Bowers, Justice Kennedy had to acknowledge the weight of
stare decisis. He writes, “The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judgments
of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an inexorable command. … Bowers was not
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers
v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled” (539 U.S. 577-78). In the overruling of Bowers, the language
of Lawrence is performative, in the Austinian sense, because it is an action: “Bowers v. Hardwick should
be and now is overruled.” And thus it was.

Barry 148
be a dangerous thing. The Angel wants Prior to preach the gospel of the Anti-Migratory
Epistle, a text that would have humanity reach some sort of stasis through an utterly
immobile text. This of course would result in Prior’s death, I think, as AIDS represents
and is a force that must be counteracted with a progressive knowledge. The angel shouts,
“FOR THIS AGE OF ANOMIE: A NEW LAW!” (Perestroika 48). The etymology of
anomie comes from the Greek word anomia, lawlessness. For this age of lawlessness,
the angels want to deliver a stable law to humanity: a law that would come to definitive
conclusion on all matters. The Angel Europa says, “This is the Tome of Immobility, of
respite, of cessation. Drink of its bitter water once, Prophet, and never thirst again”
(Perestroika 131).
But the answer is not as neat as Prior would hope. Prior wants to move forward,
he wants “more life,” because “The world only spins forward.” He does this without a
text, except the literary text he delivers as an actor and character in a play. There are
dangers to Prior’s philosophy when people go forward with a view of interpretation that
allows for change and evolution, as when people abuse the powers of interpretation.
Cohn sees the law as an “organ” to be manipulated; it is a phallic site of desire and
domination that means nothing to him but words whose meaning can be twisted to fit his
own ends: “Because I don’t see the Law as a dead and arbitrary collection of antiquated
dictums, thou shall, thou shalt not, because, because I know the Law’s a pliable,
breathing, sweating…organ…” (Millennium 66). As John Quinn notes, Cohn prizes the
indeterminacy in law: “the indeterminacy of the rule of law is a central tenet of his creed
of life” (83). Interestingly, although Cohn is a conservative character, he holds a liberal
view of the law as a force that can change depending on the circumstances of the day.
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This question of legal interpretation is particularly salient in the realm of
constitutional law, which is the body of law that deals with America’s supreme secular
text. There are originalist scholars and Supreme Court Justices like Antonin Scalia who
think that the text of the Constitution should only be interpreted through the meanings
and intentions of the words when they were written in 1787. Other scholars and Justices,
in the tradition of Justice Brennan, think that the Constitution is a living document that
we must interpret in light of changing times.50 The Justices in the Bowers majority
looked at the history of sodomy laws in the country and could not see how the law could
allow for a fundamental right to homosexual conduct; there is no mention of
homosexuality in the Constitution, so how can the Constitution fundamentally protect
those who practice it?
The Lawrence Court took a different, more expansive, forward-looking view.
The Court held that there is a fundamental right to liberty and privacy guaranteed under
the Fourteenth Amendment, which includes the intimate consensual acts committed
within a home. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence sums up this view:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its
manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume
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Justice Brennan championed this idea of a living Constitution. In a famous dissent issued just a
few years before Angels in America was written, he wrote: “We are not an assimilative, homogenous
society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else’s
unfamiliar or even repellent practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own
idiosyncrasies … The plurality today squashes this freedom by requiring specific approval from
history before protecting anything in the name of liberty. The document that the plurality construes
today is unfamiliar to me. It is not the living charter that I have taken to be our Constitution; it is
instead a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a
time long past. This Constitution does not recognize that times change … I cannot accept an
interpretive method that does such violence to the charter that I am bound by oath to uphold.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only
to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke
its principles in their own search for greater freedom. (539 U.S. 558, 579)
I see these same major constitutional law debates over interpretation being waged over
the Anti-Migratory epistle in Kushner’s American epic. John Quinn picks up on this line
of thought: “In Kushner’s America, secular law is a kind of religion, in much the same
way scriptural law was religion in the world of Old Testament Judaism. Numerous legal
scholars have theorized constitutional law as a kind of civil religion for America.
Kushner renders this same concept theatrically” (86). Quinn goes on to label Prior’s
vision of the law as “gnostic”: “Through Prior,” he writes, “Kushner exemplifies a
jurisprudential hermeneutics and substantive theme about salvation that are gnostic.
Unquestionably, Prior demonstrates the gnostic triumph of spirituality over corporeality .
. . Prior’s knowledge . . . is intuitive, wisdom based on experience and observation rather
than books and deliberation” (90). This understanding of the law is suggestive of Justice
Brennan’s vision of a living Constitution.
Kushner advocates a “jurisprudential hermeneutics” akin to the concept of the
Living Constitution. Championing the flexibility of texts allows for a liberal politics, but
a loss of certainty in knowledge and action. Kushner’s domestic hermeneutics
encompass a dramatic allegory that champions liberal methods of constitutional
interpretation. In turn, this advocates for legal decisions that expand definitions of
intimate relationships inhabiting domestic space.
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The ending of Angels in America conjures a liberal pluralistic and expanding
environment in the space of the theater itself, directly including the spectators of the play.
The main characters have converged on the Bethesda fountain to discuss politics, art, and
life in a post-Cold War world and amidst the continuing AIDS crisis, although,
significantly, Prior is not dead. The couples presented at the beginning of the epic have
broken up, and as David Savran notes, “the romantic dyad (as primary social unit) is
replaced in the final scene of Perestroika by a utopian concept of (erotic) affiliation and a
new definition of family” (Ambivalence 209). As Jill Dolan observes, the epic “draw[s]
spectators into a revised vision of kinship in which gay men, Mormons, African
Americans of Caribbean descent, and Jews find family together” (53). Paradoxically,
considering the strong theme of sexuality in the play, the community in the final scene is
strikingly desexualized. Hannah has donned a cosmopolitan identity (and perhaps a
lesbian identity, as Meryl Streep’s performance in the film implies, as if she has some
kind of awakening and realization after her sexual experience with the female Angel),
and the former gay lovers Prior, Louis, and Belize are content to debate political issues
like the Palestinian state.
The epilogue is set outside of any type of traditional domestic space, in front of
Central Park’s Bethesda Fountain. The stage directions provide Kushner’s final idealized
image: a diverse intellectual community of racial, sexual, and political debate. “Prior is
heavily bundled, and he has thick glasses on, and he supports himself with a cane.
Hannah is noticeably different—she looks like a New Yorker, and she is reading the New
York Times. Louis and Belize are arguing. The Bethesda Angel is above them all”
(143). Louis and Prior do not romantically reconcile; their domestic space permanently
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collapsed in Millennium Approaches. Kushner takes gay characters out of traditional
domestic spaces, where they had rarely met with positive fates. The final tableau in
Angels demonstrates his consciousness of linked oppressions and the political strength
gained through alliances forged across those oppressions. In that sense, this “gay fantasia
on national themes” has an intersectional political vision. Angels depicts a group of
characters—LGBTQ and allies, of different races, religions, and socioeconomic classes—
that have banded together in common cause: greater visibility for those suffering with
AIDS as well as the political power that comes through collective solidarity. They are
outside in the “Central” park of New York City, making a loud call for political mobility.

Conclusion
Una Chaudhuri’s seminal study Staging Place: The Geography of Modern Drama
(1995) explores the central role of “home” in modern drama, and recognizes the position
that place and space play in Tony Kushner’s gay fantasia on national themes: “Angels in
America engages the question of place from its title onward. What America is, what
modes of placement and displacement it enjoins—in short, what it means to be here, to be
here physically, spiritually, psychologically, and ideologically—is the range of questions
that the play’s expansive structure is designed to accommodate” (249-50).
The Boys in the Band and Angels in America persistently ask the question: what
is the place of LGBTQ people in the United States? Should they continue to live in the
shadows offstage? Crowley uses queer space to suggest the need for a new
representational paradigm. Kushner fully remaps the paradigm, and advocates for the
liberal methods of Constitutional interpretation that would not only result in Lawrence v.
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Texas, but also the recent same-sex marriage cases U.S. v. Windsor (2013) and Obergefell
v. Hodges (2015).
As Angels re-imagines the domestic legal spaces of constitutional hermeneutics, it
simultaneously redraws the domestic spaces allotted to gay and lesbian characters in
American drama. The opening credits of the 2003 HBO film version, directed by Mike
Nichols, begin by soaring through the clouds over the main cities of America.
Perestroika gradually leaves the broken domestic spaces of Millennium Approaches and
enters into spaces of nature and the cosmos. The work is a fantasia, breaking away from
whatever principles in dramatic realism that may have applied.
By expanding outward and forward into a limitless universe, Kushner’s epic calls
for an expanding, evolving space allotted to LGBT citizens. Equal LGBT citizenship
would be more fully realized in the Supreme Court decisions Lawrence v. Texas (2003)
and eventually Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), which declared same-sex marriage a
Constitutional right protected by the liberty afforded to all citizens under the Fourteenth
Amendment. I will read Obergefell as the most recent example of gay legal theatre in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 4
A Case Study:
Same-Sex Marriage in the United States
“The performance of the laws then becomes a singularly powerful locus of social control,
for it is the very means by which the members of the community know who they are.”51

Introduction
Gay and lesbian drama has always been in part a legal drama, and the court
proceedings adjudicating gay/lesbian rights have been aided by essential theatrical
elements. The cultural drama of the Wilde trials firmly entrenched the emerging modern
gay and lesbian subject as one surrounded by laws. When dramatizing them on stage
throughout the twentieth century, dramatists were always cognizant of laws relating to
representations of homosexuality on the stage and regulating homosexuality offstage.
Sometimes those dramatic representations reflected and supported those laws, but often
they challenged laws as well.
In this final chapter, I would like to make three main points about how drama and
law worked together to change attitudes toward and eventually legalize same-sex
marriage in the United States. First, same-sex wedding rituals were performed
throughout the twentieth century, before laws were officially changed to allow for
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Robert Hariman, ed. Popular Trials: Rhetoric, Mass Media, and the Law (Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P,
1990), 17.
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marriage equality. These rituals, along with theatrical representations of same-sex
marriage in gay dramas beginning in the 1980s, worked to change attitudes and anticipate
the real political and legal movement for marriage equality.
Second, the Supreme Court has worked as a kind of national theater and temple,
in which the major gay and lesbian rights cases were performed and solemnized,
culminating most recently in the case of Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). Obergefell
illustrates my contention that gay and lesbian drama is often a hybrid discourse of law
and literature. By reading the case as a kind of drama, we can uncover its superficial
comic structure that not only ends in a marriage for the gay and lesbian plaintiffs, but also
culturally entrenches the normalization of gay and lesbian citizens by ceremonially
admitting them to the institution of marriage, and by extension the American “family.”
Third, reading Obergefell for its literary and theatrical properties makes some
things apparent. The rhetoric in the fractured and fractious dissents, and the intense
theatrical and jurisprudential conflict between the majority and dissenting opinions (and
even conflict within the dissenting opinions), provides an ironic substructure for the
drama, which undermines Obergefell’s comic structure and prevents closure of the legalcultural debate. In addition, the limited nature of Supreme Court spectatorship
demonstrates how U.S. constitutional law is problematically performed and consumed.
As a result, despite my inclination to champion Obergefell as a triumphant vehicle of
justice, the case also exposes some uncomfortable truths about how laws are legitimized
in the United States, and reveals the tenuous sustainability of Obergefell in the years to
come.
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Since the Netherlands’ passage of marriage equality legislation in 2001, more
than seventeen other countries have passed laws or had courts recognize same-sex
marriage. 2015 has been a monumental year for marriage equality. On May 22, the
Republic of Ireland became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage by popular
vote. With a voter turnout of 60.5%, voters ratified a constitutional amendment allowing
for marriage equality, with 62% voting yes. A month later, the United States Supreme
Court ruled in Obergefell that state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were
unconstitutional—that the fundamental right to marriage includes same-sex couples—
thus guaranteeing full marriage equality in every state.
Beginning in the 1980s, several American gay AIDS dramas featured
representations of same-sex marriages. Soon thereafter in the 1990s, gay marriage as a
political goal began infiltrating the popular culture, in large part through the work of
Andrew Sullivan. In Virtually Normal: An Argument About Homosexuality (1995),
Sullivan argued “equal access to the military and marriage” should be the central aims of
the gay and lesbian movement (173). In fact, on the day that Obergefell v. Hodges was
issued on June 26, 2015, Sullivan came out of blog-retirement—he had been writing the
popular “Daily Dish” on andrewsullivan.com for about a decade—to post an entry titled
“It is Accomplished,” implying that the gay and lesbian movement is now completed: a
problematic assertion, considering the substantial lack of LGBT anti-discrimination laws
in place.52 Although it took a few years to gain traction as a political idea, the call for
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The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) is urging the need for a Federal Non-Discrimination Bill, now
called The Equality Act, because there are currently thirty-one states with no LGBT anti-discrimination
laws. HRC is making the following argument: “Even after a marriage victory at the Supreme Court, in
most states in this country, a couple who gets married at 10 a.m. remains at risk of being fired from their
jobs by noon and evicted from their home by 2 p.m. simply for posting their wedding photos on Facebook.
No one should be fired, evicted from their home, or denied services because of who they are or whom they
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marriage equality became a central preoccupation of the gay and lesbian rights movement
beginning in the mid 90s. Sullivan acknowledges that his argument is a conservative
one: “Gay marriage is not a radical step; it is a profoundly humanizing, traditionalizing
step” (185). It has met with a legitimate critique by queer theorists, as I will explain
shortly.
In response to the growing marriage equality movement, Congress passed the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, signed by President Bill Clinton as part of a
compromise he later came to regret; the law “defended” the heterosexual definition of
marriage for the Federal Government. DOMA anticipated that state courts and
legislatures would begin allowing same-sex marriage. Beginning in 2003, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health held that
same-sex marriage could not be denied under the state Constitution. Thus began the last
decade of legal wrangling between state courts and legislatures, as American culture
began debating not only whether same-sex couples could get married, but also who
would get to decide the issue: democratically elected representatives or judges?
On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court issued two landmark gay and lesbian rights
opinions, United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry. In Windsor, the more
important of the two, the majority struck down DOMA as unconstitutional, thus
mandating Federal recognition of those same-sex marriages legitimized in thirteen states
at the time. Written by Justice Kennedy, the same Justice who penned the Lawrence
decision ten years earlier to the day, the Windsor Court used a Due Process and Equal
Protection argument to strike down DOMA as unconstitutional. The Perry majority

love.” “Why the Equality Act.” Hrc.org. Human Rights Campaign.
http://www.hrc.org//resources/entry/why-the-equality-act. Web. 28 July 2015.
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focused on a narrower legal issue of standing, but its effect was to legalize same-sex
marriages in California and overturn Proposition 8, the voter-passed referendum that
banned same-sex marriage there in 2008. Although the rulings did not declare a
fundamental constitutional right to same-sex marriage, and did not legalize same-sex
marriage in the majority of states that outlawed the practice, it was a significant victory
for LGBT rights.
Two years later to the day, however, on June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court issued
its opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, which will undoubtedly be considered a landmark
civil rights case, akin in importance to Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which
desegregated schools. Obergefell held that the fundamental right to marriage includes the
right to same-sex marriage, as protected under the Liberty clause and Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Queer and Feminist Critiques of Same-Sex Marriage
In the 1970s, gay liberation activists and lesbian feminists questioned the
importance of same-sex marriage as a political and legal goal. Gay liberationists focused
on the need for sexual freedom: “much of the early gay press urged men to overcome
their sexual shame and to value the diverse pleasures and new friendships made possible
by sexual experimentation with many partners” (Chauncey 93). In turn, lesbian feminists
of the time greeted same-sex marriage with skepticism because they viewed marriage as a
traditionally patriarchal and oppressive institution; instead, “many questioned monogamy
and worked to construct new kinds of relationships and living patterns” (94).
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Queer theorists have questioned the importance of LGBTQ political energies
being spent on achieving marriage equality. Pushing back against assimilationist thinkers
like Andrew Sullivan, scholars such as Michael Warner and Judith Butler think that
marriage as an institution is inherently exclusive and discriminatory. Warner, along with
a multitude of LGBT activists, lawyers, academics, dramatists (such as Terrence McNally
and Paula Vogel), artists, and allies, published a manifesto that critiqued same-sex
marriage, entitled “Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision for all our
Families & Relationships” (2006).53 The manifesto argued that because families and
relationships are so varied, marriage equality as the driving political goal is misguided
and discriminatory. Excluded people include “single parent households,” “adult children
living with and caring for their parents,” “[c]lose friends and siblings who live together in
long-term, committed, non-conjugal relationships, serving as each other’s primary
support and caregivers.” People should be free to enter into domestic partnerships of
different varieties, the manifesto urges, and the economic benefits of marriage should not
be contained to conjugal partnerships. As Warner observes, “Marriage sanctifies some
couples at the expense of others. It is selective legitimacy. … Marriage, in short,
discriminates” (82).54
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Available at http://www.beyondmarriage.org/full_statement.html. Accessed 12 February 2016.
My use of Andrew Sullivan, Michael Warner, Judith Butler, George Chauncey, and “Beyond Same-Sex
Marriage” is directly influenced by Margaret Sönser Breen’s work in Narratives of Queer Desire: Deserts
of the Heart (London: Palgrave, 2009), Ch. 2, “Love in the Shadows: The Same-Sex Marriage Debate and
Beyond,” 42-71.
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Judith Butler holds the same view. In her book Undoing Gender (2004), she writes:
The recent efforts to promote lesbian and gay marriage also promote a norm that threatens to render
illegitimate and abject those sexual arrangements that do not comply with the marriage norm in either its
existing or its revisable form. … Similarly, efforts to establish bonds of kinship that are not based on a
marriage tie become nearly illegible and unviable when marriage sets the terms for kinship, and kinship
itself is collapsed into “family.” The enduring social ties that constitute viable kinship in communities of
sexual minorities are threatened with becoming unrecognizable and unviable as long as the marriage bond
is the exclusive way in which both sexuality and kinship are organized. (5)
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The political and theoretical tensions over same-sex marriage are real and
perplexing, and I do not mean to ignore them. However, marriage equality has been the
predominant political issue for the LGBT rights movement in the last ten years, and as
such deserves some careful cultural analysis. How did drama and law work together to
make same-sex marriage such a culturally resonant issue for the past decade? The
answers illuminate the nature of social change and how law gains its authority.

The Same-Sex Wedding Ritual
“Even to say it in one word, ritual, is asking for trouble. Ritual has been so
variously defined—as concept, praxis, process, ideology, yearning, experience,
function—that it means very little because it means too much” (Schechner 228). In her
book Recognizing Ourselves: Ceremonies of Lesbian and Gay Commitment (1998), Ellen
Lewin observes, “Anthropologists have defined rituals as formal action that is highly
structured, repetitive, frequently redundant, and imbued with symbolization. On perhaps
the simplest level, rituals teach or reinforce the proper way to live, the values that a
people hold in common, and the behaviors that are expected of them” (31). Many of the
legal machineries at work in trials are ritualistic. For example, there is the recurrent
dynamic interplay of performance, spectatorship, and judgment. In arguing before a
judge and jury, the parties and lawyers are then evaluated on their performances: were
they convincing? Is their cause just? In addition, the detailed rituals involving rules of
procedure and evidence (filing and formatting deadlines, who speaks when in a trial, how
to object, what is allowed as evidence, the principles and etiquette of navigating
argument at the appellate level, etc.) ensure that the wheels of justice turn far too slowly,
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but that the final result when it does come gains a symbolic moral legitimacy. Similarly,
theatre has similar features to ritual, and theatre and ritual at times overlap. Theatre can
be a community ritual, in which members of the public repeatedly come together to
witness something that reflects or comments upon their society. For instance, the play
Antigone at this point is also a community ritual because it has been repeated and
performed throughout the centuries. Productions will emphasize different things in
Sophocles’ play depending on the historical and cultural moment, but performing
Antigone, for example, is always now an inevitable blending of theatre and ritual.
The same-sex wedding ritual holds such power because it is laden with
symbolism as it is performed. Let me emphasize that I am most interested in the power
of same-sex weddings as theatrical ceremonies. Married life—what happens after the
solemnization, the quotidian challenges and gratifications—is not of much interest to me
in this study. I am fascinated with those moments when same-sex marriages are
solemnized, often literally through legal apparatus, but often only through figurative
means when the law does not recognize the union. Moments of gay and lesbian marriage
solemnization can be powerful, even awe-inspiring events. Like gay and lesbian drama,
these ceremonies fuse theatre, ritual, and legal discourse into resonant cultural
enactments.
LGBT people have been having wedding ceremonies for hundreds of years, with
varying degrees of solemnity. The concept of same-sex marriage did not reach popular
attention in the United States until the late twentieth century, but there were gay
weddings performed in Harlem as early as the 1920s, although they did not have any
legal validity (Chauncey 88). Ellen Lewin reports on early lesbian ceremonies in the
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United States: “A number of accounts of lesbian life in Depression-era Harlem describe
weddings of butch/femme couples in elaborate ceremonies that included attendants and
bridesmaids. Real marriage licenses were sometimes obtained … either by masculinizing
one partner’s first name or by having a male surrogate apply for the license” (4).
Although gay liberationists expressed ambivalence about the need to form
families and marriages in the 1960s, in 1970 several gay couples requested marriage
licenses in Minnesota and Kentucky, and the first lawsuits were filed in what would be a
decades-long struggle to attain marriage equality (Chauncey 89-90). Three years after
the Supreme Court held in Loving v. Virginia (1970) that anti-miscegenation laws were
unconstitutional, Richard Baker and James McConnell asked for a marriage license in
Minnesota. They were denied because the state statute specified that marriage was to be
contracted between members of the “opposite” sex. The men filed a lawsuit, citing the
Loving precedent as support for their case, which the Minnesota Supreme Court denied,
holding that there was no fundamental right to same-sex marriage. The men appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal in a terse, one line, per curiam
decision in 1972: “Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn. dismissed for want of substantial federal
question” (810). This was official Supreme Court precedent until the Court explicitly
overruled Baker in Obergefell. Throughout the 1970s, these legal questions continued to
surface in pockets of the United States, with events anticipating the instances of civil
disobedience that would arise again in the twenty-first century. Lewin’s research reveals,
“In 1975 the district attorney in Boulder, Colorado, ruled that no laws bar same-sex
marriages; based on that ruling the county clerk of Boulder issued six marriage licenses
to same-sex couples.” These were valid until the state attorney general intervened and

Barry 163
stopped the licenses from being issued (8). Because the law at times seemed unsettled or
unclear, same-sex couples would perform weddings hoping to shape and clarify the law.
It is important to contextualize same-sex wedding rituals within the legal
framework that has historically prevented their state sanction. Sociologist Kathleen Hull
conducted research on same-sex wedding ceremonies, concluding that in the years
preceding full marriage equality in the United States, many gay and lesbian couples
turned to such rituals to “enact legality in order to compensate for the absence of official
recognition” (632). Hull found:
the most significant motivations [for enacting a wedding rite] include the realitymaking function of ritual and the beneficial impacts for the couple both as
individuals and as a committed partnership. … But most respondents who had
held a public ritual also discussed the importance of the ritual as a public event,
witnessed by friends and family. The ritual gives the couple an opportunity to
affirm or redefine the status of the couple’s relationship for those who matter
most to them. (645)
Appreciating the “reality-making function of ritual” consistently arose in Hull’s
interviews with gay and lesbians who participated in these ceremonies: they thought their
relationships were not “real” unless they had orchestrated such a publicly witnessed
performance (646).
A same-sex wedding can be a ritual that blends elements from theatre with the
trappings of law’s authority, thus working to perform laws in order to precipitate their
codification. For example, in 2004, San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom allowed
issuance of same-sex marriage licenses in defiance of California state law. Newsom did
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this in reaction to President George W. Bush’s call in his State of the Union Speech to
“defend the sanctity of marriage” in the wake of the Massachusetts Goodridge case that
declared a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage (Coontz 273). The ceremonies
attracted a national audience via various media: “More than thirty-two hundred gay and
lesbian couples, many from out of state, flocked to San Francisco to get married” (Coontz
273). The San Francisco wedding rituals were publicly televised, theatrical performances
that should be considered transgressive; despite the normalizing and assimilationist
impulse inherent in marriage, these ceremonies defied existing laws and were acts of civil
disobedience. They were publicly enacted in order to gain the unique authority and
acceptance that can only come through law’s validation. The same-sex wedding rituals
performed transgressively in 2004 led to the passage of Proposition 8, the California
voter initiative banning same-sex marriage, and the legal challenges following Prop 8’s
passage, culminating in Hollingsworth, Windsor, and Obergefell. Thus, these illegal
wedding rituals helped spark the events that would lead to the full legalization of samesex marriage.
Until June 26, 2015, U.S. same-sex weddings always occurred in some relation to
legal prohibition. Even if the couple was married in a state that allowed same-sex
marriage, there were still other states that prohibited the practice, and so all same-sex
marriages were performed in the shadow of the law. In this sense, U.S. same-sex
weddings were, until quite recently, what anthropologists label “rituals of rebellion”
(Lewin 33). Lewin characterizes the various kinds of wedding rituals that gays and
lesbians have enacted, noting there is a spectrum of possibility between rituals of
resistance and conformity that each couple navigates as they plan their ceremony (31-36).
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I’ll take the liberty of using a personal example to demonstrate this point. I took part in a
same-sex wedding ritual myself in 2011, and the ideas in this chapter enrich my
understanding of the experience.
The legal situation in 2011 was complex. Same-sex marriage was legalized by
the Connecticut Supreme Court in 2006, my state of residence, but there had been no
definitive statement from the U.S. Supreme Court on the matter, and so what my fiancé
and I were doing was still somewhat novel, and, in our own small way, resistant. We
were normalizing the gay marriage experience for ourselves and the many heterosexuals
in attendance, it is true, but the legal context of the time made it in part a “ritual of
rebellion.” The ceremony was also a legal-theatrical ritual of persuasion for everyone in
attendance. We needed the legal authority of the state of Connecticut to give the ritual
some apparent legitimacy and to make an argument for the national recognition of samesex marriage. We also needed the theatrical elements of the wedding ritual to solidify the
legal meanings in the audience’s consciousness.
What made the experience so marvelous was that there was a collective sense that
all of the people there that day—the actors in the wedding ceremony and the spectators—
were doing something. We were making a contemporary political statement that samesex marriage should be recognized at the Federal level and throughout the entire country,
while simultaneously sharing something ancient and profoundly human: promising to
love someone until the end. In fact, it was because the essential ritual was ancient that
the contemporary political implications became so palpable that day. The political
issue’s importance arose from the community’s enactment of, and reverence for, the
ancient wedding ritual. When my fiancé and I entered the church, everyone in the seats
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stood up and watched us walk down the aisle together, in a sign of respect for us, but also
for the wedding ritual itself. We had invited about 120 people and put on a fairly
“traditional” wedding. We married in our United Church of Christ church; we wore
tuxedos; we had the first dance and cut the cake, all in front of our family friends. There
were small but deliberate derivations from the traditional script: we walked each other
down the aisle, for example, to make a subtle statement about our mutual support of each
other and independence from our parents. The experience was a mixture of exhilaration,
profound validation, and a touch of occasional embarrassment, being as we were the
objects of attention all day. But for our family and friends, performing the various
wedding rituals—sending out invitations, planning the ceremony, dressing for the
occasion, walking down the aisle, exchanging vows, displaying affection, making and
responding to the toasts, cutting the cake, opening the gifts, writing thank-you notes—
reinforced our community’s appreciation of the legal status of the marriage.
Surely, the Supreme Court Justices who have officiated at same-sex weddings
have been cognizant of some of these dynamics. Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Ruth
Bader Ginsberg, and Elena Kagan all officiated at gay and lesbian weddings before
Obergefell was issued. One of the weddings was even performed in the Supreme
Court!55 I will explore the Court as a symbolic wedding theater later in this chapter.

Theatrical Representations of Same-Sex Marriage
Stage portrayals of same-sex marriage rituals also helped to shape the cultural and
legal debate. George Chauncey reveals how the 1980s saw greater “interest of lesbians

“Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan Performs Her First Same-Sex Wedding.” Washington Post, 22
September 2014. Web. 28 July 2015.
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and gay men in seeking legal recognition for their relationships” (95). The decade’s
“lesbian baby boom,” in which many lesbian women began openly raising children, and
the onset of the AIDS epidemic contributed to the emphasis on relationship recognition
because these two issues were about “parenthood and death” (95). Chauncey explains,
“AIDS raised the emotionally charged question of who counted as family in the most
profound ways” (99). Both AIDS and the lesbian baby boom raise a plethora of legal
issues involving custody disputes, visitation rights, and estate and inheritance issues.56
We see some of these concerns reflected in 1980s gay drama. Representations of gay
marriage on the stage began most obviously during the AIDS crisis; they would often be
represented suggestively on the deathbed of one of the men. In William Hoffman’s As Is
(1985), for example, Rich and Saul make love in Rich’s hospital bed soon before his
death. The dialogue is suggestive of a marriage, with an exchange of promises.
Similarly, in the more commercially successful The Normal Heart (1985) by
Larry Kramer, there is a preoccupation with the legal implications of the surviving
partner in an AIDS death and a death-bed marriage is also portrayed at the end of the
play. Felix, dying of AIDS, goes to a lawyer to get a will because he is concerned the
insurance company will not honor his partner Ned as the beneficiary. If he does not
mount some sort of legal defense, his estate, under the rules of common law intestate
succession, will succeed to his son, who is currently living with Felix’s estranged exwife. The medical doctor officiates at the end of the play in the “church” of the hospital
room:
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Felix. I should be wearing something white.
Ned: You are. …
Felix: Emma, could we start, please.
Emma: We are gathered here in the sight of God to join together these two
men. They love each other very much and want to be married in the
presence of their family before Felix dies. I can see no objection. This is
my hospital, my church. Do you Felix Turner, take Ned Weeks…to be
your…
Felix: My lover. My lover. I do.
Ned: I do.
(Felix is dead.) (122)
The doctor Emma figures the hospital as a church in this scene, and she co-opts legal and
religious discourse within a medical setting, in order to show the fluidity of disciplinary
and professional discourses. This scene takes it emotional resonance from the fact that
the men are insistent on performing a ritual that has no legal validity, but do it anyway for
its symbolic meaning. Felix does not call Ned his “husband,” but his “lover”; they are
cognizant of the limitations of the ritual, but also intentionally shape its meaning and
effect for their relationship. Ned is interpreted as a biographical reflection of playwright
Kramer’s experience with the Gay Men’s Health Crisis during the beginning of the AIDS
epidemic, when Kramer tried to counteract gay liberation’s emphasis on promiscuity with
a message of safe sex and monogamy (Clum 62). Kramer was notoriously difficult to
work with due to his zealous belief in the cause; GMHC eventually cut ties with him.
John Clum and James Fisher both interpret the death-bed scene in The Normal Heart as
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an “atonement” and sacrifice. Fisher reads this deathbed marriage as “a profound
atonement for the character” (21). According to Clum, “there can be no happily-everafter in Kramer’s jeremiad. Ned and Felix must pay for their promiscuous past…” (63).
Clum’s and Fisher’s reading made sense fifteen years ago when Clum wrote his
comprehensive book Still Acting Gay: Homosexuality in Modern Drama, but in 2015 the
reading seems incomplete. Rather than read the scene as a mirroring of the traditional
trope of atonement in gay drama, which I discussed in Chapter Three, I see it as a
forward-looking impulse in these gay dramatists. Frustrated by the lack of legal and
social protection for gay men in the 1980s, Hoffman and Kramer created theatrical rituals
of same-sex marriage in order to encourage circulation and creation of a socio-legal
reality.
In his introduction to The Normal Heart, Joseph Papp, who produced the New
York premiere of the play, writes, “the element that gives this powerful political play its
essence, is love—love holding firm under fire, put to the ultimate test, facing and
overcoming our greatest fear: death” (29). Faced with the inexorable prospect of death in
AIDS dramas, gay dramatists often reached for a logical symbolic antidote: marriage. In
the face of collective suffering and death from the AIDS crisis, these dramatists staged
deathbed weddings that were repeatedly circulated in the culture as a means of symbolic
resistance and survival. Compare that reaction with Justice Kennedy’s concluding
paragraph in Obergefell: “As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate,
marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death” (28). For the widowed
plaintiffs in Obergefell, just as the gay characters in As Is and The Normal Heart,
marriage was figured as the bridge that sustains a couple through death.
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In the decade following the beginning of the AIDS crisis, Terrence McNally
portrays a same-sex marriage in a different context in the ritual drama Corpus Christi
(1998). The play loosely follows the passion of Jesus, but is also a gay love story
between Jesus and Judas. (Because Judas, true to the story, betrays Jesus, the gay
marriage depicted is actually between two of the disciples, with Joshua/Jesus officiating.)
Some conservative and fundamentalist Christians were offended by the recasting of Jesus
as a gay man. As a result, the play’s opening at the Manhattan Theatre Club in 1998
prompted bomb threats and public protest at the theatre’s entrance (Fisher 25). Despite
the play’s notoriety, it did not meet with positive critical reception. Ben Brantley
described the play as anti-climactic considering all of the controversy and the added
security necessary to attend: “The excitement stops right after the metal detectors.”
Brantley critiques the play and characters as too nice, too non-controversial, too normal,
and concludes “that ‘Corpus Christi’ is a minor work from a major playwright that
probably would have come and gone quietly had it not been for its early and vociferous
opponents.”57
Matthew Shepard’s death on October 12, 1998, one day before Corpus Christi
premiered in New York, added to the play’s cultural resonance. Shepard’s murder
caused McNally to quickly recognize his play as a prescient allegory for Shepard’s
murder; the playwright observes in his November 1998 preface to the published version,
“Jesus Christ died again when Matthew Shepard did” (vii). In that sense, the play works
to elevate Shepard to a gay martyr and enacts a communal ritual of expiation for the
community’s sins: “The play is more religious ritual than a play” (vii). Corpus Christi
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asks the audience to reimagine sacred spaces and activities—the church, a wedding, the
Christian passion play—as inclusive of gays and lesbians. Not only does the play reenact the passion of a gay Christ, but within the play there is a representation of a gay
marriage. The play was performed several years before same-sex marriage had been
legalized in Massachusetts; in other words, it was still considered a transgressive ritual
and contract. In this scene, the disciples Bartholomew and James want to get married:
James. Bartholomew and I had wanted our union blessed for a long time—
some acknowledgment of what we were to each other.
Bartholomew. We asked, Josh. They said it was against the law and the
priests said it was forbidden by scripture. …
James. Will You do it?
Joshua. If you say nobody else will!
Bartholomew. Out here? Someone might see.
Joshua. Where would you be married, Bartholomew? Down a dark hole?
We will marry you in broad daylight under the canopy of Heaven in the
eyes of God and for all men to see. …
It is good when two men love as James and Bartholomew do and we
recognize their union. No giggling back there! Now, take each other’s
hand. Love each other in sickness and health. Respect the divinity in your
partner, Bartholomew. Cherish the little things in him, James, exalt in the
great. May the first face you see each morning and the last at night always
be his. I bless this marriage in Your name, Father. Amen. Now let’s all
get very, very drunk. (49)
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This theatrical ritual was repeated nightly at the Manhattan Theatre Club in the
production directed by Joe Mantello. In the weeks following Matthew Shepard’s death,
Corpus Christi became an uncanny allegory for the murder. Shepard’s death was in part
a repetition of the ritual killing of gay men that reached back hundreds of years in the
transatlantic sodomy trials. Corpus Christi presented an alternative ritual, one that began
repeating with increasing frequency over the following decade.

“8”: Staging the Legal Battle over Same-Sex Marriage
After California voters passed Proposition 8 banning same-sex marriage in the
state, gay and lesbian plaintiffs challenged the law in Federal court. The plaintiffs in
Hollingsworth v. Perry, the case involving the constitutionality of California’s
Proposition 8, attempted to get the Federal District Court trial televised, but the efforts
were contested until the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited cameras in the courtroom in a 5-4
decision with the conservative justices in the majority.58 In order to counteract the lack
of judicial transparency, efforts were immediately made to convey a dramatization of the
proceedings to the public, beginning with John Ireland’s and John Ainsworth’s Youtube
daily re-enactment of the trial at marriagetrial.com. There was such interest in the trial
that Ireland and Ainsworth worked to dramatize the events hidden from the public view.
Dustin Lance Black later wrote the play “8” to bring the trial to dramatic life, and
hopefully work to influence public opinion towards greater acceptance of same-sex
marriage. The Journalist narrator says in the prologue, “the transcripts of this trial could
not be hidden. And on June 16, 2010, the closing arguments of this historic case
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commenced. These are the words, the witnesses, the testimony and the trial that the
defenders of Proposition 8 have fought so hard to keep from public view” (3).
“8” circumvents the Supreme Court’s order to ban television cameras in the
courtroom. This would have been for the most part an invisible trial, except for the text
of the transcripts and judicial opinions. The case, which eventually wound up at the
Supreme Court, would have been culturally consumed on a mainly textual basis without
the performative apparatus of a dramatized trial. Dustin Lance Black circumvented the
Supreme Court’s order with his own cultural performance.
What made “8” so compelling was its celebrity star power. A-list actors were
recruited by director Rob Reiner to play the parts. Brad Pitt was the District Judge
Walker; journalist Campbell Brown played the narrator; George Clooney and Martin
Sheen played attorneys David Boies and Theodore Olson respectively. The West Coast
staged reading was political theatre: the March 3, 2012 reading “raised more than $2
million for the fight to secure full federal marriage equality” (American Foundation). It
was staged with the help of American Foundation for Equal Rights, which facilitated
readings at multiple colleges and other locations throughout the country in the months
leading up to the arguments at the Supreme Court. In fact, readings and performances of
the play continue now even after the opinion in Obergefell has been issued. At the West
Coast reading, the event was broadcast live on Youtube, and there have been several
performances on college campuses.59
According to the description underneath its title, “8” is “based on the transcripts
of Perry v. Schwarzenegger, [which later became the Supreme Court case Hollingsworth
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v. Perry], firsthand observations and collected interviews.” Black follows the model
provided by Eric Bentley’s play Are You Now Or Have You Ever Been (1972), which
takes all of its dialogue from the Un-American Activities Committee hearings
investigating communism in Hollywood.60 “8” takes more liberties than Bentley because
although much of Perry’s trial testimony is used as dialogue, the play also takes some
artistic license to distill the arguments from both sides and more concisely frame the
narrative with the personal stories of the gay and lesbian plaintiffs. The central action
revolves around the trial’s closing arguments, with flashbacks to earlier portions of the
trial’s testimony, interviews with the parties, and excerpts from interviews and some
imagined dialogue among the plaintiffs and their families.
Black highlights the tension between intimate and legal discourse, indicating the
imperfect way laws evaluate romantic and familial relationships. In an excerpt from
Theodore Olson’s examination of Kris Perry about her relationship with Sandy Stier, the
discursive clash evokes laughter:
Mr. Olson: And how did she feel about you?
Kris: She told me she loved me, too.
Mr. Olson: We will be asking her to verify that.
Kris (smiles): Okay.
Laughter in the courtroom. (7)
The play paints the defendants, the side defending Prop 8, as buffoons. Two of the
defendant witnesses were read at the West Coast reading by George Takei, prominent gay
activist of Star Trek fame, and John C. Reilly. The dramatic crescendo of the evening
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occurred when Martin Sheen delivered Theodore Olson’s closing speech. Sheen looked
and sounded much like President Josiah Bartlett, his character on the popular television
show “The West Wing.” He seemed to be leveraging his visibility and gravitas as the
well-known President Bartlett into the impassioned plea of not only Olson’s words, but
probably Sheen’s political beliefs as well. The wall between actor and citizen broke
down by the end of the play, if it was ever up to begin with in this production. The
speech ended to loud applause.
The blending of gay and lesbian drama and the law was on full display during the
West Coast reading of “8”; indeed, it was apparent as the play was read across college
campuses and other venues as the trial court decision was appealed to the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals and then the Supreme Court. The popularity of the play, and the
willingness of A-list celebrities to perform readings, indicated a widespread desire to see
the upcoming legal proceedings mirror the theatrical ones being performed. In the weeks
leading up to the Supreme Court decisions in Windsor and Perry, prominent politicians,
including Bill and Hillary Clinton, joined celebrities in coming out for same-sex
marriage.
Several days after Hollingsworth was issued in 2013, thus legalizing same-sex
marriage in California, the actual lesbian plaintiffs Kris Perry and Sandy Stier were
married in a widely televised ceremony. I was watching The Rachael Maddow Show
on MSNBC and the event was treated as “Breaking News” and broadcast live. It was
surreal to see the normally private wedding ritual transformed into a highly public
ritual with cultural ramifications. As I watched Perry and Stier exchange legally valid
vows in a televised ceremony, I couldn’t help but compare their performance with that
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given by Jamie Lee Curtis and Christine Lahti at the West Coast premiere of “8.”
Whose love was more convincing, the actual plaintiffs or the actors playing them?
Whose wedding had more cultural impact? Which ritual was more authentic? The
distinctions between law and drama were increasingly dismantled as the issue of samesex marriage headed toward the Supreme Court. Both wedding ceremonies, the
theatrical and the “reality television” version, were in effect opening arguments of
Obergefell. Only in performing the law first—imagining and witnessing its
enactment—could the culture more fully sanction its promulgation.

The Social Drama of Gay and Lesbian Lives
The “social drama” of gay and lesbian lives has been playing out in Western
cultures since the early modern period. It has involved different periods of crisis and
various means of addressing the emergence of gay and lesbian subjects. The United
States is currently involved in a particular “social drama,” to use anthropologist Victor
Turner’s theory, over the question of same-sex marriage. Social drama is a useful means
of investigating the forces at work in Supreme Court theatre.61 Turner argues that all
societies undergo social dramas that involve four stages: “breach, crisis, redress, and
either reintegration or recognition of schism” (69).
A social drama is initiated when the peaceful tenor of regular, normgoverned social life is interrupted by the breach of a rule controlling one
of its salient relationships. This leads swiftly or slowly to a state of crisis,
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which, if not soon sealed off, may split the community into contending
factions and coalitions. To prevent this, redressive means are taken by
those who consider themselves or are considered the most legitimate or
authoritative representatives of the relevant community. Redress usually
involves ritualized action, whether legal (in formal or informal courts),
religious … or military. If the situation does not regress to crisis …the
next phase of social drama comes into play, which involves alternative
solutions to the problem. The first is reconciliation of the conflicting
parties following judicial, ritual, or military processes; the second,
consensual recognition of irremediable breach, usually followed by the
spatial separation of the parties. (92)
Turner’s social drama has played out from the early modern period to the present on the
subject of homosexuality. When transatlantic societies began classifying homosexuality
as a crime, heterosexuality became the norm that was breached when the laws were
broken. It is useful to apply social drama theory to the myriad contexts of LGBT history,
from the early political debates over gay liberation to the current legal contests over
same-sex marriage. Legal machineries, in the form of the sodomy laws and public trials,
and later the landmark gay rights opinions, were among the redressive, ritualized means
used to address the crisis of modern homosexuality.
The extent of societal reconciliation over the subject of homosexuality is still in
flux. Some families and states have achieved a semblance of “reconciliation” on the
matter; other communities of actors are still in a “consensual recognition of irremediable
breach.” Even the Windsor and Obergefell decisions make it clear that there is still much
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bitterness over the change in Federal recognition of same-sex marriage. The 5-4 split on
the Supreme Court reflects that persistent schism. “Social dramas are in large measure
political processes, that is, they involve competition for scarce ends—power, dignity,
prestige, honor, purity…” (Turner 71). The marriage equality movement illustrates a
“competition” for those very things.
Turner’s basic theory of social drama is interesting enough, as it can explain many
dynamic moments of cultural change within societies. Even more fascinating is his
discussion of the relationship between social drama and cultural performances. There is
not a neat line that distinguishes between the social drama—political contests that occur
within different venues including juridical processes—and theatrical performances and
other cultural performances, such as same-sex wedding rituals and gay pride parades.
Turner suggests that at some point social dramas feed off cultural performances, and
vice-versa; there is a dialectical tension between social drama and cultural performance.
Turner links the redressive phase of social drama to “the genesis and sustenation of
cultural genres, both ‘high’ and folk’” (74). “Whether juridical or ritual processes of
redress are invoked against mounting crisis, the result is an increase in what one might
call social or plural reflexivity, the ways in which a group tries to scrutinize, portray,
understand, and then act on itself” (75). The continual public interest in the same-sex
marriage trials and the desire of many to see them televised and performed in some way
indicate an increase in social reflexivity on this issue.
We live in a world suffused with images and cultural performances that reflect on
and intervene in the social issues of the day. Turner comments on this ultimately
inextricable relationship:
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Life itself now becomes a mirror held up to art, and the living now perform their
lives, for the protagonists of a social drama, a ‘drama of living,’ have been
equipped by aesthetic drama with some of their most salient opinions, imageries,
tropes, and ideological perspectives. . . . Human beings learn through experience
… and perhaps the deepest experience is through drama; not through social
drama, or state drama (or its equivalent) alone, but in the circulatory or oscillatory
process of their mutual and incessant modification. (108)
Cultural productions, such as films, television shows, plays, and wedding rituals, not only
influence the development of law, but they also help give the law its authority. Law and
cultural productions—social drama and theatre, as Victor Turner would label them—are
not mutually exclusive. We need to look to cultural productions to see not only how law
develops, but also how law gains its authority. U.S. v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges
would not have been written but for the totality of cultural productions portraying gays
and lesbians in a sympathetic light and advocating same-sex marriage in the years
following Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas.
On personal and familial level, my father and I traversed the stages of Turner’s
social drama, culminating in my own same-sex wedding ritual. As Turner states, “the
social drama form occurs on all levels of social organization from state to family” (92).
When my father delivered a heartfelt toast at the reception, it was incredibly cathartic for
me; he had come a long way from his initial negative reaction to my sexual orientation
when I came out in 1996. Like many others, our father-son relationship underwent the
trajectory of Turner’s social drama, and because it ended happily there was a
“reintegration,” a reconciling and general sense of closure, rather than a “recognition of
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schism.” The reason my dad was able to ultimately participate in the ceremony, I think,
was because he had been persuaded by the cultural productions suffusing the media since
the 1990s, along with the recent legal decisions handed down with sufficient theatricality
to give them authority. Both of us are lawyers; both of us respect the machineries of
justice, slow and imperfect though they may be. It was not enough that the Connecticut
Supreme Court had declared a state constitutional right for same-sex couples to get
married. And it was not enough that he had witnessed the emergence of sympathetic gay
and lesbian characters in television and film since the 1990s. The two components—
formal juridical processes working to redress the “crisis” brought on by the movement for
gay liberation and the dramatic power of those juridical processes and other cultural
productions—had to reinforce each other. That is why gay and lesbian drama has always
been suffused with the trappings of law and legal processes. Gay and lesbian drama has
always been in part a legal ritual, ultimately helping to influence the juridical processes
being navigated on behalf of gay and lesbian rights. And the courts that have delivered
victories for LGBT rights have always done so by exploiting the theatrical tools
necessary to achieve momentous social change.

The U.S. Supreme Court as National Theater-Temple
The Supreme Court itself offers a theatre that combines juridical, ritualistic, and
theatrical-literary processes. However, in order to protect itself from the dynamics of
performance, which might erode public confidence in the Court’s legal decisions,
cameras are not allowed in the Supreme Court. Audio recordings of oral arguments are
made available to the public, but television cameras are strictly prohibited. Most
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famously, the now-retired Justice Souter said in an interview, “The day you see a camera
come into our courtroom it’s going to roll over my dead body.”62 The most recently
appointed Justices Sotomayor and Kagan indicated a willingness to allow cameras, but
they are a minority on the Court.63 One worry, as Justices Kennedy and Scalia have
articulated, is that cameras would tempt the Justices to put on a performance during oral
argument. Justice Kennedy said to the House Appropriations Committee in 2007:
I don't think it's in the best interest of our institution...Our dynamic works. The
discussions that the Justices have with the attorneys during oral arguments is a
splendid dynamic. If you introduce cameras, it is human nature for me to suspect
that one of my colleagues is saying something for a soundbite. Please don't
introduce that insidious dynamic into what is now a collegial court. Our court
works...We teach, by having no cameras, that we are different. We are judged by
what we write. We are judged over a much longer term. We're not judged by what

“Souter Won’t Allow Cameras in High Court, L.A. Times, April 9, 1996, at A6 (qtd. in McElroy 1838).
For a helpful multi-media resource on the various Justices’ opinions on this issue, see C-Span’s website
“Cameras in the Court,” available at http://www.c-span.org/special/?camerasInTheCourt. The website has
links to remarks that each Justice had made about allowing cameras in the courtroom.
In her interview at the Aspen Institute on August 2, 2011, Justice Kagan said, "I do think it would
be a good idea...If everybody could see this, it would make people feel so good about this branch of
government and how it's operating...it's such a shame actually that only 200 people a day can get to see it
and then a bunch of other people can read about it. Because reading about it is not the same experience as
actually seeing..."
In her Confirmation Hearing on July 14, 2009, Justice Sotomayor said, "I have had positive
experiences with cameras. When I have been asked to join experiments of using cameras in the courtroom,
I have participated. I have volunteered. "
In contrast, the other members of the Court do not support cameras in the Court. Justice Scalia
said in 1990, "Well, when I first came on the court, I was in favor of having cameras in the court. I am less
and less so...I don't want it to become show biz...It is the tradition of common law judges not to be public
figures, not to be prominent in the political process or in the process of public interest. I think that's a good
tradition...So, for those various reasons, I'm not a big fan of having our sessions televised. Our sessions are
open and anytime any of you is in Washington, I certainly invite you to attend, urge you to attend. I think
it's a good show myself." Of course, Scalia admits it is a “show” at the end of his comments; he just wants
it to be a restricted, elite performance.
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we say. But, all in all, I think it would destroy a dynamic that is now really quite a
splendid one and I don't think we should take that chance.64
Cameras would taint the supposed impartiality of the judicial proceedings, according to
Kennedy and Scalia, and could cause discord among members of the Court and actually
further erode the public’s already eroded trust in the institution.65
Despite such attempts at achieving a Court immune to the dynamics of
performance, the Supreme Court as an institution is very much a theater.66 First, the
widely watched Justice confirmation process includes highly staged Senator interviews
with nominees, and the scripted, often infuriatingly opaque Senate confirmation hearings.
All recent nominees have demurred on articulating anything that would indicate how they
might rule in a future case, except to indicate a broad, not too controversial judicial
philosophy.67 Whether the confirmation hearings are tumultuous or smooth, legal scholar
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Ibid., link to Justice Kennedy.
For an exhaustive scholarly compilation of the various Justices’ comments on the issue of cameras in the
Court, during Confirmation Hearings and in interviews, see McElroy, 1838-1840. The other main
arguments against using cameras in the Court include a fear that the media will disseminate misleading and
sensational moments rather than the totality of the proceedings, and concern about the Justices’ anonymity
and personal security. See McElroy, 1873-1895; Mary Rose-Papandrea, “Moving Beyond Cameras in the
Courtroom,” B.Y.U. L. Rev. 6 (2012): 1901.
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Milner Ball provided the first sustained analysis in legal scholarship of the theatrical attributes and
functions of modern courts. He focused on the similarities in space, audience, and modes of conflict.
Milner Ball, “The Play’s the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater,” 28
Stan. L. Rev. 81 (1975): 81-115.
67
Chief Justice Roberts stated the following in his 2005 confirmation hearing: “Judges are like umpires.
Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make
sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the
umpire... I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.” “Transcript: Day
One of the Roberts Hearings. Washington Post, 12 September 2005. Web. 23 July 2015. Marrying judging
to the umpire role in baseball was an effective rhetorical move, considering the huge national audience for
the confirmation hearings, and the central importance of baseball in the American consciousness. A lay
audience would find little to disagree with here; however, many legal scholars have made it clear that
judging necessarily involves the imposition of values, and that it is disingenuous to pretend that judges can
neatly apply facts to legal principles without making moral, ethical, and political choices. Justice Scalia
makes a similar argument as Roberts to justify originalism in constitutional interpretation. For a
convincing scholarly critique of the “umpire” argument, see Chemerinsky, 391-395. Legal scholar Robert
Hariman argues that popular trials and legal opinions “are more profoundly rhetorical and less
autonomously legal than supposed by either rhetorical or legal scholars” (18).
65
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Tony Mauro observes that, after the hearings conclude, the successful nominee, most
recently Justice Kagan in 2010, is admitted, through a series of rituals (such as swearing
two different oaths, one public and one private, sitting in Justice Marshall’s chair for the
private oath, walking down the front steps of the Court with the Chief Justice for a photoop) into a secret society (260). Before the admission into the secret society, the nominees
undergo intense national observation. They must perform admirably in front of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and the American public for hours at a time, submitting to
questions ranging from “softballs” to adversarial and accusatory.68
With its majestic physical space, the Supreme Court building is itself a grand
theater-temple. The architect designed it in the manner of a Greek temple, complete with
religious friezes on its exterior. Steven Calebrisi observes, “Surely, that temple is a
national, modern day St. Peter’s Basilica for the American secular religion. Is it any
accident that when the Supreme Court ‘hands down a ruling’ (as God handed down the
Ten Commandments), all the television networks display the façade of the Supreme
Court building to show the sacred source of the new decree?” (qtd. in McElroy 1858, fn
124). Lisa McElroy observes that the Justices have fashioned themselves as “high
priests” as they work to reinforce a mythology about the Supreme Court that likens the
Court to the Oracle at Delphi: discerning and communicating the laws of the Gods to the

Robert Bork’s failed nomination by President Reagan in 1987, due in part to Bork’s blunt articulation of
his conservative views on cases like Roe v. Wade, prompted the recent trend of noneventful events, with the
habit of vague responses to avoid Bork’s fate. Clarence Thomas underwent a unique crucible in his
nomination process, worthy of a chapter’s analysis. Shoshana Felman would most likely label the Thomas
confirmation process as a kind of trauma trial, raising as it did the complex societal traumas of race and
gender. The Anita Hill testimony brought Thomas into a truly adversarial process. There is a suggestive
connection between Thomas’s confirmation trial and Thomas as the Silent Justice (he is the only Justice
who routinely stays quiet as his colleagues pepper the attorneys with questions and comments). It is as if
his confirmation process silenced him for his future oral arguments at the Court: he only engages through
written word now.
68
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people (1854). But the court also simultaneously works as a theatrical space in which the
laws are performed for the people as they are simultaneously challenged and enacted.
The main courtroom includes a curtain from behind which the Justices enter and exit, and
a stage upon which they interrogate the advocates.69 The mysterious inner workings of
the court involve myriad rituals hidden from public view, such as the weekly Conference
when the Justices discuss how to resolve cases.70
As much as the physical space of the Court resembles a theater, the genealogy of
landmark gay and lesbian rights Supreme Court cases—Bowers v. Hardwick (1986),
Romer v. Evans (1992), Lawrence v. Texas (2003), U.S. v. Windsor (2013), and
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)—form a particular genre in the canon of gay and lesbian
drama. We can read Supreme Court gay rights jurisprudence as a drama of its own, if we
choose not to investigate the other trappings of theatricality involved in the preparation
and dissemination of the opinions. The written opinions themselves constitute a dramatic
canon that is not meant to be performed—a closet drama, with the obvious pun in my
choice of term—but which has some of the rhetorical strategies and rhythms of theatre.
However, when reading the opinions in synthesis with an appraisal of performances at
oral argument and opinion announcement, as well as the various ways that citizens
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Legal scholar Robert Hariman notes how the theatrical design and staging of courtrooms establishes legal
legitimacy: “The use of official symbols constitutes the basic mise-en-scène of the popular trial. Here we
include all the decorum activated by the physical setting itself, as well as the general characteristics of legal
language and the special use of such symbols as "the Constitution." These dramatic props are the source of
the trial's legitimacy—and so counteract the anxieties resulting from adversarial antagonisms” (26).
70
McElroy argues that cameras should be allowed in Supreme Court proceedings, in order to transform the
“aristocratic” mythology of the Supreme Court into a more democratic national mythology. She claims
that the Court’s many rituals—public and private—work to entrench its cultural power. For a listing of the
many (fascinating) rituals involved in the Supreme Court, see 1854-1857. The general consensus among
legal scholars and members of Congress is that the Court should televise its proceedings. See, e.g., Tony
Mauro, “Let the Cameras Roll: Cameras in the Court and the Myth of Supreme Court Exceptionalism,”
Reynolds Ct. & Media L.J. 1.3 (2011): 259-276.
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witness and consume the decisions, we can discern a rich and suggestive theatre of gay
and lesbian drama. So, for example, Obergefell in its performative totality may be
understood as a piece of judicial, cultural, and literary theatre.
The physical setting of the Court provides the space of a national legal theater; in
the case of Obergefell, the Court also doubles as a temple, in which the Justices are called
on to function as a wedding officiant. The characters of the attorneys, Justices, parties,
and spectators are involved in a complex legal-theatrical ritual. Beginning with oral
argument, the suspense builds leading up to the decision, as the Justices work invisibly on
the decision, often, as we know in the case of Justice Kennedy, changing sides and remolding alliances during the opinion-writing process. On the day the opinion is released,
the author of the majority opinion delivers an oral summary of the opinion in open court,
which re-opens a complex dynamic of theatrical spectatorship not just in the Court, but
on a national level. As the lucky few audience members in attendance get to witness the
delivery, the performance of the law, everyone else interested in the decision must watch
on the exterior of the action, imagining a theatrical dynamic in lieu of actually witnessing
it. The Justice who writes the majority opinion delivers an oral summary of the opinion,
occasionally giving rise to a rare oral summary of the dissent. Justice Kennedy orally
delivered a summary of his opinions in Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell. Justice
Scalia delivered both the written and oral dissent in both Lawrence and Windsor.
The ideological division of the Court creates an agonistic model of drama: the
blockbuster 5-4 decisions issued every June amplify the Court as an institution of
conflict. The division between conservative and liberal Justices on the issue of gay and
lesbian rights—pitting the “swing” Justice Kennedy’s soaring rhetoric of dignity and
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personhood against Justice Scalia’s venomous dissents—heighten the stakes and suggest
an epic conflict over not only the rights of gays and lesbians, but the place of law in
society, the power of judges, and the political direction of the United States. These
theatrical conflicts disrupt the mythology of the Supreme Court as Delphic Oracle, while
simultaneously and paradoxically entrenching the Court’s authority as legal arbiter. The
decisions become more transparently political and unstable, but at the same time
captivating, and so ultimately convincing, in their theatrical and ritualistic power.
The theatricality of the Supreme Court strengthens the Court’s legitimacy in the
cultural consciousness. Supreme Court jurisprudence and procedure both offer a
conscious display of juridical theatricality. In order to have cultural capital, the Court
must work in tandem with, indeed produce its own, cultural performances of justice. As
Turner observes, “The winners of social dramas positively require cultural performances
to continue to legitimate their success” (74). If we recall Shoshana Felman’s definition
of a popular trauma trial, we can view the Supreme Court as a place where the old
sodomy trauma trial can either continue to traumatize new generations of sexual
minorities, or be stopped.

Obergefell v. Hodges: A Gay and Lesbian Social Drama in Four Acts
The Supreme Court’s theatrical elements call for literary analysis, especially in
social dramas like landmark gay and lesbian rights cases. I would like to read law as
literature now, one of the methodologies used in the law and literature movement.71 In

For the seminal Law & Literature books, see Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, eds, Law’s Stories (New
Haven: Yale UP, 1996); James Boyd White, Heracles’ Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law
(Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1985). Both books emphasize reading judicial opinions and trials as narrative
and rhetoric.
71
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his essay in Law’s Stories, “Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law,” Paul Gewirtz lists some
of the values intertwined with approaching law as literature. Indeed, these principles lie
at the foundation of my analysis of Obergefell:
[A]s a matter of general outlook, treating law as narrative and rhetoric means
looking at facts more than rules, forms as much as substance, the language used as
much as the idea expressed (indeed, the language used is seen as a large part of
the idea expressed). It means examining not simply how the law is found but how
it is made, not simply what judges command but how the commands are
constructed and framed. It understands legal decisionmaking as transactional—as
not just a directive but an activity involving audiences as well as sovereign law
givers; indeed, it emphasizes the ways legal processes involve speakers in
exchange with audiences everywhere. It sees laws as artifacts that reveal a
culture, not just policies that shape the culture. And because its focus is story as
much as rule, it encourages awareness of the particular human lives that are the
subject or objects of the law, even when that particularity is subordinated to the
generalizing impulses of legal regulation. (3)

Specifically, I would like to read Obergefell as theatre in order to better understand the
literary and theatrical elements that made this legal decision so culturally powerful. This
is challenging, so I will focus on some basic dramatic elements: character, dialogue,
conflict, setting, and audience.
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There are several fascinating characters in Obergefell, constituting an ensemble
cast. Legal scholar Robert Harriman explores the importance of character and
characterization in trials:
From the witness's oath to the character witness to the stock
characterization of the judge to the determinations of intent to the
essentially ethical cast of judgment itself, the legal setting displays the
elements of an inquiry after character, and the media amplify this theme
into character studies ranging from laughable to penetrating. In any case,
this tendency amplifies … the dramatic nature of the trial, for
characterization is a central element in dramaturgy… The popular trial
becomes predominantly a series of character studies. (26-7)
Ironically, Edith Windsor and James Obergefell, as the two faces of same-sex marriage
on the national stage, were positioned as de-sexualized: they are both widowed, so there
would not be a consummation of their marriages in the public imagination, so to speak.
They were also white and solidly middle-class. There is also a striking lack of
protagonists of color, bisexual, and transgendered characters in these “landmark” cases.
Anthony Romero, Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
remarked that the ACLU “cast” the perfect case to bring to the Supreme Court in U.S v.
Windsor. The attorneys wanted to portray their client plaintiff Edie Windsor as a
sympathetic, eighty-three year old lesbian in a forty-seven year relationship until her
partner died. Edie was then taxed by the Federal Government $368,000 on her spouse
Thea’s estate because their marriage was not Federally recognized at the time: “If Edie
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had married Theo, and not Thea, she would have paid zero for the assets she inherited.”72
DOMA prevented their valid marriage in New York from being recognized on the
Federal level. Similarly, Jim Obergefell was presented as a sympathetic widower who
simply wanted to change his deceased partner’s death certificate to include Jim as spouse.
Ohio did not recognize their marriage as valid. Obergefell wore a bow tie repeatedly in
public, and became the “presentable,” safe, white, upper-middle-class, de-sexualized face
of gay marriage.73 In putting forth these two plaintiffs, the ACLU seemed to be
pandering to a perceived homophobia and racism in the larger country. In turn, the social
drama as performed entrenches same-sex marriage as a white institution concerned with
the accumulation of capital and status. The lack of bisexual, transgendered, queer, and
people of color raises concerns about who has been invited to play a role in the social
drama of marriage equality.
Mary Bonauto, the lesbian attorney who argued on behalf of the plaintiffs,
deserves brief mention here as the admirable face of LGBT advocacy. Openly gay,
retired Congressman Barney Frank has called Bonauto “our Thurgood Marshall.”74
Bonauto is married to a law professor and they have twin daughters. She orchestrated the
legal victories in Goodridge, which legalized same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, and
led the challenge to DOMA. In listening to the tapes of oral argument, Bonauto performs

Romero, Anthony. “Marriage Equality and Beyond: A Watershed Moment.” Princeton University
LGBT Alumni Association Conference. Richardson Auditorium, Princeton University. 12 April 2013.
Lecture. A recording is available online at
http://alumni.princeton.edu/learntravel/lectures/videodetail/index.xml?videoid=329
73
This legal strategy of effacing gay and lesbian sexuality was effective in winning the U.S. obscenity trial
of Radclyffe Hall’s lesbian-themed book The Well of Loneliness (1928). Hall’s lawyer successfully muted
depictions of lesbian sexuality in the book, much to Hall’s dismay. See Leslie Taylor, “’I Made Up My
Mind to Get It’: The American Trial of The Well of Loneliness,’ New York City, 1928-1929,” Journal of
the History of Sexuality 10.2 (2001): 250-86, 276-77.
74
Sheryl Stolberg, “In Fight for Marriage Rights, ‘She’s our Thurgood Marshall.’” The New York Times,
27 March 2013. Web. 28 July 2015.
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admirably as the earnest, intelligent, and civil advocate for the cause. She is also
effective as a character because she is not merely an attorney representing her client’s
cause, but the cause of all LGBT Americans who want to get married. Her words take on
great resonance because they are delivered on behalf of millions of clients. LGBT
audience members may imagine themselves delivering Bonauto’s language during oral
argument, or at least recognize that she is speaking about them, and that the Justices are
listening and beginning to formulate a response to the plea made on their behalf. All
interested LGBT citizens had their day in court, not just James Obergefell and the other
plaintiffs.
In these Supreme Court cases, the Justices also become characters known mainly
through the rhetorical strategies of their opinions, but also through their performance at
oral argument and the announcement of the opinions, their disclosed personal history, and
interviews. In terms of dramatic character, I hesitate to label a particular protagonist in
Obergefell: it is more of an ensemble cast. Obviously, one’s interpretation of the drama’s
central character might change depending on one’s political beliefs. If we characterize
gay and lesbian drama as a body of texts that over time attracted certain kinds of readers
and spectators—LGBT and allies—several protagonists come to mind: the Liberal
Justices (Sotomayor, Breyer, Kagan, Ginsberg), the crucial “Swing” Justice Kennedy, the
gay and lesbian plaintiffs in the case. The antagonists emerge as the dissenting Justices,
with Justice Scalia’s particularly stinging dissent earning him the role of principal
antagonist.
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Very few Americans can name or identify all of the Supreme Court Justices; in
fact, two-thirds of the country cannot name one Justice.75 Most people only have a
superficial sense of their personalities and rhetorical style. The characters of the Justices
are mostly flat in the Supreme Court Theater. In contrast to elected representatives in the
United States, they are not supposed to have public personalities. As a result, they attain
“stock” characterizations, as Hariman suggests about judges generally in trials. Legal
scholar Trevor Parry-Giles has written about the characters of the Justices. In his book
The Character of Justice: Rhetoric, Law, and Politics in the Supreme Court Confirmation
Process (2006), he argues that “The nominee comes to embody an ideological stance”
(13). There are only a few main qualities that repeatedly surface in the popular media.
Interestingly, the Justices become stereotyped as Liberal or Conservative, and identified
with markers of identity: women, men, Catholic, Jewish, lesbian? (Kagan was initially
“read” by conservative critics as lesbian when she was nominated76), African American,
and a “wise Latina” in Justice Sotomayor.77

Steve Eder, “Most Americans Can’t Name a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Survey Says.” Wall Street
Journal, 20 August 2012. Web. 29 July 2015.
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The Wall Street Journal published a front-page story about Kagan in 2010 before her confirmation
hearings that featured a photo of Kagan playing softball. “John Wright, of gay newspaper Dallas Voice,
told Politico: ‘Personally I think the newspaper, which happens to have the largest circulation of any in the
US, might as well have gone with a headline that said, 'Lesbian or switch-hitter?' Cathy Renna, a former
spokesperson for the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, said: ‘It clearly is an allusion to her
being gay. It's just too easy a punch line.’ Alex Spilius, “Elena Kagan ‘outed’ as lesbian by Wall Street
Journal softball picture.” The Telegraph, 13 May 2010. Web. 29 July 2015. Conservative critics were
trying to spread rumors in order to not only embarrass Kagan, but to cast doubt on her impartiality on the
issue of LGBT rights. The White House denied the rumors, and The Wall Street Journal denied a lesbian
subtext to the photo, but the unsavory incident illustrates how Supreme Court Justices are pigeonholed into
identity markers.
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Justice Sotomayor was asked repeatedly during her confirmation hearings over a statement she made
during a 2001 speech at University of California, Berkeley Law School: “I would hope that a wise Latina
woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a
white male who hasn’t lived that life.”
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If you Google or Youtube the Justices, for example, the same general story will
appear in various interviews. For example, Justice Kagan repeatedly tells a story of how
she went hunting with Justice Scalia, in order to establish a perception of collegiality on
the Court. Justices Ginsberg and Scalia often mention their unlikely friendship,
considering their ideological antagonism.78 These anecdotes from the Justices, about
their relationships with each other and about certain aspects of the Court, like who
answers the door and speaks first at Conference, form a folklore about the Supreme Court
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Scalia and Ginsburg do seem to be genuinely fond of each other. Both are avid opera fans, and an opera
recently premiered in honor of their unlikely friendship and different approaches to constitutional law. See
“Scalia/Ginsburg: A (Gentle) Parody of Operatic Proportions. An American Comic Opera in one act by
Derrick Wang, libretto by the composer, inspired by the opinions of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia.” Colum. J.L. & Arts 38 (2014): 237-292. It is an actual opera that
recently premiered at the Castleton Festival in July 2015 with the blessings of the two Justices, who wrote a
preface to the opera published in the Columbia Journal of Law & Arts. The libretto has humorous and
erudite footnotes with copious references to case law. Scalia at one point sings a rage aria. Here is an
excerpt with footnotes omitted:
SCALIA (rage aria):
The Justices are blind!
How can they possibly spout this-?
The Constitution says absolutely nothing about this,
This right that they've enshrined When did the document sprout this?
The Framers wrote and signed
Words that endured without this;
The Constitution says absolutely nothing about this!
(Reverent)
We all know well what the Framers did say,
And (with certain amendments) their wording will stay,
And these words of our Fathers limit us,
For we are unelected,
And thus, when we interpret them,
Rigor is expected.
(Bewildered)
Oh, Ruth, can you read? You're aware of the text,
Yet so proudly you've failed to derive its true meaning,
And never were so few
Rights made so numerousIt's almost humorous
What you construe! (241-242)
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that superficially establishes transparency, but comes nowhere close. Nothing is ever
really said of substance in the Justices’ interviews, certainly not about the law or future
cases, and very little about a given Justice’s personality is revealed. As Lisa McElroy
observes, “They purport to deconstruct the mysticism of the Court with occasional peeks
into limited aspects of the institution. But what the Justices allow the public to see is
nothing more than a façade; the Justices’ outreach barely scratches the surface, allowing
the public to see only what the Justices offer and nothing more” (1839). The Justices’
inscrutability as personalities invites and ignites speculation and imagination about “who
they really are,” “how do they really interact with each other inside the Court,” and “what
are they like in real life.” I think there is a certain cultural expectation that they play the
part of judges, and the discipline of their performance requires mainly silence outside of
strictly controlled environments.79

Act I: Oral Argument. Tuesday, April 28, 2015.
Throughout Obergefell, most characters are static, but Justice Kennedy’s
performance as the “Swing Justice,” and some of his statements during the oral argument,
gave rise to suspense about which way he would vote. Although Kennedy wrote the
majority opinions in Lawrence and Windsor, he is moderately conservative and
inherently cautious. Laura Ray gives the Justices labels based on the quality of the
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The State of the Union address features the Justices sitting in robes in the front row of what is a nakedly
political theatre. The American public is allowed access to the interior of the speech’s political theater in
the Capitol, whereas the public is barred from the Supreme Court’s legal theater. Justices are traditionally
expected to be silent and refrain from showing political affiliations by standing or clapping when an
obviously political point elicits applause from only one side of the aisle. Justice Alito broke this unspoken
rule when President Obama began criticizing the Citizens United case in his 2010 State of the Union
speech. Cameras recorded Alito mouthing “not true” in response. Immense praise and criticism of Alito
followed, and he has never returned to a State of the Union speech.
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rhetoric in their written opinions. She characterizes Kennedy’s “judicial personality” as
“agonized ambivalence” (223) and Scalia’s as “indignant conversation” (226). Justice
Kennedy admits to “agonizing” over decisions, and has often changed his mind in cases
at the last minute.80 To give a disconcerting example, according to Justice Blackmun’s
posthumously released papers, Kennedy had originally cast his vote at the Justice’s
Conference to overturn Roe v. Wade (1973) in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992).
This would have reversed Roe’s ruling that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to
have an abortion within certain limits. Chief Justice Rehnquist was writing the majority
opinion in Planned Parenthood, joined by Byron White, Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, and Kennedy. Several weeks later, however, Kennedy changed his mind and
sided with a compromise led by Justices O’Connor, Blackmun, and Souter, which in
effect kept Roe’s central holding intact.81
Indeed, we can see internal conflict in Kennedy’s performance during
Obergefell’s oral argument. Early in the oral argument, he questioned Attorney Bonauto
on the gravity of changing a social institution that had been defined for millennia in
certain cultures as the union between one man and one woman. Suddenly, the trajectory
of Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor did not seem to surely culminate in a ruling for samesex marriage in Obergefell, as Kennedy expressed doubts:
Justice Kennedy: One -- one of the problems is when you think about these cases
you think about words or cases, and -- and the word that keeps coming back to me

Jeffrey Rosen, “The Agonizer,” The New Yorker, Nov. 11, 1996. Web. 20 July 2015.
“Justices Almost Overturned Roe v. Wade in 1992.” USA Today, 4 March 2004. Web. 22 July 2015.
See also Tony Mauro, “Lifting the Veil: Justice Blackmun’s Papers and the Public Perception of the
Supreme Court,” Mo. L. Rev. 70 (2005): 1037-1047: “[T]o see hard evidence in Justice Blackmun’s papers
tells us in pretty stark terms how close the nation came to having Roe v. Wade overturned” (1040).
80
81
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in this case is -- is millennia … I don’t even know how to count the decimals
when we talk about millennia. This definition has been with us for millennia.
And it’s -- it’s very difficult for the Court to say, oh, well, we -- we know better.
(Obergefell Oral Arg. Transcript 7)
Kennedy refused to grant the plaintiffs’ call for a national right to same-sex marriage in
Perry v. Hollingsworth in 2013, so deciding to declare such a right two years later was
not a guaranteed proposition. The nature of his speech at Obergefell’s oral argument is
full of stammerings and pauses, as he deliberates over which words to use; this
cautiousness is strikingly juxtaposed with the polished, majestic, and confident prose of
the final written opinion. His character underwent development in the drama,
culminating in the final written opinion.
Oral arguments are never filmed, but an audio recording is made and released on
the Supreme Court website several days later. Most people have to settle for listening to
a recording of the argument, and/or reading the transcripts that are also made available, as
well as viewing artistic sketches from the courtroom. SCOTUSblog also now offers “A
View from the Court,” which is a first-person account of a SCOTUSblog contributor who
was in the courtroom for high-profile cases. As a result, Supreme Court performances
are consumed though various media, and certain moments are effaced depending on the
medium.
For example, after Attorney Bonauto finished her portion of the argument, the
transcript indicates an “Interruption” in parenthesis. In fact, a man in the gallery stood up
and began shouting. Mark Walsh, a reporter for SCOTUSblog inside the courtroom that
day, describes the moment when a man stood up and began screaming: “A short, older
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man with white hair slicked back and heavy muttonchops stood and began loudly yelling.
‘The Bible teaches that you will burn in hell for eternity …’ he says, as Court officers
drag him out of the courtroom. “Homosexuality is an abomination[!]’ ”82 Moments later,
as documented in the transcript, Justice Scalia says, “It was rather refreshing, actually”
and “Laughter” follows the line.
What a startling word to describe the outburst: “refreshing.” It was “refreshing”
to break up the supposed hum-drum rhythms of the Court, Scalia indicates (he had been
sitting in oral arguments since 1986), but in this moment, Scalia chooses to communicate
with the outside world in such a way that ambiguously indicates an alliance with the
protestor’s moral opprobrium of the plaintiffs in Obergefell. Admittedly, Scalia may
have just been playing for laughs, but there is just enough ambiguity in the line to
indicate he was subtly masking a sincere statement under a veneer of comedy. One might
well hear in “refreshing” an honest condemnation of the Obergefell plaintiffs. The
protestor’s speech is only recorded as a parenthetical “Interruption” in the transcript.
Justice Scalia’s words are recorded in the transcript and become visible, albeit unstable in
meaning and legally irrelevant. Only through reading the trial as a form of literature are
we able to uncover a range of interpretive possibilities within such moments. As a legal
matter, this was nothing more than an inconsequential interruption; seen as a piece of
theatre, however, we more fully understand the complex ways in which subtext,
actor/character motivation, and performance influence the outcomes of legal trials.
Scalia’s disdain for the plaintiffs, and his colleagues in the majority, would directly

Mark Walsh, “A View from the Courtroom: Same-Sex Marriage Edition,” at
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/a-view-from-the-courtroom-same-sex-marriage-edition/. Accessed
July 22, 2015.
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manifest in his eventual written dissent. The full extent of Obergefell’s conflict would be
revealed then.

Act II: The Invisible Conference; or, In the Hall of the Continental Principalities.
Friday, May 1, 2015.
Soon after the oral arguments in a case, the Justices meet for their Conference in
which they discuss their theories about how to resolve the case, and vote to establish a
majority and possible dissenting minority. They discussed their theories of Obergefell on
Friday, May 1, 2015. The Conference has attained mystique over the years as a highly
ritualized process. Only Supreme Court Justices are allowed in the room. If someone
knocks on the door with an urgent message, the most junior Justice must answer the door
(that task now falls to Justice Kagan). The Conference has some of the following
traditions and rituals:
When meeting to decide cases, the Justices sit in their Conference Room, where
they also sit and speak in order of seniority. … No one, not even a messenger or a
law clerk, is allowed to enter the room when the Justices are in conference. The
junior Justice is assigned to hand out notes or receive messages; Justice Breyer
held this post for eleven years. The Justices sit in order of seniority around the
conference room table, with the Chief Justice at the head; each seat includes
supplies, including blotter paper, a long-standing tradition. (McElroy 1856-57)
Even when hidden from view, the Justices engage in these rituals that establish hierarchy
and orderly treatment of the cases before them.
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The Conference blends rituals of tradition with a theatrical conflict that plays out
during the Conference, as the Justices negotiate some kind of decision. In an interview
with C-Span, Justice Kennedy revealed that he gets nervous before these Conferences,
and that the process takes on a mystical quality:
It’s like being an attorney once again: you’re arguing your case. I have eight
colleagues who’ve studied very hard on the case, who may have some very fixed
views, who may be tentative, depending on how they’ve thought the case through.
And I have to give my point of view, and hopefully to persuade them. And I feel
a sense of anticipation, what is it, an adrenaline rush, I don’t know what they call
it. But this is a big, big day for us. … And I have to be professional, and accurate,
and fair. And each of my colleagues feel the same way, so there’s a little tension
and excitement in the room, but we love it, we’re lawyers, we’re designed to do
that. The job is no good if you can’t argue. This is the first time in which we give
our tentative views on the case. … So as we go around the table, it can be quite
fascinating to see how this case is unfolding. … And if the case is close, 5-4, and
let’s say you’re on the side that prevailed, the majority, there are not a lot of high
fives and back slaps. There’s a moment of quiet, a moment of respect, maybe
even sometimes awe at the process. We realize that one of us is going to have to
write out a decision which teaches and gives reasons for what we do…83
Because no one except the Justices is admitted to this central moment of the drama,
spectatorship to this act is severely curtailed. The act is invisible and left to our
imaginations. What is interesting is that the moment of central conflict among the

“Justice Kennedy Describes the Supreme Court Conference,” available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SrrNQgbfIww. Accessed 21 July 2015.
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Justices is kept from the audience. What was said as the Justices went around the room,
each discussing his or her theory of the case? Was there any dialogue, any break from
tradition or breakdown in collegiality? Although we do not see this aspect of the conflict
play out, the audience builds up anticipation after the Conference and as the release of the
opinion draws near.
I will take this moment to make a digression of imagination, because that is what
the Invisible Conference demands of spectators. Personally, I can’t help but think of
Tony Kushner’s comedic representation of the Council of Angels in Heaven, as depicted
in Perestroika, the second part of Angels in America (1992). In Chapter Three, I argued
that Angels figuratively imagined the jurisprudential hermeneutics that would give rise to
Lawrence v. Texas (2003), which decriminalized same-sex practices in the United States.
Perhaps Kushner had the U.S. Supreme Court in mind when he imagined the Angelic
Council. The Angels are comically depicted as grandiose but lost without God, who has
deserted them. God provides Natural Law, but without access to God, Natural Law
becomes inaccessible. The setting of the Supreme Court’s Conference room and
Courtroom are mirrored in the setting of Kushner’s Continental Principalities:
In the Hall of the Continental Principalities; Heaven, a City Much Like San
Francisco. Six of Seven Myriad Infinite Aggregate Angelic Entities in
Attendance, May Their Glorious Names Be Praised Forever, and Ever, Hallelujah.
Permanent Emergency Council is now in Session.
(The Continental Principalities sit around a table covered with a heavy tapestry on
which is woven an ancient map of the world. The tabletop is covered with archaic
and broken astronomical, astrological, mathematical and nautical objects of
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measurement and calculation; heaps and heaps and heaps of books and files and
bundles of yellowing newspapers; inkpots, clay tablets, styli and quill pens. The
great chamber is dimly lit by candles and a single great bulb overhead, the light of
which pulses to the audible rhythmic surgings and waverings of an unseen
generator. (126)
I am offering this connection to Kushner’s imagined Council of Angels because we only
can imagine how Obergefell’s hidden climax was performed. Kushner’s scene is a gay
fantasia of what might transpire at the Supreme Court Conference: the Angels/Justices
gather around a table with the symbols of power and knowledge surrounding and
legitimizing them, but their trappings of authority, like old laws discriminating against
gays and lesbians, are “archaic and broken.” The walls of the actual Supreme Court
Conference room are covered with bookshelves full of the Federal case law of the United
States, but in the shadow of Bowers v. Hardwick and similar anti-gay rulings, these laws
are figured as oppressive and unjust. Each Justice is responsible for one or several of the
Federal Circuit courts, which encompass several states. This makes me think of the
Angels’ names symbolizing parts of the world: Asiatica, Australia, Africanii. A map of
the world is laid in front of the Angels as they deliberate over the fate of gay and lesbian
lives. Both Angels and Justices are equipped with “inkpots” and “quill pens” as they
meet to write dictums onto the world, but it is a world constantly in motion, one that
resists enclosure in proscriptive language. As Prior says, “The world only spins forward.
We will be citizens” (Perestroika 146). Just like the other characters in Angels in
America, the American public cannot see the Supreme Court Justices’ intimate
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interactions with one another; how they spoke of the Obergefell plaintiffs; if they ever
departed from tradition. We can just imagine.84
The lack of transparency and spectatorship in the Supreme Court Conference
partly gives legitimacy to the final ruling because the public cannot see the Justices
negotiate and vote on the decision; we cannot see if and how they develop a theory of the
case that garners a majority. We do not immediately know if and when a Justice changes
his or her mind several weeks later, re-forming decisions, majorities, and dissents
(sometimes we never know, unless there is a fortuitous release of a Justice’s posthumous
papers as with Blackmun’s). The most important moments in the Supreme Court are
inaccessible to an audience that must therefore utilize imagination and anticipation until
the opinion is released on decision day. This legitimates constitutional law by making it
appear removed from a Darwinian political process, but it also problematizes the final
ruling because citizens are deprived of the opportunity to witness the actual moment of
law-making. Instead, we must imagine and anticipate the final performance of the law in
the announcement and dissemination of the opinion.

Act III: A Solemnization and Several Objections. Friday, June 26, 2015.
Shoshana Felman’s point about the repetition of trauma trials gains striking
resonance when one considers the anniversary of the major gay and lesbian rights cases:
Lawrence v. Texas on June 26, 2003; U.S. v. Windsor on June 26, 2013; Obergefell v.

Tony Kushner provides a central text in the tradition of gay legal theatre because his “gay fantasia on
national themes” focuses on the power of artistically re-imagining the laws affecting gays and lesbians. As
was the case with the British dramatists working at the threshold of passing the 1967 Sexual Offences Act,
or Mart Crowley writing one year before the Stonewall riots, theatrical re-imagining often precedes actual
revision of these laws. Imagination plays an integral role in our understanding of laws and legal processes.
84

Barry 202
Hodges on June 26, 2015. It is also worth noting that the weekend following each
decision, the last weekend of June, always coincided with major gay pride parades
around the country commemorating the Stonewall Riots on June 28, 1969. The rulings
from the national theatre of Justice precipitated theatrical carnivals celebrating the
rulings.
On the morning of Friday, June 26, 2015, at 10am the Justices gathered in open
session to announce the opinions of the Court for that day. No one except the Justices,
their clerks, and the Supreme Court staff ever knows what opinions are going to be
announced on a particular day, until they are announced from the bench. The sessions
are open to the public, but once again, spectatorship is curtailed. Some lucky people
camp out and are able to attain a seat, but most people gather outside, watch television,
or, more recently, follow a live feed on scotusblog.com. Like thousands of other people,
I “watched” the performance of Act III, the announcement of the opinions, by reading
descriptions of it via a live blog feed on scotusblog.com. Several Scotusblog staff
attorneys described from inside and outside the Supreme Court what was transpiring.
Anyone could type a question to the moderators: questions about the behavior and
patterns of the Justices, guesses about what opinion might come down today, etc. The
moderators would respond to different questions in real time. In this sense, Obergefell
became a national performance that day, as hundreds of thousands of people somehow
turned their attention to the Court. However, like many people, I could only imagine
what was going on inside the courtroom.
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The opinion in Obergefell was announced at 10:00 a.m. Justice Kennedy, who
had written for the majority, delivered an oral summary of the opinion in live Court.85
No video cameras were of course allowed that day. Most people have to settle for secondhand press accounts from people who were inside the courtroom, like in SCOTUSblog’s
“A View from the Courtroom,” or through courtroom sketches, like the one below from
Art Lien, depicting Kennedy’s announcement of the majority opinion in Obergefell:

--Art Lien, “Wide-shot of courtroom as Kennedy announces opinion.”86
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An audio recording of the opinion announcement is now available at oyez.org. These recordings
become available several months after the decision is announced.
86
June 26, 2015. Available on scotusblog.com, http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/a-view-from-thecourtroom-a-marriage-celebration/. Accessed 23 July 2015.
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Justice Kennedy undergoes a certain amount of change as a character throughout
the course of Obergefell. He expresses doubts, but over the course of the drama he
reaches a conclusion to support the plaintiffs’ cause. Kennedy delivered the Opinion for
the Court, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Ginsburg. Because he
wrote the opinion, its rhetoric informs Kennedy’s “character” in this drama.
If Act I, the Oral Argument, is centrally about the gay and lesbian plaintiffs’
search for a wedding officiant, the majority opinion in Act III reveals that officiant
through a poetic solemnization of same-sex marriage. The opening paragraph is grand in
scope: “The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes
certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express
their identity” (1-2). The opinion builds to a majestic crescendo, and the last paragraph
is the poetic solemnization of the marriages of the plaintiffs, and by extension the
marriages of all gays and lesbians living in states that banned same-sex marriage:
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of
love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two
people become something greater than once they were. As some of the
petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may
endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say
they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect
it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is
not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s
oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The
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Constitution grants them that right. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered. (28)
This language in effect solemnized the marriages of the plaintiffs. It grants “equal
dignity in the eyes of the law,” or, as legal scholar William Eskridge would note, equal
gay citizenship. The majority opinion has moments of grand poetry and rhetoric; it is not
purely a legal ruling devoid of aesthetic properties. The language is suffused with
empathy and attention to “these men and women,” and repeatedly refers to “the[m]” and
“their” stories and lives. This personalization of the plaintiffs serves in stark contrast to
the various dissents that never mention particulars of the plaintiffs’ experiences. The
passage is meant to elevate the moment of the case’s legal disposition to also constitute a
moment of symbolic transfiguration for gays and lesbians: they are meant to be
transformed by the opinion’s language into fully equal United States citizens. The
plaintiffs are granted the right to marry; by extension, the American body politic is
married to gays and lesbians. There had been tragic lives lost and squandered on the
culture’s boundaries; now, Kennedy works to transform the gay and lesbian trauma trial
into a wedding ritual: the narrative historically and structurally moves from tragedy to
apparent comedy. Kennedy employs the heightened rhetoric to generate sympathy and
emotional catharsis in the audience. The ending of the opinion is performative, just like a
wedding: the language produces a reality. The Sixth Circuit is reversed; the plaintiffs are
blessed87; the marriages are solemnized.

I think here again of Perestroika when Prior asks for a blessing from the Angel: “Bless me anyway. I
want more life. I can’t help myself. I do” (133).
87
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I do not include bisexual and transgender characters in my reading of this scene
because those members of the LGBT community are conspicuously absent from the
case’s dramatis personae and the opinion’s disposition. A queer reading of this scene
would discern a moment of paradoxical exclusion for various gender and sexual
minorities or anyone else whose relationships and families are not being recognized and
given the legal benefits of marriage: “single parent households,” “adult children living
with and caring for their parents,” “[c]lose friends and siblings who live together in longterm, committed, non-conjugal relationships, serving as each other’s primary support and
caregivers” (“Beyond Same-Sex Marriage”). In that sense, although Obergefell as
theatre has a comic structure, ending as it does in a marriage for gays and lesbians, who
may now be considered more fully integrated into the American family, the text also has
an ironic undercurrent. The moment of grand poetry and victory is undermined by the
exclusion and invisibility of people of color in the social drama’s performance; of
bisexuals and transgendered people; and of the many queer visions of family not
recognized, and actually further marginalized, in a supposed victory of social justice.
The four dissenting Justices wrote separate dissents, which fractured their
dissenting stance, although it indicated a strong disapproval of the decision. The
characters of the dissenting Justices deserve close reading in this Act, but it is important
to underscore that although the Obergefell opinion has literary qualities, simply reading it
as a text does not do justice to its theatrical qualities. As theatre, it works differently than
literary and legal prose, and people in the role of spectator consumed it differently. Few
people read the entire Obergefell opinion, especially the four dissents after it. A
substantial number of people read at least portions of the majority opinion, but the
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dissents become long and often technical, especially Justices Thomas and Alito’s
dissents. As theatre, a select few were able to witness the oral summaries from the bench
of the majority and the dissents. For everyone else, the media disseminated textual
moments of conflict between the majority opinion and the dissents, particularly the
dissents by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia.
There are two textual moments of intense rhetorical and theatrical conflict in the
dissents, arising within the dissents of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia. Roberts
provides a forceful, but empathetic and respectful dissent that rests on the need for
judicial restraint. He tries to be diplomatic but firm; the result is rhetorically effective:
If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual orientation—who
favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision.
Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new
expression of commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits.
But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.
I respectfully dissent. (29)
The word “celebrate” is repeated only to ironize the wedding celebration at the dissent’s
conclusion; in this sense, Roberts works to provide an ironic substructure to Obergefell’s
apparent comic trajectory ending in marriage. Yes, he suggests, there will be a joyous
wedding, but it has no legal legitimacy. However, I think Roberts seems to acknowledge
the inherent fairness in extending marriage benefits to same-sex couples. Although not as
empathetic as Kennedy’s, Roberts’ opinion appreciates the sensitivity of the issue and the
lives and desires of the plaintiffs. The Chief Justice further ironizes the moment by
implying that although he does not discern a legal basis for same-sex marriage within the
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Constitution, he is happy in the case’s outcome. In this sense, Roberts establishes a
credible rhetorical ethos that Scalia does not.88 Roberts’ opinion is focused on the
Constitution, not on individual stories as is Kennedy’s, but Roberts’ ends with “I
respectfully dissent.” Figuratively speaking, I find that he chooses to decline an
invitation to the wedding, but sends a gift and wishes the parties well.
In jarring contrast to Roberts’ is Justice Scalia’s dissent, which acts as a
profanation of the wedding ritual. I am not alone in condemning Scalia’s rhetoric in
Obergefell. Legal scholar Erwin Chemerinsky critiques the tone as unprofessional, and
has observed recently that his law students often write in imitation of Scalia, to the
detriment of actual legal reasoning, the legal profession, and a civil society.89 Scalia
attacks Kennedy’s style above everything else: “The opinion is couched in a style that is
as pretentious as its content is egotistic” (slip. op. at 7). Scalia’s twenty-second footnote
conjures a startlingly antagonistic statement:
If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opinion for the
Court that began: “The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a
liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful
realm, to define and express their identity,” I would hide my head in a bag. The
Supreme Court of the United States has descended from the disciplined legal

See Marie Falinger, “Not Mere Rhetoric: On Wasting or Claiming your Legacy, Justice Scalia.” U. Tol.
L. Rev. 34.3 (Spring 2003): 425-508. Failinger argues that Scalia is an unethical rhetor and documents the
destructive patterns of sarcasm and hyperbole in his written opinions.
89
Erwin Chemerinsky, “Scalia: Why He’s a Bad Influence,” L.A. Times, 14 July 2015. Web. 24 July
2015. For Chemerinsky’s more scholarly critique of Scalia’s philosophy and rhetoric, see “The
Jurisprudence of Antonin Scalia: A Critical Appraisal,” U. Haw. L. Rev. 22.2 (Winter 2002): 385-402.
“[T]here is a disingenuousness to Justice Scalia’s decisionmaking and a meanness to his judicial rhetoric
that I believe are undesirable and inappropriate” (385).
88

Barry 209
reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story to the mystical aphorisms of the
fortune cookie. (7)
This passage is buried in the twenty-second footnote of Scalia’s opinion, but in a sense
it is the center of his dissent. Scalia’s rhetoric throughout Obergefell presents
consistent interpretive challenges, as I tried to show with his choice of the word
“refreshing” after the anti-gay outburst during oral argument. Justice Scalia with a bag
over his head is another startling, ambiguous image. At first, it appears like a
throwaway line, reminiscent of his “refreshing” comment during oral argument. But
the image also evokes, subverts, and ironizes another image: a blindfolded Lady
Justice. Rather than presenting an impartial Lady Justice, Scalia paints an image of
himself needing to blind himself from the realities of the Court’s jurisprudence: he
does not want to see the law as it is enacted in this opinion. The line also evokes the
image of a condemned man about to be executed; in a figurative reversal from the
historical tradition of sodomy trials, he imagines himself, a married heterosexual man,
as being condemned to death. The image also evokes the closet, giving the impression
of an enclosed and darkened space, closed off from the world. The Court’s majority
decision puts Scalia’s vision of the law in an enclosed space of containment. His
image suggests this case should follow its logical precedent Bowers v. Hardwick
(1986), which held homosexuality could be criminalized. Instead, Scalia’s relegation
to the dissent here suggests a rhetorical removal from legal legitimacy to the simply
polemical.
Instead of ending with the traditional “I respectfully dissent,” or even the more
forceful “I dissent,” which is used to indicate sharp disagreement, he ends his dissent
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with another startling word choice that contains a veiled, barely discernible sexual
innuendo: “With each decision of ours that takes from the People a question properly
left to them—with each decision that is unabashedly based not on law, but on the
‘reasoned judgment’ of a bare majority of this Court—we move one step closer to
being reminded of our impotence” (9). The word “impotent” is an ambiguous word to
use at the end of a dissent to a landmark national ruling for same-sex marriage.
Obviously, Scalia is referring to the Court’s judicial over-reaching in the case, which
might result in a backlash against its opinions. After all, the Judiciary cannot enforce
its rulings; it depends on the Executive to do that; and it does not have the ability to
fund itself as Congress has the power of the purse. “Impotent” here also implies an
inability of Scalia’s masculine judicial persona to become at all interested in, excited,
aroused, at the prospect of same-sex marriage.
Alan Barth observes, “Judicial dissent … is, at its best, a form of prophecy in the
Biblical sense of the term. It reflects, at least on occasion, not only a protest against what
the dissenter deems error or injustice, but an Isaiahlike warning of unhappy
consequences. Like a seer, the dissenter sometimes peers into the future. He will be
accounted wise or foolish as the unfolding of events proves him right or wrong” (3).
Dissents and majorities speak to each other over time, sometimes decades or even
centuries later when a precedent is overturned or re-affirmed. Someone writing a dissent
can see his opinion become the majority rule of law years later.
To a certain extent, Justice Scalia has fashioned himself as a “prophet” since his
2003 dissent in Lawrence, when he wrote, “Today’s opinion is the product of a Court,
which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-
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called homosexual agenda…” (539 U.S. 558, 602). He warned in the dissent that the
Lawrence majority opinion would give rise to the legalization of same-sex marriage, and
indeed ten years later in Windsor he was partially vindicated at the Federal level when
DOMA was struck down. In turn, his 2013 dissent in Windsor warned that the majority
opinion would one day result in a fundamental right to same-sex marriage at both the
Federal and state level. Indeed, this came to pass two years later, to the day, in
Obergefell. Roberts might one day see his more dignified dissent become prophetic, in
the venerable tradition of dissenters like Justice Harlan, whose prescient dissent in Plessy
v. Ferguson (1896) was vindicated in the majority opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education (1954) that reversed Plessy. If a new President appoints strict constructionists
and the issues in Obergefell are revisited by the Court, Roberts could earn the status of
what Alan Barth labels a “prophet with honor.” In contrast, Scalia’s cantankerous
rhetoric reveals him to be the senex iratus character in comic drama: the irascible father
figure whose refusal of the marriage, voiced with “rages and threats,” is overcome in the
end.90
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Obergefell gives the decision its most salient
theatrical quality because his rhetoric amplifies the agonistic nature of the drama.
Taken in totality, the four separate dissents make it clear that the issue of same-sex
marriage in the United States is not fully resolved, despite the current legal ruling in
Obergefell. The legal decision is unstable and subject to future challenges, depending
on which political direction the country takes. The Court could be in a position to
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Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957), 172.
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address the issue at some point in the future, and will repeat its ritualized, theatrical
approach to legal performance.

Act IV and Chapter Conclusion: Obergefell goes Viral
The last Act of Obergefell is evocative of Kushner’s Angels in America, in
which the United States is envisioned as an expanding space that welcomes and
integrates LGBT citizens. Once it was issued, Obergefell’s ruling spread outward on
print, internet, television broadcast, and social media.91 Millions of people watched

Obergefell has already spawned literary reactions. Daniela Lapidous published “The SCOTUS Marriage
Decision, In Haiku.” Timothy McSweeney’s Internet Tendency. Web. Accessed 29 July 2015. Available at
http://www.mcsweeneys.net/articles/the-scotus-marriage-decision-in-haiku. Notice how Lapidous inverts
the order of majority and dissent; by starting with the dissents, she reveals them to be cranky legal
naysayers trumped by the circular logic of love in Kennedy’s opinion:
91

Roberts’ dissent:
I support you all
No, really, I do, but this
Isn’t our problem.
Alito’s dissent:
“Happiness is not
the point of marriage, fools. It’s
BABIES,” he whispered.
Thomas’ dissent:
“Liberty” – this word,
I do not think Locke means what
You think it means. Sigh.
Scalia’s dissent:
You’re not a poet,
Kennedy. And by the way,
Democracy’s dead.
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news reporters stand in front of the Supreme Court building to deliver the news. In
fact, many people began posting the majority opinion’s last paragraph, which
solemnized the marriages, on their Facebook pages and through Twitter and other
social media. Facebook circulated a tool that allowed users to give their profile picture
a rainbow background, and twenty-six million people did just that over the weekend.92
LGBT and allies turned their profile pictures rainbow-colored. Because many people
in 2015 spend several hours a day on social media like Facebook, it is significant that
they saw the rainbow theme become a visual motif of the weekend. The day ended
with the White House lighting up in rainbow colors, and many national and
international monuments following suit. That weekend, gay pride parades spread
throughout the country; the widespread use of the rainbow flag reinforced the rainbow
motif spreading through social media. In his book Anatomy of Criticism (1957),
Northrop Frye claims that “the movement of comedy is usually a movement from one
kind of society to another. … The appearance of this new society is frequently
signalized by some kind of party or festive ritual, which either appears at the end of the
play or is assumed to take place immediately afterward” (163). Large swaths of United
States culture enacted this literary trope of traditional comedy with the gay pride
parades and social media rainbow disseminations on the weekend following the
decision.

Kennedy’s majority decision:
Hark! Love is love, and
love is love is love is love.
It is so ordered.
“Facebook Rainbow Profiles Used by 26 Million.” CNN Money. CNN.com, 30 June 2015. Web. 23 July
2015.
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As the celebrations swept through the United States and around the world, the
ironic substructure of Obergefell simultaneously revealed a fractured and contentious
Court, whose majority opinion is legally tenuous because of the strong dissents.
(Brown v. Board of Education was a unanimous ruling, thus becoming much more
settled law.) As a result, a sizeable portion of the national community reacted with
dismay to the ruling.93 Turner observes, “redressive means are taken by those who
consider themselves or are considered the most legitimate or authoritative
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Obviously, the language in the dissents helped to fuel this opposition. In addition to the highly
circulated dissenting language I have been analyzing, Justices Alito and Thomas also contributed to the
cultural backlash. In his dissent, Justice Alito warned that Obergefell’s ruling “will be used to vilify
Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy” (Slip op. at 6). In the United States,
conservative groups and politicians had varied reactions to the ruling: some expressed disagreement with
the decision but vowed to respect the rule of law; others suggested the decision be ignored or overruled in
the future. Republican Presidential Candidates Mike Huckabee and Rick Santorum likened the decision to
the infamous 1857 Dred Scott decision that declared African Americans were not citizens as originally
intended in the Constitution. See Amy Davidson, “What does Marriage Equality have to do with Dred
Scott? The New Yorker, 8 July 2015. Web. 7 August 2015. See also Rod Dreher, “Democracy is Dying;
Persecution is Coming.” The American Conservative, 26 June 2015. Web. 7 August 2015: “The warnings
of the dissenting Justices about the radical challenge to our democracy, and the threats now faced by
religious believers, are absolutely chilling — and indeed, prophetic. This is not the end of something. For
Christians, because of the text of the decision and the means by which the Supreme Court majority arrived
at it, this is only the beginning of some very dark and difficult days. It is time to confront this soberly but
realistically, and prepare for the resistance.” Notice how Dreher characterizes the dissents as prophetic,
already imagining and preparing for a strategy of “resistance” that will result in Obergefell being overruled.
This reading of the case focuses on the dissents’ ironic substructure within the larger opinion in order to
emphasize different meanings in Obergefell’s overall text and performance.
Others chose more colorful language in protest, as catalogued in part, and mocked, by Rolling Stone: “the
anti-choice American Life League … issued a statement on the decision, declaring, ‘Our nation has become
like a dead body floating downstream, to what destination only the devil knows.’ Presidential hopeful Rick
Santorum argued that the Supreme Court had ruined the ‘foundational unit of society.’ (Unmarried people
don't belong to society? Who knew.) Tim Wildmon, president of the American Family Association, kept it
classy and called the decision ‘a spiritual 9/11.’ And Ted Cruz, another GOP presidential contender, noted
that Friday marked ‘some of the darkest 24 hours in our nation's history.’ Forget the Civil War or Pearl
Harbor. Americans getting marriage certificates — that's when things got really dark for our country.”
Amanda Marcotte, “5 Conservative Freakouts about Last Week’s Supreme Court Rulings. Rolling Stone,
29 June 2015. Web. 7 August 2015.
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representatives of the relevant community. Redress usually involves ritualized action,
whether legal (in formal or informal courts), religious … or military” (92). There are
“alternative solutions to the problem. The first is reconciliation of the conflicting
parties following judicial, ritual, or military processes; the second, consensual
recognition of irremediable breach, usually followed by the spatial separation of the
parties” (92). The opinion suggests that, using Victor Turner’s theory of social drama,
there is currently a “consensual recognition of irremediable breach” with regards to
same-sex marriage. The dissents argue that the nine Justices are absolutely not the
most authoritative representatives for this issue, but in terms of settling a matter of law,
they were given the last word, at least for now. 94 However, suspense is already
building for future Court vacancies, new Presidents who can appoint them, and the next
plaintiff who can set in motion another trial over this issue. 95 The social drama of
LGBT rights is not over and will continue in new permutations of legal theatre.
Through the interconnected workings of law and drama, some of the old
traumas inflicted on sexual minorities have been healed to a degree. Generally
speaking, the sodomy trials have morphed into the same-sex wedding rituals of the
twenty-first century, but these new rituals will be contested in the future. Despite its
apparent comedic structure and happy ending for supporters of marriage equality,
Obergefell has not fully resolved the social drama of LGBT rights, which will continue
in the United States. It would only take a particular President and several Supreme

Chief Justice Roberts asks in his dissent, “Just who do we think we are?” (3). Scalia writes, “to allow the
policy question of same-sex marriage to be considered and resolved by a select, patrician, highly
unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle even more fundamental than no taxation without
representation: no social transformation without representation” (6).
95
Justice Scalia passed away unexpectedly on February 13, 2016, leaving a vacancy on the Court and
initializing what could be a contentious nomination for his successor.
94

Barry 216
Court vacancies to put Obergefell and Lawrence in danger of being overturned. In
other words, Obergefell may well prove a continually contested decision, much as has
Roe v. Wade (1973). There will be new mutations of the Obergefell ritual in the years
to come: new challenges will emerge, different actors will engage with the issues, and
potentially surprising results will ensue. When the ritual is repeated again, drama and
law will work closely together to create a cultural narrative that attempts to understand
and contain the conflicts.
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